Will congestion charges work (in smaller cities)?

 -- "A Test for Congestion Charges in Smaller Cities" is a Bloomberg CityLab article.

The idea of congestion charges is to assess a daily fee on motor vehicles entering the highest in demand, "most congested" parts of a city, most typically its central business district.  The intent is to use the revenues generated to fund transit and other sustainable mobility improvements, as well as to encourage motor vehicle operators to shift to transit to avoid the fee.

For congestion charges to work in center cities, the business districts can't be susceptible to competition and poaching from neighboring jurisdictions.  

(Separately, some European cities have introduced a separate charge based on CO2 emissions.  See "London introduces Ultra Low Emissions Zone for vehicles with charges up to $130," ABC News.)

FWIW, I don't think congestion charges will work in smaller cities, at least in the US, because for the most part metropolitan areas are super de-concentrated.  And the quality of transit options tends to be sub-par.

The article is about Oxford, England, which is imposing a low emissions vehicle charge, not a congestion charge technically.  But Oxford is probably an exception to the general rule, because of the dominant university.  It's not like Oxford University will move out of Oxford to the suburbs. 

From "Does Polycentric Urban Spatial Development Lead to Less Commuting : A Perspective of Jobs-housing Balance" 

In short the issue has to do with monocentric versus polycentric development patterns.  Monocentric places will be able to impose congestion charges not worrying that it will induce and support business recruiting by alternative commercial districts.  It will be much harder to induce compliance in polycentric areas subject to inter-city competition.  

See Cities in Full for a more detailed discussion of monocentric versus polycentric development patterns wrt both center cities and transit systems.

AP photo, London.

Instead, there is intra-metropolitan competition and the polycentric pattern of business district development--e.g., in the DC area you have business centers in Crystal City (now called National Landing), Rosslyn and Ballston in Arlington County, Alexandria, not just in Potomac Yard/National Landing but elsewhere, multiple centers in Fairfax County but especially Tysons, Reston, and Fair Lakes, Bethesda and the I-270 Corridor in Montgomery County, with lesser centers in Rockville, Silver Spring, and Wheaton, to some extent in New Carrollton in Prince George's County, and independent centers in Loudoun County around Dulles Airport, Ashburn, etc.

Looking west on Lee Highway in Arlington, lines of cars split between taking Interstate 66 or staying on Lee Highway during rush hour on Dec. 4, 2017. (Jahi Chikwendiu/The Washington Post)

Any of these jurisdictions would be tempted to and would use congestion charges (tolling) in DC as a way to recruit DC-based businesses.  

For example, it is argued that one reason that Virginia has added tolling to I-66, a major route to DC, is to encourage firms to relocate to Northern Virginia from DC, as a way for their employees to be able to avoid driving into DC and paying a toll ("Did Va. Gov. McAuliffe and his transportation team mislead I-66 commuters on tolling? Not really, but his team could have been more clear," Washington Post).

New York City.  As it is, New York City approved a congestion charge, which with the delays as a result of the covid-induced migration from office buildings to working at home, is slated to take effect next year ("Congestion Pricing Is Coming to New York. Everyone Has an Opinion," New York Times).

I'm not sure that post-covid, a congestion charge will work in NYC, the one city heretofore in the U.S. that I thought it would work in.

But I think it should probably be pushed out later, because Manhattan's office districts have been pummeled by that outmigration.  A congestion charge will give non-transit users one more reason not to go back to the office.

And even Manhattan faces competition from other parts of New York City like Long Island City, the suburban office district in Westchester, New York north of the city, districts in Connecticut, and in New Jersey, especially Jersey City, which developed a strong positioning as "back office" support for New York City's financial services businesses (a role first played by Long Island City).

Even Manhattan isn't quite as comparable to London, Stockholm, or Singapore, which don't have the kind of polycentric activity center development pattern common to the US.

Suburban districts may have a better position for imposing congestion charges.  Ironically, it may be places like Tysons in Fairfax County, Virginia (versus DC), Greater Palo Alto in the San Francisco Bay region ("Mapping the Polycentric Metropolis: journeys to work in the Bay Area," Under the Raedar) (versus San Francisco), even Bellevue in Suburban Washington (versus Seattle) or the Buckhead District in Atlanta, have a better position for imposing such charges compared to the central business districts (Downtown) in the center cities in those metropolitan areas.

Congestion zones are too small to have the desired effect?  A separate Bloomberg article ("What Comes After London’s Congestion Charge?") argues that the London congestion charge isn't doing enough to limit negative environmental effects, because the zone to which the charge applies is too small relative the London metropolitan area.  It recommends a broader "road journey" charge.

It seems like it'd be logical to make these kinds of agreements upfront: Maryland can't collect $ in tolls from out of state residents

The Washington Post reports ("Out-of-state drivers owe more than $137 million to Maryland. The state wants to recoup the unpaid tolls") that Maryland has millions of dollars in uncollected road tolls assessed on cars registered in other states.  

Maryland moved to cashless tolls, and people without an EZPass transponder are mailed a bill.  But while Maryland residents can be fined and lose their license for not paying, the State has no similar recourse against nonresidents.

The article states that Maryland Transportation Authority is considering selling the debt to private debt collectors, while some elected officials are suggesting that the state agency ink reciprocity agreements.

The article reports that some states have reciprocity, like Pennsylvania with Delaware, so that they can collect tolls across borders.  

And that Virginia's system requires EZPass transponders, making collection easier, but Maryland doesn't.

A few years ago, Congress mandated inter-operability for all the various toll pass collection systems.  Although the hoped for deadline of 2016 has long since passed ("Unifying our toll road systems," WJLA-TV).

And many of the systems are multi-state, like EZPass, which has 19 member tolling agencies in the Northeast and Mid Atlantic..

But wow, if you know from the outset that a goodly number of users will be from out of state, why not create inter-state collection compacts at the outset?

And inter-operability in tolling and collection systems.

It's an amazing example of planning failure.

The real problem with the I-270/HOT Lanes proposal is that they've already come up with the solution: HOT Lanes

GGW has an entry discussing the possibility of monorail as an element of the I-270 expansion program ("Is a monorail on I-270 in Maryland a crazy idea? Here are its legit pros & cons").  It makes the good point that there should be a complete Alternatives Analysis.

But while offering a seemingly complete list, it's actually inadequate.

First, the biggest problem planning-wise, besides the fact that the Republican Governor does not favor transit at all, is that there isn't a "corridor management" approach to the I-270 to Beltway to DC mobility corridor.

-- "Maryland HOT lane study versus "corridor management", 2018
-- "Transportation network interruptions as an opportunity: Part 2," 2016

Second, consideration of monorail is a sop to some quarters (see item #3 in this entry, "Revisiting the Purple Line (series) and a more complete program of complementary improvements to the transit network).

The GGW post recommends an Alternatives Analysis, but without a more complete corridor management approach, it misses elements that should be considered.

The basic point of a study is to determine opportunities for shifting traffic from I-270.

1.  In the past, I've suggested that a separate underground MARC Line on I-270 should be considered, to better serve the business parks along the way and to provide service to Bethesda.

2.  This line could branch off and serve Northern Virginia across the American Legion Bridge, and even to Georgetown and Arlington, but this would require tunneling under Wisconsin Avenue in DC and then crossing the Potomac.

That should be considered.  But so should

3.  Extending the Metrorail Red Line to Germantown.  (Suggested by GGW commenter BTA.)  It'd probably mean a couple stations between the Shady Grove Metro and Gaithersburg, and then it's 3 more miles to Germantown.

4.  Expanding service on the MARC Brunswick Line to capture more trips between Frederick and DC.  This would include more service as well as

5.  Bi-directional service on the MARC Brunswick Line.

---

Note that the Brunswick Line terminates in West Virginia, but WV hadn't been paying towards the service which creates issues.  Maryland's threat to truncate the line got WV's attention and they agreed to funding. And other entities in West Virginia want the line to be extended further into the state ("Economic development board backs rail service to Hancock," Morgan Messenger). From the article:

This year, Maryland officials have demanded that West Virginia pay a larger portion of the costs of running the commuter trains into the state.

West Virginia legislators agreed to pay $1.1 million to keep the trains running into the Eastern Panhandle. Maryland has said it needs $3.4 million to continue running three trains each morning and three each evening.

According to news reports, West Virginia governor Jim Justice said the state would pay the additional $2 million to Maryland if the towns and counties served by the rail line would come up with the additional $300,000. A deadline to come up with the funds was set for November 30.

Eight localities, including Shepherdstown, Ranson, Charles Town, Harpers Ferry, Bolivar, Martinsburg, Berkeley and Jefferson Counties have all agreed to contribute to the rail costs.

Morgan County EDA Executive Director Daryl Cowles, who is also a West Virginia Delegate, said the idea of bringing passenger train service back to the Hancock station has resurfaced several times in the last two decades.

---

6.  Infill railroad stations where demand can be stoked.

7. In addition, since freeway based rail systems don't work so well without strong complementary bus service connections to nearby destinations, a MARC 270 Line would have to be paired with shuttle services.

One example is the Irvine Shuttle in Orange County, California, which complements Metrolink.  And the Airport Corridor Transportation Association in Suburban Pittsburgh is a good example of organizing a "transportation association" to provide such services ("Transit super stop coming to Robinson," Pittsburgh Post-Gaette, 2014).

8.  And a MARC Line from Frederick to Baltimore, as discussed in "A "Transformational Projects Action Plan" for a statewide passenger railroad program in Maryland."

=========

Listening to the webinar today featuring international planning consultant Joe Berridge, after having read the GGW entry, I couldn't help but think how Governor Hogan really isn't thinking very big.

The question they should be asking is what should they be doing transportation-wise/infrastructure wise to make Montgomery and Frederick Counties much stronger economic engines for the State of Maryland in the context of their being suburban counties outside the City of Washington.

Especially in the context of the Climate Change Crisis and the need for a Green New Deal and decarbonization within the mobility paradigm.

HOT Lanes aren't it.

Relatedly, the Post has an article about how the Federal Government has stopped subsidizing airline flights to Dulles and BWI Airports from Hagerstown ("Maryland airport goes to court after getting booted from federal subsidy program"). The article makes the point that Hagerstown is less than 90 minutes from either airport by motor vehicle.

Shouldn't the state be emphasizing the creation of an intra-state railroad and inter-city bus network to strengthen the connections between Maryland's more rural areas to the urban areas?

Graphic by BeyondDC showing the potential for a statewide passenger rail program in Maryland.

Rail from Hagerstown is another element of strengthening rural areas but also decarbonizing transportation.

If a new Washington area football stadium were to go to the National Harbor, now's the time to being planning to extend the Green Line

A couple years ago, Paul Meissner developed some integrated transit maps based on (1) my wanting to show DC area railroad and subway/light rail services on one map like how it's done in part in London, and on transit maps in Paris and Hamburg (among others), and (2) ideas he and I both had for transit extension.

It's hard these days to think much about transit extension, given the massive decrease in ridership on the Metrorail system ("Metro Just Had Its Lowest Ridership Numbers In 20 Years. What’s Going On?, WAMU-FM/NPR), in response to service degradation and the service outages caused by reconstruction programs.

The Washington Business Journal has an article, "Prince George's executive hopes to see NFL team stay in the county, but isn't a fan of Oxon Cove site," about Prince George's County Executive Angela Alsobrooks and her musings about the status of the Washington Redskins football stadium.

FedEx Stadium is currently located in the area of the Largo Town Center Metrorail Station and is a very typical suburban land use configuration--a stadium separate from most anything else.

Last December, DC was angling for the stadium through a stratagem concerning the federal budget getting the land where RFK stadium is fully under control of the city (it's owned by the National Park Service).  That didn't go through--instead we got a government shutdown ("Yes, modify and extend the RFK Campus lease; No, don't do it for the Washington Redskins football team").

Separately, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan was looking to provide space at Oxon Cove Park, also controlled by the National Park Service, roughly adjacent to the National Harbor development in return for a land trade involving another part of the state.  While the Governor has backed off that concept, it does make some sense.

If you're going to have such a complex, why not put it in an area where it can generate additional benefits, which are hard to develop with football stadiums ("Been to Largo lately? Sports teams often aren't very good partners").

I think football stadiums are lousy development augurs, but it could be beneficial for PG County by providing justification for furthering along a Metrorail connection to National Harbor, which is severely under-served by transit.

Paul's map shows a "western" branching of the Green Line Metrorail at the southern end, from a new wye between the current Congress Heights and Anacostia stations.  The western branch would include some new stations for DC.  The eastern branch would include a new station for the St. Elizabeths campus as well as an extension further south with four more stations, terminating in Brandywine.


Conceptual Future integrated rail transit service network for the Washington DC National Capitol Region. Design by Paul J. Meissner.  Concept by Richard Layman and Paul Meissner.

I suppose DC would not be super in favor of this, because making National Harbor more accessible creates more competition for DC's waterfront districts--Georgetown, Wharf, Southeast Capitol Riverfront--but we'd get more Metrorail stations within the city and it would help to reduce traffic and would make it easier for people staying in hotels at National Harbor to come into DC.

But it would be well worth it in terms of DC not coming up with land for a stadium, and instead the RFK site could be redeveloped in a manner with significantly more financial upside for DC.

====
A whole other issue is planning to extend the Purple Line light rail southwest from New Carrollton.

If Governor Hogan, a proponent of HOT lanes for the Beltway and I-270 ("Maryland is focusing on adding toll lanes in plan to widen the Beltway," Washington Post) were smart, he'd tie extensions of the Purple Line and the Green Line to National Harbor in with that program which would make it hard for transit advocates to oppose the roadway expansions.

More on the origin story for Portland transit/+ current proposal for tolls on I-5

Portland Oregon is the poster child for sustainable transportation, known for demolishing a waterfront freeway, focusing serving the downtown by transit, later creating light rail and streetcar programs, supporting bicycle use, etc.

It's frustrating as a planner when people bring up Portland as an example, because what they usually don't understand Portland's "secret," which is that what they see today is built on almost 50 years of tough, visionary, bold decision making. (1) not only did they make a visionary decision to move away from freeways; (2) they realized they needed to focus development downtown; (3) and instead of prioritizing the car, they prioritized transit service--first bus, then light rail, and then streetcar; and (4) they continued to build on these decisions "incrementally" with what we might call "continuous process improvement."

-- "A summary of my impressions of Portland, Oregon and planning," 2005
-- "Nohad Toulan: The University in the City," Portland State University, 2014
-- "Portland Oregonian says that Seattle is now far more innovative concerning sustainable mobility than Portland," 2018
-- "Light rail: blight or bliss"," Vancouver Columbian, 2013

In short, they were bold and they continued to be bold, through decisions that build on and extended the previous decisions. It's a perfect example of what I call "Transformational Projects Action Planning," although it was more incremental and somewhat unintentionally a process where the sum of the parts ended up being even stronger than the individual pathbreaking efforts.

-- "Why can't the "Bilbao Effect" be reproduced? | Bilbao as an example of Transformational Projects Action Planning," 2017
-- "Downtown Edmonton cultural facilities development as an example of "Transformational Projects Action Planning" 2018


Pioneer Square, Max Light Rail, Protestors, at Lunchtime.  Photo from the now sadly defunct website PortlandGround.

An article on a proposal for tolls on I-5 in Greater Portland, which links Oregon and Washington, includes a link to a 2014 piece from Willamette Week, the alternative newsweekly for Portland, with more back story on how light rail came about, "Feb. 4, 1974: Portland kills the Mount Hood Freeway..."

Neal Goldschmitt, the mayor who "killed the freeway," started out as a legal aid lawyer who saw the city's plans for a bunch of freeways to be not only a bad thing but a hook for running for office. He got elected to City Council in 1970 and as Mayor in 1972. (The Downtown Plan discussed in the 2005 entry was passed in 1972.)

Goldschmitt didn't want to lose the money allocated for "highways" and proposed a system of dedicated "bus roads," but was convinced to push for light rail instead, which originally was opposed by the area Growth Machine, including the local newspaper.

But he was successful, and the rest, as they say, is history.

========
Tolling and I-5

The FreightWaves article, "Oregon Toll Proposal Pits Trucks Against Transit," is important because it shows how flawed transportation capacity planning usually is, because of the various political and economic interests, and the failure to employ more objective "transportation demand management" approaches, and other problems.

I-5 in Portland.  Photo: Portland Tribune, "City Council supports tolling to ease highway traffic."

For example, I-5 is used as a major commuting artery between Washington State and Portland, and the backbone of freight transportation along the West Coast, but expanding light rail to Vancouver hasn't been successful, although it would capture a fair amount of car traffic, thereby "adding capacity" for freight and other uses.

Note that the Tri-Met Yellow Line ("Interstate"), was originally intended to terminate in Vancouver, but the political complexity added to the project by attempting to serve two states led the transit agency to drop the Washington State connection in order to start building the project.

Currently, Oregon laws as currently written only allow toll revenues to be used for road projects, not transit and sustainable transportation. And the various trucking lobbies want the funds to be used solely for adding lanes.

From the article:

Truckers support tolls that would increase efficiencies and offset the cost of congestion, said Jana Jarvis, the head of the Oregon Trucking Associations (OTA). "But," said Jarvis, who represented trucking interests on a committee studying the tolling, "we want additional lanes, additional road capacity."

The Washington Trucking Associations referred FreightWaves to Vanderpol for comment. He echoed OTA's position. "We are supportive of tolls if they create new road capacity."

That contingency doesn't sit well with the Street Trust, a Portland-based bike, pedestrian and transit advocacy group. The FHA's approval called for the state to study a hugely complex set of issues, including how tolling revenue will be spent, and what impact it will have on neighborhood traffic and low- income residents, noted Richa Poudyal, the Street Trust's advocacy director.

"In this next phase we advocate for [toll] revenue to be allocated for transit improvements rather than highway projects," Poudyal said. "If the proposal doesn't address those considerations, or if the revenue is only used for highways, we won't support it."

Maryland HOT lane study versus "corridor management" and regional scaled transportation planning

The Maryland Transit Opportunities Coalition sent out a press release about problems they see with Maryland's study for the addition of high occupancy toll lanes to I-270 and I-495. The first round of public meetings starts tonight:

Tuesday, April 17 at 6:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

Dr. Henry Wise Jr. High School

12650 Brook Lane

Upper Marlboro, MD 20772

Wednesday, April 18 at 6:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

Clarksburg High School

22500 Wims Road

Clarksburg, MD 20871

Thursday, April 19 at 6:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

Bethesda Chevy Chase High School

4301 East West Highway

Bethesda, MD 20814

Tuesday, April 24 at 6:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

Eleanor Roosevelt High School

7601 Hanover Parkway

Greenbelt, MD 20770

They prefer a more balanced set of responses, including more investment in transit, while this particular transportation planning initiative is solely road focused.  The proposal is to add lanes exclusively for people willing to pay tolls, on the Capital Beltway (I-495) and on I-270.  These lanes would link up to comparable infrastructure in Virginia. 

MTOC makes the point that given the experience with tolls on newly tolled I-66, where sometimes tolls are greater than $41 ("A quick comment on I-66 Tolling"), the impact of this addition would be limited mostly to high income households.

The program is being driven by interest in the private sector ("Public gets chance to weigh in on Md. toll lane plans," WTOP; "Speedy selection process ends with Maryland official’s former firm being chosen for project," Washington Post).  Still they have been in state highway plans since 2005.

-- Maryland’s Statewide Express Toll Lanes Network Initiative

Last week I was riding up Georgia Avenue in Montgomery County in the late afternoon and the traffic was backed up for one mile or more northbound to the I-495 entry ramps.

It made me think that it would be worthwhile to connect the Maryland initiative with ideas I've suggested over the years to create a system of tolled "commuter road tunnels" under major thoroughfares within DC, to mitigate the traffic impact on the abutting neighborhoods, but also speeding up traffic and maintaining the relevance of DC's central business district as a regional center for commerce and employment.

Two pieces discuss "underground toll commuter routes"  ("Tunnelized road projects for DC and the Carmel Tunnel, Haifa, Israel example--tolls" and "London Mayor proposes roadway tunnels to divert surface motor vehicle traffic and congestion") on routes such as North Capitol Street-Blair Road, 16th Street, and New York Avenue, and these pieces cover the idea of  "corridor management" in the I-270 corridor, but in terms of continuing on to DC ("Transportation network interruptions as an opportunity: Part 2 and "Transportation network service interruptions part 3: corridor/commute shed management for Northwest DC and Montgomery County, Maryland).

Given the traffic I witnessed on Georgia Avenue, that street and maybe Connecticut Avenue ought to be included in such a network. 

But while previously my suggesting about a Blair Road-North Capitol tunnel (ironically comparable to the originally suggested "North Central Expressway" in highway planning dating to the 1960s) would have ended the route at Georgia Avenue, obviously such a route should continue on into Maryland for some distance.  Same with Connecticut Avenue and 16th Street.

Ideally, were we to have a true regional transportation planning system, you could integrate this kind of road planning between DC and Maryland because this initiative might be the only way to bring such a complete network about, while also considering transit expansion both in terms of bi-directional railroad service between DC and Frederick Maryland (item #4 in this piece) and between Bethesda and the Tysons District of Fairfax County via I-495.

While not exactly comparable, Orange County and Riverside County in California have cooperated to extend the SR-91 Toll Road into Riverside County ("91 Express Lanes in Orange County paved way for new toll lanes opening Monday in Riverside," Orange County Register).

======
Besides the development of three different bus rapid transit programs in the metropolitan area, the comparable planning failure I'm thinking about would be DC's failure to take advantage of Virginia's Silver Line Metrorail expansion as a way to bootstrap its continuation into DC, as the old proposed "separated blue line."  I first wrote about that in 2006 ("Blinking on urban design means you limit your chance for success").

Graphic published in the Washington Post in 2001, outlining WMATA's plan for a separated blue line


Paul Meissner/Richard Layman concept for an expanded Metrorail system including a separated Silver Line in place of the original separated blue line proposal

A quick comment on I-66 tolling

-- Transform 66 in Northern Virginia

This week, rush hour tolling has been introduced to I-66, the east-west Virginia interstate that provides access to DC. 

In advance of the launch, there has been a fair amount of communication about it, including full-page ads in the Washington Post and in other media (don't recall seeing tv ads, but then since the November 2016 election, I don't watch tv news very much), and media coverage ("Interstate 66 tolling starts Monday. Here's what you need to know," Washington Post).

I've written about this in the context of corridor management planning ("Transportation network interruptions as an opportunity: Part 2") and indirectly in terms of conceptualizing a broad plan of improvement of the Northern Virginia transit network in the context of the Silver Line extension ("Using the Silver Line as the priming event, what would a transit network improvement program look like for NoVA?").

As an occasional driver, of course I prefer to not have to pay tolls, but as a planner, I recognize why you want to charge tolls, not only to raise the monies necessary to pay for transportation infrastructure, but also to provide better "cues" to encourage more optimal choices in the context of supply, demand, and infrastructure supply constraints.

Transportation is one of those areas where consumers and elected officials especially want to believe that it has nothing to do with economics. 

The reality is that the failure to apply economic decision-making to transportation creates "market failures" a/k/a "congestion," although this is abetted by what I call transportation physics and the difference between personal mobility and mass transit--the latter uses space much more efficiently.

One 40-foot bus transports as many people as are usually carried in about 60 cars.


The thing about the I-66 toll program is that it contravenes the typical experience across the US in terms of having specific toll roads, especially HOT -- High Occupancy Toll -- lanes.

Other than HOT lanes, the DC metropolitan area has two toll roads in Northern Virginia (Dulles Toll Road, Dulles Greenway, and people aren't particularly enamored with them, and many users lack alternatives. (Elsewhere in Maryland and Virginia there are various bridge and tunnels that are tolled, and other tolled roads, including a stretch of I-95 towards the Maryland-Delaware border.)

Typically, HOT lanes add capacity but restrict access to those willing to pay the price to use the lanes, while still providing access to lanes that aren't tolled. The idea is that the toll is variable, designed to maintain the flow of high speed traffic. As capacity is absorbed by toll payers, the toll rises in order to discourage people from using the lanes, in order to maintain a relatively high speed.

On day one of new tolls along I-66 inside the Capital Beltway, climbed over $30. (WTOP/Dave Dildine, "I-66 afternoon tolls moderate after ‘unfair’ $40 morning high."

The I-66 tolling project hasn't added any capacity.  Heretofore, rush hour access to I-66 has been limited to vehicles with two or more occupants (with exceptions for hybrid vehicles and people traveling to Dulles Airport), and the entire freeway was treated as "High Occupancy Vehicle" lanes.

The toll project has removed the HOV restriction.  Now, previously non-qualified drivers -- single occupant vehicles -- can use the road during rush periods, if they pay.  HOV-2 users can still drive for free, and hybrid vehicles no longer have an HOV-exception.

What the tolling project does is increase demand to use the road, with no increase in lane capacity.  Normally, HOT lanes add capacity in return for restricting access to people willing to pay for it.

Looking west on Lee Highway, lines of cars split between taking I-66 vs. staying on Lee Highway What the project during rush hour Monday. (Jahi Chikwendiu/The Washington Post).

So yes, compared to other toll lanes in the area, tolls on I-66 are likely to be "outlandish" ("Day 3 I-66 toll hits $23. Are commuters finding alternatives?" and "I-66 express lanes debut with $34.50 toll, among the highest in the U.S.," Washington Post) because now more cars will be competing for the same amount of road space.

And as Charlie points out in a comment, it communicates a major problem with "Public Private Partnerships," in that they are contractual and the operator is typically uninterested in being flexible. 

Furthermore, concessionaires are somewhat insulated from bad press even if they get it, because they have contracts that are pretty much impregnable.

Although it can come back to haunt the elected officials who approved the contracts.

The I-66 project is even trickier because at one level, the State of Virginia wants to encourage business to locate in Virginia instead of DC, so the outlandish pricing is a "feature, not a bug" to encourage businesses to leave DC so that their employees "don't have to" drive the toll road.

At the same time, there aren't transit improvements, at least in the short and intermediate term, such as those suggested in the Meissner-Layman idealized transit network map--extending the Orange Line west, creating a separated Silver Line, adding a new "Pink Line"--giving people alternatives, and increasing "transportation infrastructure supply" in significant ways.



In fact, were Virginia to extend the Orange Line west, they'd have to pay penalties to the concessionaire.

However, what I would have done, were I the concessionaire, is have had a "free" one- or two-week introductory period with the toll pricing being communicated in real-time, so people would have a much better sense for how much the tolls were going to be.

Even so, it's not going to help DC, and DC has no ability to influence the process.  By contrast, in California, most toll roads are run by the counties or Joint Powers Authorities that are cross-jurisdictional.

And the separate programs for each of the "states" -- DC, Maryland, and Virginia -- don't seem to be too well coordinated. 

Orange and Riverside Counties in California offer a significant contrast, where they jointly manage the the SR-91 toll corridor--a corridor management plan. The toll road started out as an exclusive Orange County project, but have ben extended by Riverside County for 8 miles, to better manage the road resource and add capacity ("91 Express Lanes in Orange County paved way for new toll lanes opening Monday in Riverside Orange County Register). The counties as operators coordinate management, tolling, collections, etc.

Such integration and coordination seems a foreign concept here. Cf. "The answer is: Create a single multi-state/regional multi-modal transit planning, management, and operations authority association"

Maryland HOT lanes extension proposal by Governor Hogan

I have to admit that 10 years ago, I was much more hardcore about transit vs. cars.  While I am still pretty hardcore about shifting trips from motor vehicles and supporting the sustainable mobility platform, the reality is that the transportation system is a system and it's best to approach it in that fashion, rather than to be almost exclusively focused on one particular mode.

From the standpoint of a multi-modal transportation system functioning at multiple scales--and in the case of freeways at multi-state, regional, and metropolitan scales--I can see the utility of adding roads, recognizing that in the US transportation system motor vehicle use is privileged and we must fight to ensure that sustainable modes are prioritized and at the very least, simultaneously addressed when major road projects are proposed.

Besides the scale at which various proposals need to be considered, what needs to be focused on in such proposals is the land use context, whether the project extends "sprawl," AND complementary mobility network improvements, especially in terms of other modes.

One of the best ways to "expand capacity of the road network" is to shift trips from cars to transit and biking, and walking.  Even marginal drops in traffic of 5% to 10% can result in significant capacity and throughput improvements. 

But what happens is that the throughput improvement leads people to make more trips, ultimately using up the capacity. This is why many smart growth advocates talk about "induced demand" and argue that adding roadway capacity just gets "used up," so why bother? It's also why some economists argue for tolls, so that there are costs associated with taking trips, and therefore capacity is less likely to be absorbed "frivolously."

-- "What’s Up With That: Building Bigger Roads Actually Makes Traffic Worse," Wired Magazine
-- "Some Like It HOT: High-occupancy toll lanes work best on high-traffic roads. Without congestion, drivers have little incentive to pay the toll<," Brookings Institution, 2002

Yesterday, Maryland's Governor announced a major program to add high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes to I-270, I-495--the Capital Beltway in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties, and the Baltimore Washington Parkway, which currently is controlled by the National Park Service ("$9 billion highway project would widen 3 major Maryland roadways with toll lanes, Hogan says," Baltimore Sun).

From the article:

Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan on Thursday proposed a $9 billion plan to add express toll lanes to the routes of three of Maryland’s most congested highways — the Interstate 495 Capital Beltway, the I-270 spur connecting Frederick to D.C., and the Baltimore-Washington Parkway between the two cities. ...

The highway expansions would add two express toll lanes each way to roughly 100 miles of roadways in Maryland’s densely populated central region. Existing lanes on each road would remain free to drivers.

The massive undertaking involves persuading the federal government to give the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, now controlled by the National Park Service, to the Maryland Transportation Authority.

The price tag for the Baltimore-Washington Parkway would be $1.4 billion. It’s dwarfed by the size of the combined $7.6 billion project to widen I-495 and I-270. Those new lanes would be built and maintained by private companies through public-private partnerships, or PPPs, in what the governor said would be the largest highway public-private partnerships in North America.

HOT lanes add capacity through the private sector, which builds lanes in return for revenues from toll charges, usually on very long contracts--50 to 99 years in duration. 

The argument is that the public sector can't afford to add capacity on its own and that the addition, even if less democratic because people have to pay to use it, leads to throughput capacity improvements for all the lanes.

These arrangements are called "public-private partnerships," but I don't think they meet the definition of a partnership.  They are contractual and financing agreements guided completely by contract provisions.  The contracts are difficult to change.  There isn't a sense of mutuality. 

In short, the state is desperate for someone else to pay for road expansion, and the operator wants to maximize their financial return.  The party with money has more power and advantages within the relationship.

There can be problems with HOT lanes in terms of how to get scofflaws to pay and public oversight of the process of penalizing non-payers. 

One advantage of HOT lanes is that they tend to be well run in terms of maintenance and "accident clearance," because of performance standards within the contract. 

Sometimes, because use projections have been too robust, the projects go into bankruptcy, and either the project is refinanced, acquired by another operator, or sometimes acquired by the public sector.

HOT lanes are big in Virginia. The are expanding in the I-95 corridor and will be extended to the I-66 corridor (66 Express Lanes website). 

They function in Northern Baltimore too, on I-95, where they are run by the state ("I-95 toll lanes set to open north of Baltimore," Washington Post), but it isn't clear that the system needed the capacity expansion as much as they were a political priority of the Ehrlich Administration, which also approved the creation of the Inter County Corridor toll road in Northern Montgomery and Prince George's Counties.

There have been some complaints, which I think are reasonable, that the HOT lanes for 495 in Virginia would work better if they were integrated with Maryland roads. 

Definitely that makes sense for the I-270 corridor, which needs a broader corridor management approach as I wrote about last year ("Transportation network interruptions as an opportunity: Part 2" and "Transportation network service interruptions part 3: corridor/commute shed management for Northwest DC and Montgomery County, Maryland"), but I argued that if HOT lanes were extended to I-495/American Legion Bridge and I-270, they should be accompanied by simultaneous transit improvements.

Along those lines, I came across an article about the integration of toll lanes in the SR-91 corridor--a corridor management plan--for both Orange and Riverside Counties.  The toll lanes started out in Orange County, but were extended by Riverside County for 8 miles, to better manage the road resource and add capacity ("91 Express Lanes in Orange County paved way for new toll lanes opening Monday in Riverside," Orange County Register).

While each county will keep the tolls it collects, the lanes are managed and operated jointly across the two counties.  This is a big deal because such agreements typically are handled by "joint powers authorities" operating at a multi-county scale.

My concerns about the Maryland "Traffic Relief Plan"

1.  The road expansion proposals are mode-specific and aren't part of a complete and integrated multi-modal proposal.

Virginia's Atlantic Gateway project ("What to expect from Virginia's Atlantic Gateway projects," Washington Post) is a good example of what is missing in the Maryland proposal.

Maryland is proposing roadway expansion only.  While Virginia is focusing on roadway expansion, they are also working on large scale transit improvements at the metropolitan and regional scales. 

Although there is justifiable criticism that transit service (long distance bus) was supposed to be included in the 495 Express Lanes project and it wasn't.  (It is supposed to be a significant element of adding tolling to I-66.)

The Atlantic Gateway considers how to simultaneously improve other modes and shift trips away from the automobile when it is efficient and cost effective to do so.  The Maryland HOT lanes proposal does not.

Maryland already has an expansion program for MARC, the passenger railroad system, but for the most part it isn't moving forward, with the exception of work towards extending service on the Penn Line to Delaware.

According to the Wilmington News-Journal ("Maryland trains to Newark inch closer"), either MARC could extend from Perryville to Newark, or alternatively, SEPTA could extend from Newark to Perryville.  Service could start in about three years.

Lower Hudson Transit Link proposed bus service, Westchester/Rockland, New York

As another example of providing integrated transportation improvements using a corridor management approach, the new Tappan Zee Bridge in New York State, which primarily serves automobile and truck traffic, is accompanied by a program of transit and traffic improvements called the Lower Hudson Transit Link, targeting the I-287 corridor, although the new bus service connecting Westchester and Rockland Counties won't open until next year with the opening of the Bridge's second span (and the final service program will be truncated, as it originally anticipated providing service as far south as the Bronx ("Street Beat: A New Bus For A New Bridge. TZx–>LHTL," Nyack News and Views).



Light rail and MARC train, Camden Yards Station, Baltimore

MARC expansion more generally, my idea for beginning to merge the MARC and VRE systems ("A new backbone for the regional transit system: merging the MARC Penn and VRE Fredericksburg Lines"), and ideas expressed in this post, "Setting the stage for the Purple Line light rail line to be an overwhelming success: Part 2 | proposed parallel improvements across the transit network," proposing complementary transit network improvements simultaneous with the creation of the Purple Line light rail line are the kinds of things missing from the Maryland transportation infrastructure expansion HOT Lanes expansion initiative.

2.  Too much money sloshing around in financial markets favors HOT lane projects.

Because there is a lot of money out there to finance toll projects, these kinds of road construction projects ends up making states like Maryland more focused on expanding roads, rather than considering road expansions as part of a broader set of transportation system improvements, including long distance transit (railroad and commuter bus), medium distance transit (subway, light rail, bus), and short distance transit.

Separately, this problem, the availability of financing and revenue generating capability driving transportation "planning," is endemic to the various proposals by the Trump Administration for investment in "infrastructure" ("The Many Problems With Donald Trump's Infrastructure Plan," Newsweek Magazine).

3.  There's no way that Maryland will be able to negotiate an agreement with the Federal Government/NPS on a short time frame to be able to get control of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway.

The Baltimore-Washington Parkway is owned and operated by the National Park Service.  NPS doesn't willingly give up programs, especially when the change is likely to be accompanied by changes that aren't congruent with natural resource preservation, conservation, and management principles. 

Even in situations where the federal government wants to give up property, it takes years.  For example it took about 5-6 years to transfer the deaccessioned Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the DC Government.  

Although various proposals over the decades have put forth transferring the road to the State of Maryland, but for various reasons such a change was never consummated.  Similarly, issues concerning the Parkway and various use matters have been top of mind for awhile ("B-W Parkway Upgrades: How, When?: NPS, FMA Discuss," BizMonthly), including a proposal to widen the road initiated by a Baltimore-area Congressman, Dutch Ruppersberger ("Plan to widen BW Parkway concerns local officials," Washington Examiner).

The announcement by Governor Hogan wrt the Parkway illustrates that such initiatives tend to have very long histories.

4.  However, it would be a good idea for NPS to get out of the road operation business.

First and foremost, the National Park Service should be focused on park management and operations.  While parkways in the Washington-Baltimore area run by the NPS do connect various park installations, for the most part these roads serve transportation purposes.  Roadway operation that is not park related diverts scarce funds from parks.

It would be better for NPS to give up financial responsibility for this and other parkways in the DC-Baltimore area, and reprogram monies spent on these roads to other NPS priorities, given their gargantuan maintenance backlog. See the 2016 blog entry, "The National Park Service shouldn't be on the hook for basic roadway infrastructure in the Washington Metropolitan Area."

5.  The parkway is a particular type of long distance road treatment that is "park like" in conception.  Adding HOT lanes to the Baltimore Washington Parkway completely changes its context, negatively.

There's something to be said for roads that aren't "traffic sewers," that are park-like.  For example, according to a History of Pelham Parkway in the Bronx borough of New York City:

The parkway is lined with trees on both sides and had a strict building code. Nobody was allowed to build within 150 feet of the center. No railroads were allowed to cross over the parkway; this is why the roadbed of the New Haven Railroad had to be laid in a tunnel underneath the parkway which is now the Dyre Avenue subway line. Bars and hotels are also prohibited from being built alongside the parkway.

Baltimore Washington Parkway as a scenic entry to Washington, DC.  NPS photo.

It would be a shame to lose the park-like elements of the BWI Parkway. Although granted, it can be full of cars now and isn't the kind of experience that was intended by the parkway's creators.

While there are many "parkways" that are freeway-like in terms of the volume of traffic, they are still park-like in design. I doubt there are any HOT lane projects with a parkway-like design, and I can't imagine that is a concern of the Hogan Administration.

If NPS would even agree to the change, if Maryland were to take this road over and change its context, in return significant mitigation benefits in terms of park and transportation system (bikeways and trails and transit improvements especially) should be provided, something that is unlikely to be received warmly by the Hogan Administration.

Some highway stuff

1.  I didn't realize that technically, the 60th anniversary of the US Interstate Highway System is this week.

One of the infographics released with the report.

A road advocacy group, TRIP, has released a report opining about future needs, The Interstate Highway System Turns 60: Challenges to Its Ability to Continue to Save Lives, Time and Money.  From the press release:

The TRIP report ... finds that while the Interstate Highway System represents only 2.5 percent of lane miles in the U.S., it carries 25 percent of the nation’s vehicle travel. The system is increasingly congested, with truck travel growing at a rate twice that of overall Interstate travel. And, while the nation’s Interstates tend to be in better condition than other roads and bridges, the aging system lacks the required funding for needed improvements and repairs.

2. Something else I didn't know is that Pennsylvania has the highest state gasoline excise tax. Technically, it's not an excise tax on gasoline, but a set of various taxes that add up to the equivalent.

According to the Harrisburg Patriot-News "Get ready for another gas tax increase," the tax is rising to fund Act 89, an infrastructure bill passed a few years ago, which is providing a wide range of funding for road, bridge, transit, bicycle, and pedestrian projects (although the bike funding is middling, equivalent to less than a rounding error, "Non gasoline-tax initiatives to fund transportation projects"). From the article:

But it's unfair to compare Pennsylvania's gas tax with other states, Kirkpatrick said, since other states have various means of paying for roads and bridges instead of relying mainly on gas taxes and motor license fees.

Some charge sales tax, and some have vehicle registration fees in the hundreds of dollars, Kirkpatrick said.

And Pennsylvania's road system is larger than many states. It is equal to that of New England, New Jersey and New York combined, he said.

"It is a user fee in essence. If you are driving and buying gas, you are being charged a user fee to keep the roads in good shape," Kirkpatrick said.

Without the additional revenue, we would face deteriorated highways and bridges, more vehicle repairs, and weight restrictions or closures on roads and bridges, Kirkpatrick said.

The state's Act 89 web site shows 9,557 projects totaling about $32 billion are planned or completed over the next 12 years, provided funding is available.

I do think the point about the size of the state's mobility (road) network relative to other states is an interesting point. Similarly, the road and transit networks are old too, which means that they cost more to maintain.

3.  However, because the same funding pool is used to fund the Pennsylvania State Police, unless things change, eventually all of the increased funding for transportation infrastructure improvements will be instead directed to the police ("What's eating up a growing share of transportation funds? It's not road and bridge work").

4.  Plus, Pennsylvania Turnpike tolls continue to rise ("Travel on Pa. Turnpike in 2017 will take a bigger toll on your wallet") because the Legislature passed a law requiring the Turnpike Authority to make annual payments to the State of $450 million, which is used to fund transit.

But a lawsuit in New York State, where New York State Turnpike tolls are used to fund the state's canal system, found that it was unreasonable to fund the canal system in this way.  It's possible that a lawsuit in Pennsylvania could find the diversion of toll monies to transit is illegal also.  (Note that tolls on the Dulles Toll Road in Northern Virginia are used to fund the construction of the Silver Line Metrorail line.)

Beginning to develop a framework for understanding the success and failure of toll road projects

The Washington Post reports ("95 Express Lanes mark first anniversary") that the first year of high occupancy toll Express Lanes on I-95 in Northern Virginia have been reasonably successful, with 37% of the users having incomes > $100,000, and 43% with incomes from $50,000 to $100,000.

HOT lanes are specially tolled lanes, usually funded and constructed by the private sector, in contract with those entities that run the freeway system.  Lanes are added but with tolls, with the expectation that the tolls pay for the road construction and operation of the new roadway, but the added capacity also facilitates throughput on the non-tolled lanes.

The HOV lanes on I-395, which continue northward from I-95 at the Springfield interchange are going to be converted to HOT lanes now as well ("Virginia to extend I-95/395 HOT lanes north to D.C. line," Washington Post).

Opponents who argue for untolled expansion, often pejoratively refer to HOT lanes as "Lexus Lanes," or roads for the rich.  (Note that the I-95 project was particularly controversial because lanes were added, but at the same time, the High Occupancy Vehicle lanes--which require that cars have three occupants--were converted into HOT lanes, although qualified HOVs can still use the lanes for no additional charge.)

But the Inter County Connector in Montgomery and Prince George's County, Maryland hasn't been particularly successful, and there are plenty of other "public-private partnership" ventures with other toll roads in the region and nationally which have, over the years, been in bankruptcy and changed operators as a result ("Are private toll roads a losing idea?," Reuters; "Pocahontas 895 toll road under a new operator," Richmond Times-Dispatch; "Dulles Greenway: Deal or no deal? As tolls keep rising...," Washington Business Journal; "State launches review of toll-road finances," Orange County Register).  Plus the I-95 HOT lane project north of Baltimore doesn't seem to be particularly successful either.

The bankruptcy of the Indiana Toll Road in particular got a lot of attention ("Australian company buys bankrupt Indiana Toll Road vendor," Chicago Tribune).

Tolls are always controversial because drivers believe they are already paying the full cost of roads. Toll proposals are always going to be controversial, as has been proven with the move to toll inbound I-66 in Northern Virginia ("State Approves I-66 Inside the Beltway Plan: Tolls Begin in 2017," Fairfax County) as well as in the Hampton Roads area and the expansion of the Midtown Tunnels there ("Virginia is getting soaked on Midtown Tunnel deal," Washington Post) because it contravenes the "spirit" of the "open road" and the fervent but incorrect (and vehement) belief that gasoline taxes fully cover the costs of road maintenance and expansion.

Even so, planning for more tolling, justified by the need to address demand expansion, limited funds and an unwillingness to raise gasoline taxes, continues apace (e.g., "Six new toll scenarios being considered for Hampton Roads," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot ) especially because Congress is unwilling to increase the federal gasoline excise tax even as revenues are eroded by inflation and improvements in vehicle efficiency.

The recent passage of the federal transportation bill is noteworthy for not raising the tax, which has remained the same for 23 years.

The Reuters piece ends with this paragraph:

The call for a national infrastructure bank must be balanced with an accounting of the successes and failures of this model of public asset control. America desperately needs infrastructure funding, but passing assets into private hands has produced many failures. That must be taken into account.

Thinking about all I've read on toll road projects, I'd argue that there are four types of road projects that tend to be built and only 1.5 of the types are likely to be financially successful in the short to intermediate term. That means a lot of projects will fail.

Partly the failures are a function of the political process (and the Growth Machine demand for access) when economic projections are "shaped" in order to support political-ideological positions, but aren't likely to be met in terms of financial success.

The four types of toll roads:

1.  Adding capacity to highly congested roadways serving large employment centers with highly paid jobs (I-95/I-395/I-66 in Northern Virginia).

2.  Adding more capacity to minimally congested roadways serving deconcentrated employment centers without a preponderance of high paying jobs (I-95 north of Baltimore).

3.  Building new roads to provide better connections or access  in areas that are developing when other sources of funding do not exist (Dulles Toll Road) with a great degree of latent demand and a set of concentrated origins and destinations.

4.  Building new roads to provide better connections or access to "new" areas for development when other sources of funding do not exist (Dulles Greenway, Inter County Connector, Pocahantas Parkway, Richmond) with limited latent demand and critical mass.  Usage may be seemingly large, such as in the case of the Dulles Greenway, with more than 45,000 daily users, but it isn't enough to pay off the financing.

A sign announces that the 73 toll road no longer take cash payments, but it doesn't say how much the toll is for drivers. Sam Gangwer, Orange County Register.

Category 1 projects tend to be successful, although often still experience financial difficulties because of the high upfront costs. Category 2 projects tend to fail.

In addition to vagaries in the cost of financing, the success of Category 3 projects over Category 4 projects is dependent on the relative population density of the area, a concentrated set of origins and destinations, and higher vs. lower income populations.  Mostly, Category 4 roads are built in advance of demand and when built by the private sector, can fall into bankruptcy, which contributes to escalating toll rates.

Dulles Toll Road is reasonably successful--it has funded, with a great deal of animus and a recognition of unfairness, a goodly amount of the Silver Line Metrorail project in Fairfax and Loudoun Counties in Virginia ("Washington Airports Authority control of Dulles Toll Road looking shaky over $325m misspend," TollRoads News).

The Dulles Greenway went into bankruptcy because it was built before there was much demand for its use.  Similarly, the Inter County Connector provides an alternative to I-495 and I-95, but has configuration issues and the area it serves isn't particularly dense.  Had it been funded and operated by the private sector, it may have gone into bankruptcy.

Category 4 projects are likely to fail, in that they enter bankruptcy.  Although this may be a feature, not a bug, in that it allows local governments then to buy the road at a price lower than it cost to construct the road in the first place.  When the roads are locally funded, they don't go into bankruptcy but do absorb larger shares of the highway budget than can be justified on the basis of use.

Not paying tolls as a form of resistance.  The Washington media was full of reports about the I-95 Express Lanes and their "going after" persistent nonpayers.
While some of the large bills due were in fact the result of system problems, according to the operator of the roads, Trans Urban, the vast majority of the people in Court over nonpayment persistently don't pay and have received many notices of this fact.  I wonder if their nonpayment is a form of "resistance," just like a demonstration. Also see "Since nixing booths, toll roads continue to struggle with unpaid tolls, deliberate violators," Orange County Register.

Privately operated toll roads tend to be operated better than non-toll freeways. As discussed in the past blog entry "Town-city management: 'We are all asset managers now'," because privately operated toll roads are fee for service and governed by detailed contractual requirements, the roads tend to be managed and operated to higher standards than typical roadways.

Partly this is the result of managing the roadways in terms of maximum uptime, which means that the toll roads tend to have a much more robust approach to "incident management." Rather than letting traffic accidents fester, with incident management the aim is to clear the roadway as soon as possible, to facilitate throughput. Typically this is not a priority on freeways run by local and state departments of transportation.

History.  Before the 20th Century, most long distance roads were privately constructed and tolls were the way the builders got paid.

Turnpikes run by governmental authorities, such as the Ohio Turnpike, the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the Indiana Toll Road, the Garden State Parkway, New York Thruway, Massachusetts Turnpike and others, were the successors to these roads.  Tolls were justified because much of the traffic was "through traffic" not originating in the state, and people believed that the users should justifiably be charged for creating and operating the roadway.

When the Interstate Highway system was created, it was legislated to be "free," although pre-existing toll roads were included in the system without having to end their tolling programs.