DC area transit commission board member thinks he has a brilliant idea on how to fund Metrorail: sales taxes

Given that I only tangentially "live" in DC these days, writing all the time about DC seems misplaced.  

Then again, I understand the place, there are universal lessons, and a lot of dumb stuff that I feel compelled to write about--I joke that I might not be a good planner, but I am great at gap analysis, and man are there many "gaps" in how planning is done in the DMV.

Similarly, my writings on DC area transit, even if trenchant, sometimes bore even me.  I mean, how many times can you write the same thing over and over and over, like this piece just two weeks ago:

-- "What to do about DC area Metrorail?," May 18, 2022

The Washington Post reports "Transit commission chairman offers advice for Metro’s funding problems." From the article:

Michael Goldman proposes Metro pitch the public on a sales tax after it wins back confidence

Sales taxes will save WMATA?  Um, wtf?

The reason this gets me is that for about 20 years, the idea of funding WMATA in part through sales taxes has been bandied about, editorialized about favorably in the Washington Post, etc.  Brookings fellow (I think now Virginia Tech professor) Robert Puentes has been the most visible proponent.

-- Washington's Metro: Deficits by Design, Brookings, 2004
-- "Keeping Metro On Track: The Federal Government's Role in Balacing Investment With Accountability at Washington's Transit Agency," Brookings, 2005
-- "Mass Transit: Issues Related to Providing Dedicated Funding for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority," GAO, 2006

I think sales taxes should be one of the funding streams, sure, but the 2008 Recession proved that sales taxes as a revenue stream for transit drop precipitously in recessions, endangering service.  Systems across the country big and small made massive service cuts in response to funding losses.

But the problem is bigger than safety and successful operation.    

1.  Crisis is a bad time to ask for money.  Although yes, first, being in crisis and performing badly isn't the time to ask for such funding.  Although to be fair, Michael Goldman concedes the point.

2.  The three jurisdictions controlling WMATA, Maryland, Virginia, and DC, disagree on the purpose of transit.  Sadly, the three jurisdictions, especially Maryland and Virginia, don't have congruence on what they think the system is supposed to do and how to fund it.  

3. The best time to ask for regularized funding is when you're successful.  I've made the point, in part because of this issue, that the best time to ask for regularized funding is when you're wildly successful, not desperate.  This should have been pursued in the 1980s, when WMATA was wildly successful, growing, and seemingly well managed, definitely a still young system in good repair.

Rebuilding the regional consensus about transit.  Note that in 2009 and later, after the crash that killed 9 people, I wrote that it was necessary to rebuild the regional consensus on transit, what it was supposed to do and why, how to manage it, etc.

-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis continued and 2016's 40th anniversary of WMATA as an opportunity to rebuild (2015)
-- "WMATA and two types of public relations programs (2015)
-- WMATA 40th anniversary in 2016 as an opportunity for assessment (2014)
-- St. Louis regional transit planning process as a model for what needs to be done in the DC Metropolitan region (2009)

Even without the crash this was necessary because from a planning standpoint the system was over 50 years old, even if it didn't start opening until 1976

The consensus "thingy" is important because transit service is hardly the exclusive domain of WMATA.  Yes they provide the precovid most frequently used transit service in the region, Metrorail heavy rail, and highly used "regional bus services," Metrobus.  

But most of the jurisdictions now provide bus service, DC has a streetcar service independent of WMATA, Maryland will be running the Purple Line light rail independent of WMATA (although fares will be integrated), the MARC and VRE rail services are independent of WMATA, and other transit types of services are being promoted like gondola or ferries, to be operated independently of WMATA, etc.  Amtrak Virginia offers services, there are inter-city bus services, etc.

Commenter charlie argues that the problems result from the tension of acting as commuter rail versus a city subway for DC and Arlington (see comments here, "Can WMATA's death spiral be staunched?," 2016).

Transit financing.  And I've written a lot about WMATA and financing.  It has a big problem in that the jurisdictions appropriate money on a year-by-year basis, not as a matter of course.  Yes, this does make it harder for the agency.  Especially because jurisdictions will put off capital expenditures as long as possible.  Many people make the point that lack of dedicated funding is why the system is in failure mode.  I disagree.

-- Getting WMATA out of crisis: a continuation of a multi-year problem that keeps getting worse, not better (2015)
-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis (2015)

And as I've argued, the federal transit pass has historically disproportionately funded the system, alongside the practice of charging fares by mode--most systems charge one fare for a bus+rail ride.  Not WMATA.  They charge two.  And pass products lowering the overall cost of transit have historically been a low priority.

This let the system get sloppy in terms of finance, budgeting, and understanding why "WMATA is so successful at funding operations from farebox revenue."

My solution: Step 1: creating a regional transport association.  The fact that there are so many "mobility" services, even beyond transit (taxis, car sharing, bike sharing, scooters, etc.) is why I've argued that the DC area should adopt the German form of regional transport association (called a VV, Verkehrsverbund), which links planning, budgeting and operation into one overarching organization, even if many different entities provide actual transit service.    They have an integrated planning and transit fare media system.  But there are over 20 operators of the various services, including private operators of bus lines.

-- The answer is: Create a single multi-state/regional multi-modal transit planning, management, and operations authority association, 2017
-- Metropolitan Mass Transit Planning: Towards a Hierarchical and Conceptual Framework
(presentation in 2010, at the University of Delaware Institute of Public Administration)
-- (Sort of a repeat) Without the right transportation planning framework, metropolitan areas are screwed, and that includes the DC area (2011)
-- "Verkehrsverbund: The evolution and spread of fully integrated regional public transport in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland," Ralph Buehler, John Pucher & Oliver Dümmler,  International Journal of Sustainable Transportation (2018)
-- "Branding's (NOT) All you need for transit," 2018

It should also aim to integrate for profit providers (car sharing, etc.) into what I call the "sustainable mobility platform framework."

Step 2: Separate planning from budgeting.  Too many transit services in the DC area make planning subsidiary to budgeting.  I understand why this happens, but if there were true "mass transit planning," we would define the breadth and depth of the network that we want.  And then come up with the funding to make it happen.

Transit operators would come back and say: you've defined the network breadth and depth (level of service) as X.  But the funding won't support that.  Then there would have to be a discussion of how to address funding shortfalls in terms of raising revenues or cutting service.

Step 3: Fix the Funding.  Yep, it needs to be done, but not just for Metrorail, for all of the regional transit services.  This entry from 2013, "Metrolinx Toronto: 25 potential tools to fund transit-transportation infrastructure," suggests a more structured process for identifying funding than an interview published in the Post.

Step 4: WRT WMATA, declare force majeure, and contract out operation of the heavy rail system to Hong Kong's MTR.  Start over.  Force majeure allows the abrogation of all contracts and starting over.  MTR runs the subway system in Hong Kong, the just opened Elizabeth Line and other lines in London. lines in at least three cities in China, and the heavy rail systems in Stockholm and Melbourne (London’s new Elizabeth Line is open – and it’s being run by Hong Kong’s MTR," South China Morning Post). (Then again, there is that US versus China political issue.)

Pre-covid, the Hong Kong subway system had about 5 million daily riders, which is about 7x higher than WMATA's precovid ridership on Metrorail.

MTR does a good job.   By contrast WMATA is failing.

As the British would say "WMATA needs to be sorted."  

The way it's being overseen, managed, operated, and funded isn't working.

All but one of the bus transit providers in Raleigh-Durham use the same logo and livery design, 

with different colors for different agencies.

Step 5: Reconfigure bus service in the metropolitan area.  A VV also has the opportunity to rearticulate bus service.  Recommendation 13 in "Setting the stage for the Purple Line light rail line to be an overwhelming success: Part 2 | the program (macro changes)" suggests:

Consider a redesign and rebranding of the the metropolitan area's bus systems into an integrated framework, comparable to that of GoTransit in the Raleigh-Durham area.

Although recommendations 10, 11, 12, and 15 also address bus service, with 15 focused on an overnight metropolitan Night Owl bus network.

-- "Will buses ever be cool? Boston versus the Raleigh-Durham's GoTransit Model," 2017
-- "Making bus service sexy and more equiable," 2012
-- "Route 7 BRT proposal communicates the reality that the DC area doesn't adequately conduct transportation planning at the metropolitan-scale," 2016