Back from the Brink, an oral history of the introduction and implementation of Broken Windows theory policing in New York City

I have been remiss in reviewing Back from the Brink, the book by Peter Moskos that is an oral history of the New York City Police Department during the Bratton period, where new strategies and tactics were introduced to suppress crime in significantly measurable ways.  (I first mentioned the book last September, in "Murder rate in Chicago is bad: "correct" applications of broken window policing.")

Unfortuately, I have a bad habit of if I don't write the review as soon as I read the book, I'm not likely to get back to it, partly because I have another bad habit of writing my notes on various different pieces of paper, some get mislaid etc.

But the review of the book by Michael Fortner, a professor at Claremont McKenna College in Washington Monthly, "How New York City Got Safe: A historical reconstruction of the Big Apple’s crime decline, told from inside the institutions responsible for public safety," reminds me that it is important to do so.

A New York Subway car before Broken Windows policing practice was introduced in the late 1980s.

Fortner covers the book pretty well, but I think he misses some points.  

I lived in DC during the bad times in the 80s and 90s, and am a fervent believer in broken windows policing theory.  

In general, especially in progressive academia, it has a bad rep because most departments interpreted it as "zero tolerance policing" with a lack of focus on major crimes and the creation of a siege mentality by arresting people for the least transgression, like an unbuckled seatbelt (also see "Looking Through Broken Windows: The Impact of Neighborhood Disorder on Aggression and Fear of Crime Is an Artifact of Research Design" Annual Review of Criminology, "Why the Fraudulent 'Broken Windows' Theory of Policing Refuses to Die," Current Affairs).

What I got out of Moskos book are a few key things.  

First, the interviews make clear that Bratton and the top people believed that crime could be suppressed.  CompStat was about (re)focusing police time towards proactiveness.  "Cops on Dots" -- putting cops where crime is occurring--as some people called it.

Although as Fortner quotes one commander, it was a philosophy.  Moskos cites a cop talking about how they had a problem with bike-based robberies in his precinct and how it was addressed.  But others took out of CompStat meetings about their approach that they should "arrest more bicyclists" rather than analyze whether or not bicycles were used repetitively in perpetrating crime.

Bratton's team believed that by addressing pattern crime, and arresting perpetrators crime would drop.  

While generally, the police department wasn't focused on "broken windows" or improving public spaces per se, the application of focused policing on the subway system was complemented by a refurbishment of subway stations and subway cars--not just buying new equipment--but by addressing graffiti, etc.

The book gives you a great picture of the effort and how it was incremental, building on each success, or adjusting after failure.  I really got a sense of the breadth and depth of the effort and the spirit of experimentation.  

The idea of "moving the success of broken windows from underground/the subways" to above ground wasn't just about the CompStat tracking system and delving deeply into crime patterns, precinct by precinct.  It was about making improvements in crime reduction and physical improvements very visible, which in turn led to more support for the Broken Windows Approach.

Two stories in particular cover the integration of policing with public space improvement were the campaigns to significantly improve the  Port Authority Bus Terminal and Bryant Park (although the program to improve BP began before the Bratton period of policing).  

People didn't used to go to Bryant Park, day or night.  Now it hums with activity.

But as the president of the subway system told Bratton during his interview "if we don't fix stations and subway trains in association with better policing people won't take the train," the success of Bryant Park likely would have taken much longer to come to fruition without better, focused policing in public parks and Bryant Park in particular.

Another element of public space improvement at the time had nothing to do with policing, but with the creation of business improvement districts, funded by local property tax surcharges, these groups provided extranormal cleaning services, public space improvements and monitoring (Jane Jacobs style "eyes on the street") in places like Times Square and around Penn Station.

And the proof is in the pudding.  Sure multiple cities had significant crime drops starting in the late 1990s.  But eg DC versus NYC.  NYC had a 75% drop in homicides, DC 38%.  I'm sure this quantum difference in results between NYC and other cities was across the board in other crime categories.

Living in DC at the time, there weren't many broken windows approaches, but there was a focus on involving neighborhood groups, the way that Patrick Sharkey in Uneasy Peace attributes some of the fall in crime during that period to civic and collective action ("George Kelling, co-creator of the "Broken WIndows" thesis, dies," 2019).

I myself participated in one such neighborhood group that was started in response to a major drug distribution area, and over (a long) time the problem was cured.  

Cops came to monthly meetings, problems were discussed, there were occasional walks with police and elected officials, etc.  (I also did small BW experiments in my neighborhood, with litter pick up and measurement of its impact on certain streets and in bus shelters.)

A blog reader once made the point that as crime dropped, maybe stop and frisk was in part a response of needing something to do, but with the lack of restraints applied during the post Bratton Guiliani years (although Bratton in his later stint did support stop and frisk; later he recanted) it became a big problem.  

Obviously, Stop and Frisk was proven to be not productive.  Unlike the value of arresting fare jumpers and checking them for outstanding warrants, an early initiative of Bratton's on the subway system, less than 2% of the people stopped under Stop and Frisk had outstanding warrants.  

They were stopping people without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and it showed in the data.  Whereas fare jumping is a crime, and jumpers often perpetrate other crimes, on the subway system and off it.

So for me, the biggest issue with BW is that it hasn't really been applied in a true fashion in very many places.  And with how the Bratton people were pushed out by Giuliani, my lesson from DC is that you can't ever stop being vigilant when it comes to crime and order versus disorder.  Once disorder returns it's hard to reverse.

The rise in social justice concerns, deserved somewhat in response to structural racism, as crime dropped and fewer elected officials and academics had direct experience of the mess of disorder during the worst of 1990s, did lead to a rise in crime in places like DC ("The Coming D.C. Crime Boomerang," Atlantic), as crime decriminalization was seen by perpetrators not as a social justice move to help them because they were "driven to crime because of life circumstances," but as a signal to commit more crime (see the argument, by extension here, "The role of physical environment in the ‘broken windows’ theory," University of Chicago)

BART's new fare gates, seen at the Coliseum station in 2025, have generated more money for the transit agency. Lea Suzuki/S.F. Chronicle

BART and fare gates. Recently there was a super interesting BW finding in SF with BART stations with new fare evasion resistant gates ("BART’s long fight against fare evasion is finally paying off. Here’s how much," San Francisco Chronicle).  

Not only did rider attitudes improve, ridership and fare revenue grew, and instances of vandalism dropped significantly.  Like Bratton said, turnstile jumpers commit other crimes.  If they aren't on the subway because they didn't pay, well, then there is less likelihood for vandalism of subway infrastructure.

Note that NYC and DC subways ("Metro’s new, higher faregates reducing fare evasion by more than 70 percent"), and St. Louis and Minneapolis light rail ("Transit safety and security: Broken Windows theory and reality | and the state of transit safety today," 2023) are also implementing new fare gates to reduce fare evasion.

Playgrounds and cafes were some of the positive use spaces added to the area.   Photo:  Jessie Cooper and Justin Roth embrace on a swing at a playground at Civic Center in San Francisco, California, on Sunday, Oct. 21, 2018. Gabrielle Lurie / The Chronicle

Revival of BART's Civic Center station.  Predating the fare gate program, the BART Civic Center Station became a center for nuisance and crime including drug dealing, where the main two block "entryway" to the station became a gauntlet where drug dealing, loitering, and quality of life offenses blossomed..  

Above-ground, the City of San Francisco invested in improving the public realm on those two blocks and beyond, adding new facilities and refurbishment to encourage more positive use of the space, while below ground BART made complementary station-specific improvements.  

Media coverage of the project makes clear that the effort involved police and multiple other partners including philanthropy, physical interventions and ongoing programming ("SF Civic Center’s new vision: soccer fields, shaded gardens and people," "SF Civic Center — cleaner and safer — now a place to play and have a bite," "Rejuvenating SF Civic Center Plaza: a challenge beyond design," San Francisco Chronicle). 

While the area’s transformation remains a work in progress, the differences are stark. In addition to two new playgrounds that cost $10 million, the space hosts a growing number of public events, including outdoor concerts, art installations and food-truck gatherings. A winter park — complete with a 6,000-square-foot ice rink — is set to open next month.

BART has developed a station modernization program equally focused on reducing public safety issues.

The Station Modernization Program focuses on increasing safety, capacity, sustainability, appearance, and enhancing the customer experience: 

• Vibrancy-- Reflect the energy of the surrounding community and enhance the station’s existing strengths 
• Connectivity – Strengthen multi-modal and universal access to the station and promote a safe and comfortable customer experience 
•  Sustainability – Incorporate sustainable materials and technologies into the station to increase the life-cycle value of the station’s infrastructure and to conserve natural resources and protect the public investment. 

Residents hope a similar program can be developed to improve the environment and public safety elements at the 16th Street-Mission Station ("Can BART bring a Civic Center-style revival to another dilapidated S.F. station?," SFC).   But in contrast to the Civic Center project, they seem to be focusing more on BART, and less on engaging other agencies into creating a broader response.

There not thinking either multiplicatively, nor in terms of below ground versus above-ground improvements.

 “If you really think about it, this is the living room of the Mission,” he said. “And the BART station is the front door. The first impression you have of the neighborhood is coming through the fare gate and up that escalator.”

As discussed in the 2013 entry "Transit, stations, and placemaking: stations as entrypoints into neighborhoods," transit stations are entry points--porches or living rooms--to neighborhoods.  While transit systems typically don't plan them that way, it is a responsibility that goes beyond the transit agency, and should require ongoing coordination and planning with the local jurisdiction.

Managing to prevent disorder is an ongoing process.  The final lesson with BW in NYC is that it requires constant vigilance too.  That it's hard to maintain because people get burned out.  But also when elected officials want the credit, they push out the top cops who bring the changes about.  That definitely happened in NYC.  Most of the top implementers of BW at NYPD were gone within a few years of Bratton's departure.  Although fortunately, further down the ranks were commanders, inspectors, and captains who had been (re)trained to the approach, embedded the precepts, and continued to implement the BW approach of proactive crime suppression.

Covid-related uptick in crime.  Although yes, things tipped the other way during the covid pandemic, in NYC and nationally "Explaining the COVID Violence Spike and the Roaring Crime Decline").  Although today, in most places reported crime including murders, has dropped significantly.

Police officers and detectives enter the crime scene area where a 9-year-old boy was fatally shot. Photo: John J. Kim, Chicago Tribune

Chicago.  Chicago is an outlier nationally, in that the city that has continued to have high murder rates, although they are dropping, despite purportedly adopting BW approaches ("End-of-Year Analysis: Chicago Crime Trends," U of Chicago Crime Lab).   More recently, the city has had success with crime reductions in association with community intervention programs.

In a past blog entry, I opined that they probably aren't doing BW very well, have many high profile negative incidents that indicate systemic problems with management, and that a high rate of financial settlements for police misconduct, fatal errors, etc. indicates, from a risk management standpoint, that they have a serious crime problem.  Although more recently, like Baltimore ("Baltimore Mayor Brandon Scott discusses how the city has brought violent crime down," NPR, "Baltimore has cut homicides by almost 60 percent in five years," Washington Post) they seem to be having effect with violence interruption programs.

Also see:

"The federal help Chicago really needs," Crain's Chicago Business

At the University of Chicago Crime Lab, we have spent over fifteen years studying which interventions actually reduce gun violence and maximize the impact of government spending. We think we’ve found a clear path forward: Build the capacity of police commanders managing jurisdictions with the highest rates of violence. The Policing Leadership Academy has a simple premise — treat policing as a profession using the formula that has had tremendous success for private sector companies: investing in people’s leadership and management skills.

Also see "Policing and management," NBER, which makes the point about how the use of management time shapes outcomes positively or negatively.

Murder rate in Chicago is bad: "correct" applications of broken window policing

 

I can't remember where I came across a mention of the new book by Peter Moskos, a professor at CUNY's John Jay College, Back from the Brink, which is an oral history interviewing various police and other people involved in developing in the early 1990s, "the system" of focused policing on improving place and suppressing crime in New York City, which became a national best practice for reduction in crime and policing, and a shining light leading to the resurgence in interest in urban living--most major cities began adding population in the 2000s because city living was perceived to be cool, but also safe.

I was so intrigued I bought a copy right away, forgetting I could probably get a review copy for free.

It's a slow read only because there are so many lessons to be drawn from the examples of what people did to bring down crime, and how they improved quality of life in New York City, leading to the city's "revival" in rising population, commerce, new construction, and tourism.

I used to say, after reading William Bratton's second autobiography, The Profession: A Memoir of Policing in America, that the New York City subway system was the only place that true "broken windows" policing ("Broken Windows," Atlantic) was implemented, to great success.

Many academics and advocates deride the theory, saying it didn't improve places, that it led to over-incarceration, etc.  

The reality is that what most people call "broken windows" is effectuated by police departments as "zero tolerance policing" where they arrest people for the most minor crimes.  By contrast, BW arrests when the effect can be multiplicative, in that turnstile jumpers tend to commit other crimes, when people not wearing their seatbelts tends to not be associated with criminal activity.

More and more research finds the "broken windows" approach to be successful.

So I'm reading the book, slowly, preparing to write a blog entry about lessons, but it's spurring me to buy more "old books" on the topic such as Crime Fighter about Jack Maple, Disorder and Deviance--after the BW theory was devised this book looks to better define what disorder looks like, and Bleeding Out. by a University of Maryland professor, about community organization ground up initiatives aimed at reducing violence.

Maybe I'll include them all in one big entry, maybe not.

Once the NYC subway was "cleaned up," police and stakeholders wanted to bring the concept of place-based improvement policing "up to the surface."  Bryant Park was first.  Then the Port Authority Bus Terminal.  Then Times Square.  These were the anchors that helped to create a critical mass of improvement, developing critical mass, leading to even more widespread improvements.

When I was in the process of buying other books, I noticed that the author of the book on disorder, who is based at Northwestern, has a lot of books about the "success" of community policing in Chicago.  I'd say that the number of police-involved killings, the hundred millions of dollars of judgements the city pays out each year, and the persistent level of crime indicates that community policing hasn't worked.

National Guard federal law enforcement accosting a guy on a bench in a park, Washington, DC.  Reddit photo.

Bloomberg reports, "Eight Dead, 58 Shot in Chicago Fuel Trump’s Troop Threats," on an especially high rate of violence in Chicago over Labor Day weekend, and how it gives Trump justification for his threats to put "federal law enforcement" in the city, the way he has in DC ("What a great headline (about Trump's takeover of the city police department in Washington DC) | and more on disorder").  

(Note that federal court ruled that the entry of federal law enforcement in Los Angeles, was illegal, "Trump deployment of military troops to Los Angeles was illegal, judge rules in blistering opinion, Los Angeles Times).

The fact is that DC and Chicago are great examples of not applying broken windows principles to policing and/or public safety, and having persistent crime as a result.  

In DC, it's a failure to focus on youth, their participation in crime including murder, car jacking, armed robberies, assaults, and what precipitates it ("Empty desks: How the District’s failure to curb truancy in middle schools fueled the biggest youth crime surge in a generation.," Washington Post).  FWIW, Washington Post columnist Colbert King has been writing about this problem since the 1990s.

Another book in my queue to read, Unforgiving Places The Unexpected Origins of American Gun Violence. I learned about it from the Atlantic article, "Are We Thinking About Gun Violence All Wrong?."  Also see, "What We Get Wrong About Violent Crime," New Yorker.

Decades ago in the 1990s I was thinking about moving to Chicago, so I subscribed to Chicago Magazine for a bit.  

I remember a couple articles focusing on crime in that city, on the areas where it was worst, and how a relatively small number of perpetrators were responsible for a preponderance of crime.  (These articles are more recent: "The Truth About Chicago’s Crime Rates," "The Truth About Chicago's Crime Rates: Part 2," "New Tricks," Chicago Magazine).

I can't find that article without going to a place with a microfilm copy, but the New Yorker review of the book discusses that concept:

... research—from criminologists like David Weisburd and Lawrence W. Sherman—showed that, in city after city, crime was hyperconcentrated. A handful of blocks accounted for a disproportionate share of violence, and those blocks stayed violent, year after year. In other words, the problem wasn’t people. It was place.

Recognition that there were high crime areas, and the need to focus on those areas, while developing effective strategies for reducing crime, not just reacting to it, is the basis of broken windows policing.

I'm not sure what's happening in Chicago.  When I was on grand jury duty a decade ago, one of the people on the jury was from Chicago and she opined that the closure of various housing projects redistributed criminal activity into different areas, leading to turf wars.

Clearly Chicago isn't doing it, and their community policing strategy wasn't focused on the most important elements ("Civic heavyweights push CPD to rethink community policing strategy," Crain's Chicago Business)., Operationalizing Community Policing Within The Chicago Police Department, CP Solutions, "Homicide, Social Efficacy, and Poverty in Chicago," Chicago Magazine).

Also see:

-- "Chicago's Poor Neighborhoods: Everything Deserts," Chicago Magazine
-- "Is Chicago an Outlier? Organizational Density in Poor Urban Neighborhoods," University of Chicago

======

Also see, included within many links to past entries, "Redefining what public safety means: Community Safety Partnership, Los Angeles."

======

-- Restore the Core: A citizen's guide to building a livable Washington, DC

I lived in DC for almost 15 years before I started getting involved in civic affairs.  I did so believing if I didn't, nothing would change.  

I did have good timing.  Around then a desire to live in cities began to build.  And crime was dropping.  Neighborhood specifics was one of my foci.  

The other, "smart growth," and the report from the local Sierra Club chapter that I picked up at the Adams Morgan Festival definitely spurred me into involvement.  Before that I had been interested in urban issues, bought and read books, read the Washington Post and the New York Times, etc.  But I was an observer.

One of my first involvements was a local community group that was focused on the community sure, but especially on crime.  

The group was called Near Northeast Citizens Against Crime and Drugs and it was spearheaded by a firebrand "old lady," Loree Murray ("A Woman who won't sit still for it" and "Fought D.C. Cocaine Epidemic" Washington Post).  This area was right in the center of Rayful Edmond's crack distribution operation ("Rayful Edmond was no victim," Washington Post).  She lived around the corner from it, while I lived about 5 blocks away, in an area still affected by it.

This was the kind of community organization that Patrick Sharkey says in Uneasy Peace: The Great Crime Decline, the Renewal of City Life, and the Next War on Violence, that helped to bring crime down.

In 2003, I ended up getting featured in the Post, "on a slow news day," on the overconcentration of liquor stores in my neighborhood ("Neighbors fight single beer sales").  The photo in my blog profile is from that story.

This kind of overconcentration elsewhere had been associated with significant crime increases ("Alcoholic beverage sales restrictions moving forward in Seattle," 2006).

Ironically, later I opposed a reflexive opposition to taverns and restaurants with liquor licenses, believing it would help revitalize the lagging commercial district, stating there was a big difference between liquor stores and restaurants ("Restaurants and liquor licenses--How much is too much on H Street?," 2005).  Of course, my position was the correct position.

Like a lot of issues, policing gets all mucked up in politics.  The way forward has been shown.  It's just that in most jurisdictions, that's not what police want to do, especially in Chicago ("The federal help Chicago really needs," "A tough truth about police management in Chicago," Crain's Chicago Business).

Proof of Broken Windows theory in Philadelphia and New York City

Broken Windows theory ("Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," Atlantic Magazine, 1982) posits that communities where there are vacant buildings, litter, abandoned cars etc. communicate that it's okay to commit crime.  Unfortunately, there are few examples of its implementation, as police departments did mostly "zero tolerance policing" calling it community policing.  

New York City did data-based policing, but still not community investment, and it was very successful in reducing the crime rate.  But as crime dropped police needed stuff to do, and Giuliani was more of a hard ass, so they moved to Zero Tolerance Policing--stop and frisk.

And so there is a huge contingent of progressives and academics who argue that Broken Windows is b.s.

Broken windows successfully implemented on the NYC Subway in the early 1990s. One of the only places Broken Windows was implemented truly was the NYC Subway system under David Gunn, and transit police chief William Bratton.  

It's discussed in Bratton's second autobiography, The Profession: A Memoir of Community, Race, and the Arc of Policing in America ("Bill Bratton Explains His Ideas of Good Policing," New York Times).

During his interview for chief, Gunn took him around the system.  Gunn said we can fix the trains, eliminate graffiti on them (which is why miscreants now use acid to etch cars and windows), and run them on time, but if people have to experience chaos in the stations, they won't ride.

Broken windows theory in action.  An op-ed in the Philadelphia Inquirer, "Home repairs decrease gun violence in Philadelphia," references research done at University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University that found investing in fixing up abandoned properties led to significant neighborhood improvements including a marked reduction in gun violence.

From the article:

One study of Philadelphia’s Basic Systems Repair Program found that when even one home on a block received repairs, there was a 21.9% decrease in homicide rates. And the more home repairs a block received, the more homicide rates fell. The data reflect what we already know: When people’s basic need for a safe, stable home is met, it decreases violence in our neighborhoods. 

But that message isn’t getting through to our local government. As we talked to close to 200 Grays Ferry residents, the stories poured in. Many residents have applied for home repair programs — for plumbing, roofing, weatherization, insulation, and other renovations — but haven’t heard back, have been denied, or have had to wait many years. Philly residents need home repairs, and we know home repairs are a key part of reducing violence, so why isn’t our city making them more accessible? It is literally lifesaving work to keep longtime Black residents in their homes ... 

Our Council member, Kenyatta Johnson, is now also Council president, and he has enormous power to protect affordable housing in his district and beyond. We need him to work with community advocates to pass citywide policies that prioritize low-income housing and opt the 2nd District into the mixed-income neighborhood overlay, which would require housing developers to ensure 20% of their units are affordable. 

 -- "Fighting blight by fixing up homes could bring down Philly gun violence, new study shows," WHYY/NPR
-- "Abandoned house repairs reduced nearby gun violenceAbandoned house repairs reduced nearby gun violence," Penn Today (2023)
-- "Urban Blight Remediation as a Cost-Beneficial Solution to Firearm Violence: A Citywide Cluster Randomized Trial," Journal of the American Medical Association (2022)
-- "Urban Blight Remediation as a Cost-Beneficial Solution to Firearm Violence," American Journal of Public Health (2016)

==== 

Past blog entries include:

-- "George Kelling, co-creator of the "Broken WIndows" thesis, dies" (2019)
-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 1, theory and practice," 2016 (references the speech by Ronald Clarke upon receiving the Stockholm Prize in Criminology)
-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 2, what to do"
-- "Night-time safety: rethinking lighting in the context of a walking community," 2014
-- Crime prevention through environmental design and repeated burglaries at the Naylor Gardens apartment complex," 2013

Social urbanism is a related concept to Broken Windows, first introduced in Medillín, Columbia, which during the program experienced a 90% drop in the number of murders.

-- "Experiments in Social Urbanism"
-- "'Social urbanism' experiment breathes new life into Colombia's Medellin Toronto Globe & Mail
-- "Medellín's 'social urbanism' a model for city transformation," Mail & Guardian
-- "Medellín slum gets giant outdoor escalator," Telegraph
-- "Medellín, Colombia offers an unlikely model for urban renaissance," Toronto Star

I've written about ways to implement it in the US.

-- "Social urbanism and equity planning as a way to address crime, violence, and persistent poverty: (not in) DC" (2021)
-- "Creating 'community safety partnership neighborhood management programs as a management and mitigation strategy for public nuisances: Part 3 (like homeless shelters)" (2020)

Transit safety and security: Broken Windows theory and reality | and the state of transit safety today

Liverpool Echo photo.

When I was in Liverpool in June of 2018, I was really surprised at how many security personnel were present at the Downtown transit stations, at the entrances and on the platforms, all wearing bright yellow vests, because the system seemed pretty safe, that safety wasn't an issue.  

-- MerseyTravel TravelSafe Partnership

MerseyTravel also has a teen "officer" program and an adopt a station program.  One adopter was 12 years old when he started ("Merseyside railway station adopter is just 12 years old," RailAdvent)

Same with one of the main Metro stations in Los Angeles when I rode that system a few years ago. Lots of police but at the time, they seemed unnecessary.

William Bratton, the former police commissioner for New York City, is attributed as the leading proponent of the "Broken Windows" theory of policing ("Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety," Atlantic Magazine) which posits that visible disorder in communities--broken windows on empty buildings, abandoned buildings and cars, litter etc.--left unaddressed communicates that it's okay to commit crime.  Addressing this is both a police issue and a community investment issue.  

He didn't ever come across the theory of social urbanism, but that's a good approach to implementation of the ideas of community investment ("Social urbanism and equity planning as a way to address crime, violence, and persistent poverty: (not in) DC," 2021) also different ways of serving the community ("Los Angeles police department "Community Safety Partnership," 2014).

In his second autobiography, The Profession: A Memoir of Policing in America, Bratton discusses interviewing for the New York Transit police chief job (which was the stepping stone to commissioner).  He was taken on a tour of the subway system by David Gunn, the president.  

Gunn showed him the disorder in the stations, and said "we can fix the trains and improve service but if this is the way people come into and enter the system, they'll never come back and ride the trains" (paraphrase).

Famously, this environment was addressed by Gunn and Bratton and the subway system was revitalized ("Bill Bratton Explains His Ideas of Good Policing," New York Times).  From the review:

Bratton took over the city’s transit police in 1990, at a time when the transit system was at a low point. Crime was rampant on the subways; the cars were covered with graffiti; riders were sneaking through turnstiles. Bratton implemented a strategy of “quality of life” policing, derived in large part from the “broken windows” theory advanced by the social scientists George Kelling and James Q. Wilson. Controlling minor offenses, they argued, restored a sense of security, and identified petty criminals likely to graduate to more serious crimes. The strategy seemed to work better than even Bratton could have predicted. In less than two years, robberies on the transit network were down 40 percent and crime as a whole was down 22 percent. It was such a striking — and unexpected — success that when the job of New York police commissioner opened up in 1994, when Bratton was back in Boston, there really was no other logical choice for it.

But thinking about this later, I think Bratton's policing approach on NYC Transit is the only example of actual implementation of a Broken Windows approach of investment in the facilities and service improvements--which are the facilities that present the potential for disorder in a transit system--and enhanced policing in the stations.

When Bratton became police commissioner they didn't do Broken Windows, they did "Data Oriented Policing" now he calls this Precision Policing, focused on addressing crime and the use of police time based on geodemographic analysis of crime data within precincts.

Later he was fired because Mayor Guiliani didn't like how much attention that Bratton got by the press and public, and the policing strategy changed from data based to what is called Zero Tolerance Policing, which could be pretty oppressive and didn't engage the community.  As crime dropped and police needed things to do, this was implemented in communities of color as "stop and frisk" which was later found unconstitutional.

Other police departments implemented forms of data based policing but mostly zero tolerance.  The alternative approaches community policing or problem-oriented policing--a mix of Broken Windows and precision policing--were pretty much ignored.

The state of transit safety today.  The media is full of reports of serious safety problems on transit networks--murders, assaults, and other terrible crimes.  Drug use--a few days ago BART had three overdose deaths on the system in one day.  And other problems like homelessness, panhandling, mental health issues, etc.

Crime increased during covid, although it is trending down.  But commensurate with the decline in transit use--the big systems have about 50% of the ridership they had pre-covid--there are fewer "eyes on the street" and a lot more problems reducing the likelihood of people returning to transit.

This was accentuated by the pre-covid social justice movement which led to some cities like DC and NYC decriminalizing fare evasion.

At the time many transit advocates including myself were opposed, because of the sense that it would denigrate a sense of responsibility towards the public good of transit.  Plus the findings during Bratton's time that fare beaters often committed other crimes on the system.

I read a lot of posts and comments on social media about transit system safety, and online media ("Metro gets earful from callers about safety, service, homeless on buses, trains," "Metro riders speak out about crime, drug use and homeless on transit system," "Survey says: Fewer females ride LA Metro buses and trains, many citing safety and harassment," Los Angeles Daily News).  

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA – JANUARY 31: BART Crisis Intervention Specialists Ontreal Wiltz, left, and Morey Deundra Moore, center, talk with a man at the Fruitvale Station on Tuesday, Jan. 31, 2023, in Oakland, Calif. The BART transit agency is venturing into the area of homeless services to deal with an ever worsening homelessness crisis on trains, and in stations. (Aric Crabb/Bay Area News Group)

Some systems have responded with ambassadors as opposed to more police, which are more costly ("LA Metro’s ‘Transit Ambassadors’ offer alternative to armed officers," Los Angeles Daily News).  Many systems are adding fare-focused ambassadors ("Sound Transit fare ambassadors are checking if you paid, but nicely," Seattle Times).

Most systems have personnel devoted to address homeless issues, including social workers.  BART recently hired a couple dozen more people to work on this ("A transit agency is taking on the Bay Area homelessness crisis," San Jose Mercury News), transit ambassadors and crisis intervention specialists.

Safety on transit definitely is top of mind for many potential riders, especially those people predisposed against mass transit--hence the rise of ride hailing (Uber, Lyft) which on a per trip basis is much more expensive, but more convenient as it usually is a point to point trip.

Hardening fare turnstiles.  In response to the decriminalization, severe loss of revenue, and crime on the system, major subway systems like NYC and DC are installing new types of fare gates which make turnstile jumping more difficult.

St. Louis is enclosing its light rail stations making them controlled access to rebuild confidence in the system.  Light rail systems are known for mostly having open platforms.  Unlike subway stations, where you have to pay before you can enter, on light rail it's more the honor system, with open access.

The Minneapolis Star-Tribune published a series on how to improve public safety on the light rail network in Greater Minneapolis:

-- "Systemic insecurity: Saving Twin Cities light rail"
-- "The safety-first effort in St. Louis: 'We had a problem to solve'"
-- "Light rail in the Twin Cities: We have a problem to solve"
-- "Eight recommendations for Twin Cities light rail"

In response the St. Louis Metrolink system commissioned a Metro Security Assessment and Strategy study.  The final report listed 99 improvement recommendations, in four categories: technology improvements; security staffing; procedures and training; and fare enforcement.  Right now more safety personnel visible on trains and other changes have been implemented, and they are implementing creating restricted access platforms

From the St. Louis article (paragraphs reordered):

... Every aspect of operations was reexamined with an eye toward keeping passengers safe. Then, because Roach felt more was needed to rebuild trust in the system, he resurrected an earlier proposal to physically secure the platforms. By spring 2024, the first four stations should be complete.

--- Metro St. Louis Secure Platform Program 

The light-rail system in the St. Louis area is second only to that in the Twin Cities area as the largest in the Midwest, with two lines and 38 stations that span two states. Like the Twin Cities, St. Louis also faced issues with rising crime and declining ridership that predated the pandemic. 

After a series of violent crimes, leaders here took decisive action starting in 2018. They zeroed in on one element above all else: rider safety. The overhaul that followed changed the city's entire approach, with a single-minded, unapologetic, safety-first mindset that has resulted in a far more visible security presence, from police and other staff on trains to better use of technology. 

The final phase is in progress now: a potentially groundbreaking conversion from the open "honor" system, like the one used in the Twin Cities, to one in which gates and fences ensure that only paid passengers have access to platforms and trains. The $52 million project includes a rarity in transit: a public/private partnership in which major downtown corporations are putting up $10 million to help fund the conversion.

... Roach touched on a point that should resonate with Minnesotans. "As we looked through the arc of what we needed to accomplish, it was confidence in the system," he said. "This is a publicly supported system, so I need folks even out in the suburbs, who may not ever take light rail, to still understand it has value. Like any Midwestern community, they want to know that it's fair and that it's safe. We decided if we could make a bold step like [secured platforms], we could really change the reality and perception of this system." The system, he said, is one in which "the public has invested millions. And they were asking us to rethink public safety."

The Star-Tribune recommends that Minneapolis go to a restricted access system for the light rail system.  According to surveys, Minneapolis Metro residents want improvements in public safety and fare enforcement.  And Minneapolis Metro has installed thousands of cameras in facilities and on trains, has a homeless intervention program, and transit ambassadors to add more eyes on the street in the system.

From "Eight recommendations for Twin Cities light rail":

• Adopt a single-minded focus on passenger safety
• Reject a piecemeal approach to safety issues
• Enclose stations as both a symbol and a strategy
• Rely on professionals to bolster security
• Step up fare compliance efforts
• Take a different approach to homelessness
• Adopt and publicize a new code of conduct that clearly and concisely spells out passenger behavior standards and consequences for violators
• Provide the public with a better online dashboard.

That's a pretty good agenda, basically it's a "Fixing Broken Windows" approach.  Also see "Criminology and the Fundamental Attribution Error," a speech by Ronald Clarke on the acceptance of the Stockholm Prize in Criminology (2015).

One that WMATA ought to pay attention to as well.

Other options.  Maybe not every station needs to be access controlled.  Thinking about it, I'd create a typology of stations based on crime statistics.  Maybe every station doesn't need restricted access, but certain stations, especially in the center city, do.

A tent city in front of Washington's Union Station last year before the National Park Service cleared the homeless encampment. (Michael S. Williamson/The Washington Post)

Addressing homelessness.  And the Post has an interesting article about how Amtrak at DC's Union Station has contracted with nonprofit organizations to work with homeless in the station catchment area on moving to permanent housing, getting necessary services, etc. ("Can we solve homelessness? A program at Union Station is a huge step").  

Note that I used to think this kind of program was innovative, but now I think of it as an indicator of system failure in terms of addressing the homelessness issue.  When libraries, parks, and transit systems are spending millions of dollars addressing the ramifications of homelessness on their facilities, it demonstrates an offloading of the problem to other agencies.

Conclusion.  For public agencies that are customer facing every moment they operate, perhaps transit systems are the most likely to execute true Broken Windows policing strategies.  When implemented such approaches see results.  Which ought to be a lesson to police departments and elected officials deal with policing and problems and disorder in their communities.

I hope they installed cameras: Illegal dumping cleanup in Oakland, California

According to the San Francisco Chronicle ("Dramatic before and after photos show Oakland street cleanup") a cleanup of a 2.5 mile stretch between Permain Street and Douglas Avenue in Oakland, California, a street that repetitively experiences illegal dumping involved 135 volunteers who removed 24 tons of refuse in a five hour effort.

It was organized by the Alameda County Illegal Dumping Pilot which is:

a six month-long endeavor to end illegal dumping regionally. Through education (teaching school children, landlords, and businesses about the dumping issue), eradication (sending out clean-up crews), and enforcement (cracking down on illegal dumpers), they hope to create a permanent shift in people's behavior.

While I think education and such is important, and it does reduce dumping by the small grouping of people who listen, as well as by making legal dumping easier, the best way to address illegal dumping is cameras, enforcement, big fines, and community service focused on making the people clean up the places they've soiled.

That's what they're doing with great effect in St. Louis ("Foc used ways to deal with illegal dumping: camera-based enforcement," 2018).

George Kelling, co-creator of the "Broken WIndows" thesis, dies

I'd been taking a break from the computer for the last couple weeks and during that time, Professor George Kelling, co-creator of the "Broken Windows" approach to order/disorder/crime, died.

-- "George L. Kelling, a Father of 'Broken Windows' Policing, Is Dead at 83," New York Times
-- "George Kelling: A Visionary of Public Order," City Journal

I was reminded of Kelling by a new article in The Atlantic, "Did Cellphones Bring Down Crime Rates in the '90s?," hypothesizing that one of the reasons for the crime drop in the 1990s was due to the impact of cell phones on drug sales by making them less turf (geographically) specific, reminds me.

Kelling wrote with James Q. Wilson, based on an experiment in Newark, New Jersey, where they figured out that disinvested property (houses, cars, etc.) contributed to more disinvestment and in turn, crime. By "fixing broken windows" crime escalation was dampened.

-- "Broken Windows," The Atlantic, 1982
-- "Making Neighborhoods Safe," The Atlantic, 1989

The cell phone thesis is interesting, because I am not completely sold on the hypothesis that much of the crime drop was due to increased citizen involvement, such as that laid out by Patrick Sharkey in Uneasy Peace, which has its roots in "collective efficacy" theory. Yes, that helped. But it wasn't enough.

Guns and bullets often trump protest.

Unfortunately, in practice "Broken Windows" became what is called "Zero Tolerance Policing," which makes sense at some level because police officers are trained to use force, not be "Civic Action Officers" (cf. military pacification programs).

And even the earliest interpretations of the writings focused on the policing aspect rather than  dealing with disinvestment/nuisances.


Anti-policing initiatives haven't taken hold as much in DC compared to other cities, although there is a current schism between the police department and the Executive branch in DC versus the legislative branch, on these kinds of issues ("D.C. police chief says critical council hearing 'emboldened' drug dealers," Washington Post).

As a result, many academics and others have sought to discredit the approach ever since.

More recently, I've come to believe that the best approach is a combination of Broken Windows and collective efficacy + way more training for police officers + a greater focus on directed problem solving as a structural approach + approaches that aren't just about more policing.

But my experiments with litter picking and other stuff back when I lived in the H Street neighborhood c. 2000 convinced me that Broken Windows was on the right track.

That places where properties were vacant and unkempt, crime flourished. When you picked up litter, less trash was deposited. When alleys were kept up, less trash was dumped illegally. That one way streets made it easier to deal drugs. Etc.

At the same time, focused enforcement needed to be applied to dampen crime. And more innovative programs too, like the Community Safety Partnership in Los Angeles.

-- "Broken windows/collective efficacy: Baltimore; Newark; Grand Junction, Colorado; Pittsburgh; Albany," 2019
-- "Resource: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing at Arizona State University," 2019
-- "Revisiting intimate partner abuse/murder," 2017
-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 1, theory and practice," 2016
-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 2, what to do," 2016
-- "Los Angeles police department "Community Safety Partnership"," 2014
-- "Night-time safety: rethinking lighting in the context of a walking community," 2014
-- "Policing: escalation vs. de-escalation," 2014
-- "Crime prevention through environmental design and repeated burglaries at the Naylor Gardens apartment complex," 2013

Broken windows/collective efficacy: Baltimore; Newark; Grand Junction, Colorado; Pittsburgh; Albany

EE called our attention to the cover story on Baltimore, published two Sundays ago in the New York Times Magazine, "The Tragedy of Baltimore."

Baltimore.  The article was very disturbing.  The description of the post-Freddie Gray riots and the rapid rise in crime and murders in Baltimore reminded me of what it was like living in Washington, DC and specifically the H Street NE neighborhood back in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the city was faced with the scourge of crack and a rapid increase in murders--over 400 per year for many years.

Where I lived was a few blocks from Union Station and a bit more than one mile to the US Capitol and to Downtown, but by happenstance, it was also just a few blocks away from one of the city's primary open air drug markets, and in an 18-month period, there were 30 murders.

It was a terrible period for me personally.  My then wife was assaulted, we had a car stolen, our house was burglarized multiple times, and after the breakup of our marriage, I got mugged a number of times (hurt a bit but I always managed to get away and never lost anything, not my wallet not my bike).

It was living under siege.

Interesting, the article ascribes the riots, and even the death of Freddie Gray, to a number of poor decisions and choices by the police department, the State's Attorney's Office (who in advance of the arrest of Freddie Gray, asked the department to increase patrols in the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood), under trained police officers and the failure of the State of Maryland to provide the police department with back up officers in the period of unrest after Gray's death and before the onset of riots a few days later.

Broken windows versus collective efficacy theory.  My primary response to the article concerned how in the past I had scorned collective efficacy theory (ironically, one of the leaders in this school is Robert Sampson, who is speaking next week at American University) in favor of "broken windows theory" and how I had been wrong and missed the point.

I believe in the concept of broken windows theory, which is that by addressing disorder -- vacant houses, crime spots, litter, abandoned cars, etc. -- communities end up being better able to manage and reduce crime.

-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 1, theory and practice," 2016
-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 2, what to do"
-- "Night-time safety: rethinking lighting in the context of a walking community," 2014
-- Crime prevention through environmental design and repeated burglaries at the Naylor Gardens apartment complex," 2013

The thing about the original theory is that it was also about investing in the community, but for the most part, police departments abandoned that element of the approach, and focused on what came to be called "zero tolerance policing," and the arrest of people at the merest provocation -- not having a fastened seatbelt, a broken tail light -- including rampant "stop and frisk."

The basic idea behind collective efficacy is that communities that are more organized and active, despite income and other demographics, are supposed to be better at warding off crime and disorder, without necessarily more policing, and even in low income areas.

To me, the data on this is mixed.

Which is why I was, I hate to say, derisive ("Urban Health, Nasty Cities, Broken Windows, and Community Efficacy," 2008).

But I missed the point.

Not either/or but and/and.  One of the factors acknowledged by Professor Patrick Sharkey's book discussing the decline of crime in major cities is collective efficacy ("NYU professor's book traces the decline of crime in U.S. cities since the '70s," New York Daily News).

What I failed to acknowledge is that focusing on the defense of Broken Windows wasn't the point -- and I had first hand experience from my H Street neighborhood.

Instead, I should have been considering the fact that how bad things could be, that the neighborhoods and community organizations were functioning at all was a miracle.

This is especially true for low income neighborhoods, which for a variety of reasons, have fewer resources, fewer functioning community organizations, and less of a sense of collective trust.  Also a lot more direct experience with all kinds of trauma.

The real point is that neighborhoods under siege need even more investments in community organizations, neighborhood improvement, and the like.

Likely collective efficacy surveys would find more positive results commensurate with increased investment in social infrastructure.

Newark.  Yesterday's NYT has an article ("'Newark's Original Sin' and the Criminal Justice Education of Cory Booker") on Presidential hopeful Cory Booker, now a Senator from New Jersey and formerly the Mayor of Newark.  Much of the article discusses his record on addressing crime.

While the city was successful at reducing crime and the murder rate, it was more focused on a zero tolerance policing strategy, although it was called "broken windows," and eventually the city submitted to a consent decree with the US Department of Justice over overzealous execution of policing to the point where people's civil rights were frequently violated.

Broken Windows and Collective Efficacy Theories need to marry.  Again, I believe that Broken Windows theory has been transmogrified from its origins.  Had it been paired more overtly with collective efficacy theory as a way to implement the community investment side of the equation, it would have worked better and generated less opprobrium.

Granted, police departments aren't always the best agency out there to implement community investment programs.  But there are exceptions:

-- "Los Angeles police department "Community Safety Partnership"," 2014

Grand Junction, Colorado.  The Grand Junction Sentinel has a great article ("We got our neighborhood back: Targeted areas see a drop in crime") about a targeted crime reduction effort in Mesa County.

The program focuses on places of frequent incidence of crime, and in addition to arrests provides and coordinates the provision of other resources in a Broken Windows fashion to make the changes permanent.

Pittsburgh and Albany.  Other articles on the East Liberty neighborhood in Pittsburgh ("How community-led renovation is helping a rundown Pittsburgh neighbourhood fight crime," Guardian), and the difficulty of making new investments in weak market neighborhoods ("In Albany, struggling neighborhoods face uphill battle to improve: Local couple faced many hurdles trying to build in low property value area," Albany Times-Union) provide other insights into the advantages of such approaches, but also demonstrate the difficulty of making new private sector investments in such communities, because the cost of new construction exceeds the value of existing properties.

Fare evasion and returning to the days of "Defining Deviance Down"

Last year, NYC decriminalized transit fare evasion, at the instigation of the District Attorney ("Manhattan DA To End Most Prosecution for Fare Evasion This Fall," New York Observer).   DC has just passed legislation to decriminalize transit fare evasion ("DC Council Approves Decriminalization of Metro Fare Evasion," NBC4).

The metropolitan transit agency, WMATA/Metrorail doesn't support the legislation, and claims that policing fare evasion contributes to crime reduction on the system.

The issues with decriminalization are fourfold:

(1) the loss of revenue to transit systems and how decriminalization impacts compliance;

(2) linkage between fare evasion and committing other crimes;

(3) transit access of the impoverished; and

(4) perceived differential enforcement against people of color.

It turns out there is some academic literature out there on the subject, including the book, Secure and Tranquil Travel: Preventing crime and disorder on public transport.

Increased tolerance for crime and disorder versus zero tolerance policy as a response.  Decades ago, Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote a seminal article, "Defining deviancy down: How we've become accustomed to alarming levels of crime and destructive behavior," making the argument that out of sense of being overwhelmed by crime and not having the resources to respond, certain crimes were redefined as not being crimes.

The proposed response to "public tolerance of intolerable behavior" was to increase police enforcement using the "zero tolerance" approach.

Zero tolerance as repression, especially of people of color.  Many pushed back ("Defining Deviancy Down": How Senator Moynihan's Misleading Phrase About Criminal Justice Is Rapidly Being Incorporated Into Popular Culture," Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture, 1994) arguing that was this meant in practice was further police repression meted out against the underclass.  Or that actions that shouldn't be considered crimes, were made into crimes, therefore "defining deviance up."

Fare evasion as an element of criminal activity.  Former transit police chief and later NYC Police Commissioner William Bratton believed that fare evasion was a crime that wasn't victimless, and associated with other criminal acts.

He argued that turnstile jumping was one element of people's perceptions that the subway system was unsafe.  And that people who were fare beaters tended to commit other crimes on and off the subway system, so that arresting fare beaters ended up reducing crime overall. 

From The Formula: How Algorithms Solve All Our Problems . . . and Create More:

... at a time when crime on the subway was at an all-time high, Bratton focused his attention on making sure that people paid for their tickets. His reasons .. were simple: fare evasion was a gateway drug to more serious crime.

Legitimate riders felt they were entering a place of lawlessness and disorder. They saw people going in for free and began to question the wisdom of abiding by the law. The system was veering toward anarchy. By stopping and searching law violators for even the most minor of infractions, troublemakers decided it was easier to pay their fares and leave their weapons (which were often uncovered during searches) at home. Crime fell exponentially.

Studies, such as by the New York City Transit system ("Measuring and Controlling Subway Fare Evasion: Improving Safety and Security at New York City Transit Authority"), Philadelphia ("SEPTA: Felonies down after crackdown on fare-evaders," Philadelphia Inquirer), and in the Netherlands ("The Effects of Increasing the Certainty of Punishment: A Field Experiment on Public Transportation," European Journal of Criminology) find a link between crime reduction and fare payment enforcement.

Also see "Sorry, but jumping a turnstile is not like getting a parking ticket," Washington Post).

Fare evasion as a function of poverty.  Arresting fare evaders has often been criticized as an initiative with disproportionate negative impacts on the impoverished ("Fare evasion is a crime of poverty," New York Daily News), especially people of color ("Subway Policing in New York City Still Has A Race Problem," Marshall Project). And this is in fact true.

The San Francisco Chronicle article, "How bad is BART fare evasion? We saw 90 people in 92 minutes slip through the gates," includes a time-elapsed video of fare evasion at the 16th Street/Mission Station.

 Photo by Gabrielle Lurie: A man jumps the turnstile at the BART station at Civic Center despite gates that were installed (seen at left and right) to deter fare evasion in San Francisco, California, on Thursday, Aug. 16, 2018.

Need to distinguish between the ability to pay and anti-social and criminal behavior.  In dealing with fare evasion, I think it's important to separate out criminal behavior from those people evading more out of being impoverished.


BART system.  WMATA has similar signs, less well designed, posted on the emergency gates in stations.  Photo: Dan Brekke, Flickr.

Rather than decriminalize fare jumping, because of how it contributes to people's sense of lawlessness and because of the association between fare jumping and criminal activity, I would rather see center cities provide reduced price transit service for the impoverished.

The solution to low income people needing transit assistance is to provide transit assistance, not to make it easier for people "to steal" from the public via the local transit agency,.

New York City's just done it ("New York Will Cut Transit Fares for Low-Income Riders," CityLab).  Cities like San Francisco already do.  Some bike sharing systems provide low cost or no cost access for people on income and/or housing assistance programs.  Other cities may not have a low income transit pass but provide discounted or free transit passes to youths--and youths, especially teens, commit fare evasion disproportionately.

DC does not have a low income transit pass.

Fare evasion seems to rise with decriminalization.  In keeping with the results of some of the studies cited above, NYC Transit has experienced a rise in fare evasion after decriminalization ("Fare Evasion Is Skyrocketing on New York City's Subway. Here's Why," NYT), although the article opines part of this might be a "protest" against bad service.

Photo: Photos By Jessica Christian / The Chronicle. A man is given a citation after failing to pay his fare at Civic Center BART Station during the morning commute in San Francisco, Calif. Thursday, May 31, 2018.

Note too that an illustration of the necessity of distinguishing between fare evasion as anti-social and/or criminal activity versus fare evasion is the San Francisco case.  The city offers some of the best priced reduced cost transit passes in the country for low income residents and youths.  But while these passes include BART access within San Francisco's core, the reduced price transit pass does not include BART stations outside of San Francisco.

So it's possible that fare evasion on the BART system, which mostly lies outside of San Francisco, has a slightly different etiology compared to the SF MUNI system.