Dangerous thinking about WMATA

1. That the technology problem that led to the crash that killed 9 people was a technical problem not a management problem. The same problem had happened at least twice before but fortunately resulted in only close calls, no crash. Failure to deal with that was a management problem of catastrophic proportions.

From "Metro board members discuss Catoe, service, fares" in the Dr. Gridlock blog:

Catoe's legacy
Zimmerman: "He absolutely helped this agency." When people look back, they'll see that progress was made. We had an agency that was having a lot of problems three years ago. "Even in safety, tremendous progress was made."

Of the Red Line crash, still under federal investigation, he said, "I think we'll find it had nothing to do with management ... that it had to do with a piece of old equipment."

Frankly, I was surprised to read this. It is clear that the rail operations management had let a very very very serious problem fester and get much worse, to the point where trains crashed and people died.

When my computer crashes and I haven't backed up my hard disk this highlights a couple problems: (1) whether or not I maintained the computer; (2) whether or not I took notice of the warning signs of imminent crash; and (3) backed up my hard disk; (4) to prepare for the inevitable moment when the computer will break down and take all my data, programs, and photos with it.

I can't just blame the computer. I have a hand in not being prepared for failure or better yet, working to prevent the failure, or by being proactive eliminating the possibility of failure (from that potential problem anyway...).

Plus, the multi-year rebuffing of the recommendations of the Tri-State Oversight Commission is an indication of systemic managerial failures.

2. That the management issues with WMATA these days have to do with its transition from a construction and development organization (building and creating the original system) to a full time operator. (I don't have a quote handy, but I have seen this sentiment expressed in a number of outlets.)

The reality is that the rail system is projected to reach capacity in the next decade.

To address this, more capacity needs to be added.

It's also an economic and land use issue. For example, the separated blue line proposal wouldn't only add necessary and needed capacity and redundancy at the core of the system, it would also provide service to areas that would support high ridership levels, further improving transit and transit use, as well as significantly reducing vehicle use, especially in areas of particularly high congestion (such as Georgetown).

While getting WMATA's operations right are of fundamental importance, it would be a big mistake to jettison any possibility of significant expansion, which is important for many many reasons.

3. While I understand the sentiment of Jonetta Rose Barras, the Examiner columnist, that something must be done to improve WMATA on many dimensions ("Leaving the Metro station") looking to the federal government, expecting munificence and wisdom first of all, and second of all to save us--in this case, WMATA, is a losing proposition.

Congress runs against Washington. Congresspeople are here but they are not "of here." When asked to put money into their districts or to put money in Washington DC proper, for the most part, they will always choose their district, as the great AP story on the National Mall discussed ("the article" is discussed in this blog entry Let's Go to the Mall).