Public housing administration as a measure of government (in)competence

 DC received a scathing report from HUD about the failures in managing the city's public housing stock of 8,000 units, 25%--2,000-are vacant because most are uninhabitable ("D.C. Housing Authority’s leadership is failing, HUD report says," Washington Post).  From the article:

A damning, 72-page report the agency authored portrays a housing authority in disarray and at risk of defaulting on its agreement with the federal government. Auditors catalogued 82 findings of deficiencies that DCHA must make substantial progress on within three months or risk escalating actions by HUD, which delivered its findings to DCHA in recent days.

The sweeping findings detailed in the report, a copy of which was reviewed by The Washington Post, reveal dangerous conditions at properties that form one of the last lines of defense for District residents who cannot afford homes, including violence, lead-paint hazards, out-of-code plumbing, water damage and mold. A DCHA maintenance foreman told HUD evaluators that emergency work orders are not addressed at night due to safety concerns. Prospective tenants turn down units for fear of crime, the report states.

HUD noted that DCHA’s occupancy rate is the lowest of any large public housing authority in the nation, with one in four of its roughly 8,000 physical units vacant. The vacancies result in fewer people housed and millions of dollars every year in forgone income, the report said. It attributed the issue to management failure and said the vacancies have accelerated the agency’s steadily deteriorating financial condition.

The City Council is worked up about it ("D.C. Council votes for $8 billion Medicaid contracts, housing overhaul," Post).  And the leader of the DCHA board says they're working on it ("We already are working on making the D.C. Housing Authority better," Post).

Ironically, under the Williams Administration--1998-2006--the resuscitation of the DC Housing Authority was one of the city's great accomplishments, and the director, Michael Kelly, was even detailed by HUD to help fix failing authorities in Philadelphia and New York City.

What happened in the intervening 16 years?  ("DC Housing Authority Director Resigns, Post).  

Note that a couple years ago under the previous board chair, also appointed by Mayor Bowser, DCHA was tied up in a conflict of interest matter by the then President of the board, who steered contracts to his girlfriend ("D.C. Housing Authority Board Chair Neil Albert Will Resign," Washington City Paper).  The funny thing was the "girlfriend" was eminently qualified.  And successful enough that she didn't need the work.   All he needed to do was disclose and recuse and it would have been legal.  But he didn't.

How are these multiple failures not an indictment of the capacity of the DC Government to manage and act?  ("HUD report on D.C. public housing should outrage and embarrass residents," opinion column by Colbert King, Post).  From the article:

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s scathing report on management and operational shortcomings in the D.C. Housing Authority has documented more than 80 deficiencies ranging from inadequate management to lack of knowledge of a host of basic housing functions to 220 contracts awarded in violation of DCHA procurement policy. The unearthed defects and failures are so serious that without immediate remedial action, HUD has threatened to declare the District in default of its federal contract. D.C. residents have every reason to be outraged and embarrassed by this latest government fiasco.

Among the glaring weaknesses cited was the leadership of the DCHA’s executive director, Brenda Donald. Donald, who earns a salary of $275,000, “has no experience in property development, property management or managing federal housing programs,” the audit notes. During the HUD review, Donald accepted the need for HUD-supplied training for herself and staff on critical functions of housing programs. That speaks volumes.

HUD also found a DCHA workforce lacking in the capacity to perform even the most basic financial, procurement and housing-related functions. The agency, HUD said bluntly, is failing “to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing opportunities for residents in violation of program requirements.”

At the heart of the problem is abysmal financial and operational oversight — a searing indictment of D.C. leadership, since the DCHA’s 13-member Board of Commissioners is dominated by Mayor Muriel E. Bowser’s six D.C. Council-approved appointees and her chief of staff and deputy mayor for planning and economic development, John Falcicchio, who is an ex officio member.

John Kotter’s Eight Step Model for Leading Change

It definitely shows lack of accountability and no sense of urgency to act-2,000 units could house at least 4,000 people.  

 One of the points I make these days is boards need to have as part of their monthly reports, lists of open items.  In the case of DCHA, the number of vacant units needs to be an element of such reporting and monitoring.  

(When I was a student "activist" at the University of Michigan, I read the monthly Regent Board Meeting packet, which was the equivalent of a looseleaf folder, as many as 1,000 pages.  One of the items was a listing of all open litigation.  The way the Board reports were organized there, listing plan versus actual, and the various open items for action in many areas is a model.)

I know that technically, DC Housing Authority is a quasi-independent agency.  But it is not truly independent.  The board is appointed by the mayor and city council.  The employees are considered DC Government employees.  The agency reports to the mayor.

It's also a failure of elected officials to not see themselves as "asset managers" and "risk managers."

-- "Town-city management: "We are all asset managers now"," 2015
-- "Municipal Natural Assets Planning Initiative, British Columbia," 2018

What's up?

Performance dashboards.  I've been thinking about them a lot lately.  For example, I think that the Orange County Register dashboard on covid is best practice, and a model for how local media can present and track data.

In the summer we visited a rural area of Montana, and the kindling box for the fireplace in the cabin we were in was full of previous year's issues of the Bozeman Daily Chronicle and some farming publications.  Of course, I skimmed them all.  

And the farming section of one (although it might have been a different paper, for Idaho) had good graphics on the water levels in various reservoirs.  But the data, presented as easily understood graphics, needs to be made more widely available, beyond those involved in agriculture.

I was thinking that such a graphic needs to be built into an online water availability dashboard in the State of Utah, which faces serious drought, but it turns out as a whole the state has the lowest cost of water and a middling track record for conservation ("For Mormons, a perfect lawn is a godly act. But the drought is catching up with them," Guardian).

Similarly, an online dashboard for a public housing authority, also made available to citizens, should have data on the number of unavailable units, overall, and by building, with the budgeted/expected percentage, which I think should be less than 5%, and the length of time each unit is out of service.