To Change Company Culture, Focus on Systems—Not Communication

I was fortunate in college to have taken a class that included Social Psychology of Organizations as a textbook.  It taught me about systems thinking.  (I'd lost my copy of the book, but recently repurchased it.  If you do, make sure to get the 1978 edition.)   

A few other books I read then, but not for class, further strengthened my thinking on this, including Diffusion of Innovations, Strategic Marketing for Not-For-Profit Organizations, and Change: Principles for Problem Formation and Problem Resolution.

Later, books like Reengineering the Corporation, Reinventing Government and Process Innovation.  Processes are systems or elements of sub-systems, and they aren't unique to IT or corporations.

So the headline of this Harvard Business Review article, "To Change Company Culture, Focus on Systems—Not Communication," called out to me.  I've written tons of articles espousing applying systems thinking to urban revitalization and planning ("20th anniversary of the blog| Urban revitalization systems thinking's greatest hits: Part one -- (in)FAQ and my influences").

It's too bad people don't read blogs anymore, or that I haven't changed with the times, with say a Substack newsletter, or Medium.

From the article (emphasis added):

Culture is one of the most talked-about priorities in leadership, yet one of the least consistently understood. Executives routinely declare it is a strategic imperative. They launch values campaigns, unveil wellbeing programs, revise mission statements, and deliver impassioned talks about trust and purpose. But for all this activity, something isn’t working: in many organizations, we’ve seen that the louder leaders talk about culture, the more performative it feels—especially when actions don’t align with the message.

Culture shapes everything from decision-making norms to employee engagement, brand perception to risk tolerance. When it’s mismanaged, organizations don’t just lose trust; they lose traction.

... A consistent pattern emerged: many leaders treat culture as a communication strategy. They believe it lives in messaging—in the articulation of purpose, the rollout of values, the tone of internal campaigns. But culture doesn’t shift because a new narrative is introduced. It shifts when systems change.

What we found was striking: culture doesn’t fail because it’s forgotten. It fails because it’s misunderstood. It’s treated as branding, not behavior. As output, not infrastructure. And when that happens—even the most well-meaning efforts can erode the very trust they’re meant to build. Here’s what we learned.

... In many organizations, work on culture begins with visible gestures. Leadership teams roll out refreshed values, commission posters, launch Slack emoji packs, or schedule empathy workshops. While the intent is often genuine, when these symbolic efforts aren’t accompanied by a shift in leadership behavior, employees don’t feel inspired—they disengage.

Funny, this finding was the basis of the work by organizational psychologist Chris Argyris, who researched and wrote extensively on organizations and their ability to change. He found that while people expressed beliefs that they were collaborative and open to ground up approaches, the reality was the opposite, and a focus on top down decision making.  From the article:

The problem isn’t the intention—it’s the framing. Culture is still too often treated like a project: something to roll out, brand, or assign to HR. Meanwhile, underlying power dynamics, communication habits, and decision-making norms go untouched, and the deeper operating system stays intact.

Another HBR article had a lot of impact on me, "Your Company's Secret Change Agents," about how to elevate pockets of excellence in organizations that weren't high performing.  It was a rewarding but challenging article--I had to read it a couple times to fully understand it.

It's especially relevant to cities that are more distressed, emerging, and transitioning.

Redefining what public safety means: Community Safety Partnership, Los Angeles

Defund the police versus... My big disappointment over the reaction to the death of George Floyd at the hands of a police officer was not the demonstrations, except when violent or used by thieves as an opportunity to commit crimes, was the slogan "Defund the Police" ("Is it too late to change the messaging on "Defund the Police"? How about "Reconstruct Policing"?"," 2020).

Redefining public safety.  The slogan certainly hasn't helped the Democrats, who've been wrong-footed on public safety ever since.  Most importantly, it obscured the real need, to redefine what public safety means and how to deliver it.

A multi-faceted public safety response, including police, at least initially costs more to deliver than the current system.  Although maybe not once savings are counted.

What is public safety? Is it to just arrest people after they commit a crime, is to provide the mental health care services that when not provided lead to people's problems being defined as criminal, is it to create lasting structural change with a number of moving parts, police--because face it, some people need to be "policed", mental health services and crews, programs to break the generational cycle of crime in low income neighborhoods. Etc.

Alex Vitale's End of Policing has some provocative suggestions about how to decriminalize many social problems, which have been criminalized because the lack of alternatives to police.

It's not "bad apple" police officers, the system is the "bad apple." It's unfortunate that the concept of "broken windows" policing ("Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety," Atlantic Magazine, 1982) got translated into practice as "zero tolerance" policing, with a focus on citing or arresting people for the most minor of violations.  

I often think that the New York City Transit Police--under William Bratton before he became overall Police Commissioner and the Transit Police were merged into NYPD--is the only place where true "broken windows" policing, with a focus on addressing disorder in terms of both people and place, was implemented.

-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 1, theory and practice," 2016
-- "The state of "broken windows" versus "problem oriented policing" strategies in 2016: Part 2, what to do," 2016
-- "Broken windows/collective efficacy: Baltimore; Newark; Grand Junction, Colorado; Pittsburgh; Albany," 2019
-- "Transit safety and security: Broken Windows theory and reality | and the state of transit safety today," 2023
-- "Proof of Broken Windows theory in Philadelphia and New York City," 2024

Failures repeat and few officers face repercussions for their illegal acts.  The blog entry "The opportunity to rearticulate public safety delivery keeps being presented: Rochester New York" (2021) and the comments section discusses a broader paradigm for providing public safety focusing on continued problems in Rochester New York, when police respond to people with mental health issues.

Just last week, three Memphis police officers were exonerated for the killing of a man they cornered in a traffic stop ("3 former Memphis police officers found not guilty in the death of Tyre Nichols," NPR).  To me, these cases and those resulting in large payouts--e.g., Chicago spends millions of dollars per year on settlements over police misconduct--ought to be indicators of a need for a structural approach to change ("Where is the risk management approach to police misconduct and regularized killings of citizens?," 2020).

Spending billions to maintain a community's level of crime and poverty/equity planning.  After my grand jury service in 2013, I was left with the thought that DC spends a couple billion dollars per year just to keep the low income parts of the system the same, at a negative equilibrium.  In Los Angeles a similar estimate is many many billions of dollars per year.

That led me to write about equity planning and social urbanism.

-- "An outline for integrated equity planning: concepts and programs," 2017
-- "Equity planning: an update," 2020
-- "Black community, economic and social capital: the Englewood neighborhood of Chicago/Chicago," 2021

Community Safety Partnership, Los Angeles.  Besides NYC subways, Los Angeles probably has one of the most significant "public safety" initiatives built on broken windows windows principles in the US, the "Community Safety Partnership" ("How Watts and the LAPD make peace," Los Angeles Times).

I first wrote about the CSP in "Los Angeles police department "Community Safety Partnership"" (2014) after seeing it featured on the old Bryant Gumbel HBO TV show on sports.

In 2020, I wrote a follow up speculative piece applying it to different kinds of neighborhoods not dealing with gang problems like LA, but the problems resulting from drug use ("Creating 'community safety partnership neighborhood management programs as a management and mitigation strategy for public nuisances: Part 3 (like homeless shelters)."

The heart of the program is building a new relationship between the community and the police department ("American Police Must Own Their Racial Injustices," American Prospect)

New article on the CSP.  Last week, Rolling Stone Magazine published an up to date article on the program, "Inside the Battle for the Soul of the LAPD."

... the most salient thing Coughlin did in 2011 was say yes to Emada Tingirides. Tingirides, a Black sergeant and unstoppable rock star in the LAPD, had been tasked with setting up four new squads to undertake the impossible in Watts: to make peace with its residents, build faith with its leaders, and break the gangs’ stranglehold on its corners. Those new units, to be known as the Community Safety Partnership (CSP), were the brainchild of a pair of ex-combatants: the newly named police chief, Charlie Beck, and a firebrand opponent of gang cops and chiefs, the social-justice titan Connie Rice. After years of warfare in open court — Rice, an attorney and civil rights activist, had spent decades suing men like Beck for their “blue grip” suppression of the poor — they’d come to a hard-won truth: Shock-and-awe policing didn’t work. Far from making Los Angeles safe, it wreaked war without end between cops and gangs, and turned Watts and Compton into domestic kill zones, forever blighting the lives of the kids raised there.

It was no one’s intent to invent the future of policing when CSP was launched in 2011. But that is precisely what its founders have done: built a new breed of cop and retooled the social contract between a community and the officers who protect it. It’s premised in the notion that safety is a covenant between two parties: the cops who patrol the riskiest streets, and residents who trust and respect those cops enough to help them keep the peace. That is where CSP comes in. It deploys its cops less as foot patrolmen than as problem-­solvers. They get streetlights fixed, abandoned cars towed, and gang graffiti scrubbed. They find jobs for strapped parents, treatment for first offenders, and vocational education for at-risk teens. They sit gang leaders down and strike a pact: They’ll ignore petty drug deals and public drinking on weekends in exchange for those men leaving their weapons at home. Above all, they recruit every kid they can find for CSP rec teams and youth clubs. Volunteer-based outfits like the Police Athletic League have been around for decades, offering after-school programs, tutoring, and camps in major cities across the country, but L.A. is actually paying CSP cops to run cheer squads and reading groups. 

... He walks me through the protocols CSP established before it sent its officers into Watts. Stop the stop-and-frisk — a tactic Bratton endorsed — replace it with stop-and-chat, and get to know everyone on your beat. Focus less on crime than the problems that create it, especially with respect to school-age kids. Become their Pee Wee coach or their reading tutor. Take them out to Popeyes for heart-to-hearts. And when violent crimes occur, go arrest the doer, then return and ask his folks what they need: cash or food assistance, a job-training slot, an after-school program.

Despite the success, it's a constant battle to keep the CSP program in LA going, because it is so different from how police departments mostly operate on the principles of "warrior policing," "zero tolerance policing," "shock and awe" policing, mass incarceration, and focusing on car-based response to 911 calls rather than place-based policing.  It's another example that the problems of policing are structural, not the fault of a bad apple or two.

For example, a pilot CSP was created in the MacArthur Park area of LA.  But it never became part of the program, wasn't continued, and the gains have all been lost ("Community safety partnership for MacArthur Park in Los Angeles?").  And the program hasn't expanded to abutting neighborhoods that have similar problems.

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Exemplary public safety programs, that are mostly one-offs

• the above-mentioned Community Safety Partnership
• true broken windows policing
• Fullerton, California police department reorganized after officers beat a homeless man to death ("Killing people is seen as a routine outcome, not as an indicator of the need for change: Orange County Sheriff's Department versus Fullerton Police Department," 2022)
• CAHOOTS (Eugene, Oregon) and other mental health response units here and there across the country--nevertheless most cities don't have enough teams to provide round the clock service and killings at the hands of police still occur
• Domestic violence response unit, High Point, NC and Appleton, Wisconsin  (""How High Point, N.C., Solved Its Domestic Violence Problem," Governing Magazine, "11 questions that could save a woman's life," Appleton Post-Crescent)
• Operation Ceasefire, gang intervention program, Boston ("Straight Outta Boston," Mother Jones)

Chicago Community Policing Study

Civic groups in Chicago joined in to commission a study, Operationalizing Community Policing Within the Chicago Police Department: A Summary of Current and Promising National Practices, to help the Chicago Police Department realize its goal to become an agency committed to "community oriented policing."

21CP’s study – which involved interviews with personnel and community stakeholders with direct knowledge of community policing practices in 17 jurisdictions nationally as well as a review of relevant literature –identified a number of elements that CPD’s community policing approach should reflect and incorporate going forward, including:  

• Community policing must be an express, defined overall philosophy. In many, but not all, of the departments studied, community policing is specifically identified as an overall philosophy of policing and an overarching way that the department does its work – and not a specialized program with its own label, name, or personnel
• Community engagement must be understood as part of, but not the same as, overall community policing. Because community policing involves dynamic partnership with community to co-produce public safety, it necessarily requires police personnel to foster relationships with community stakeholders. However, operationalizing “community policing” likely benefits from police departments systematically describing how that community engagement factors into a wider “community policing” philosophy or approach.
• Community policing likely benefits from formally codifying and tracking community problems, assets, and events – and from other types of centralized, department-wide coordination or administration. Even as community policing can and must happen at the level of individual officers, problem-solving efforts, community assets, and opportunities for community engagement must be inventoried, codified, and tracked so that progress can be made and measured. That is, it appears that departments benefit from maintaining some structures and processes to ensure that individual personnel are appropriately “plugged into” the department or a geographic area’s community policing concerns.
• Police agencies must articulate specific, granular performance expectations for personnel across all ranks (i.e., including supervisors) and roles on community policing responsibilities and provide training on such expectations. This may include: (1) Specific guidance on how to use unstructured community engagement time (2) Specific guidance on how to incorporate community policing principles into call response and enforcement activity (3) Specific guidance or instructions on promoting visibility (4) Designating specific expectations about the amount of time that officers should spend on community and problem-oriented policing activities; and (5) Providing personnel with responsibility for a defined geographic area
• Community policing programs benefit from mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and using performance data and metrics. For a police agency to gauge whether its personnel are in fact conducting the types of activities that community policing requires, it will necessarily benefit from collecting and analyzing information from the field about officer performance. Although some departments have established mechanisms for gauging performance and outcomes, several departments with whom 21CP engaged said that data and metrics regarding community policing is an area that they are actively trying to address – recognizing that the absence of concrete information makes it more difficult for the department to gauge its level of success and share positive outcomes with community and external stakeholders.
• Many departments benefit from having some centralized, department-wide coordination or administration of community policing. Although departments must ensure that the existence of some individuals to oversee community policing is not seen by others as making community policing someone else’s role or responsibility, they can benefit from personnel ensuring that the department, as a whole, is aligning its activities with the community policing objective.

Also see the blog entry:

-- "The opportunity to rearticulate public safety delivery keeps being presented: Rochester New York," 

The "nonprofit industrial complex," city government and service delivery

The Baltimore Sun has a commentary, "Baltimore is being strangled by the nonprofit industrial complex," criticizing the city for making a grant of almost $1 million to an organization with a limited track record.

A $900,000 grant by the Baltimore Children and Youth Fund (BCYF) to a nonprofit organization known as Thrive Arts Inc. in 2022 is the latest evidence that Baltimore’s version of the “nonprofit industrial complex” wields too much power. 

As reported by The Baltimore Sun, Thrive Arts was incorporated in 2021 but lost its corporate charter last year after failing to file tax returns for three straight years, and is [legally] now defunct.

It was an extraordinarily large grant for a small organization with no proven track record. Yet to be confirmed is how much of the $900,000 was disbursed to the grantee and spent on the purposes for which it was intended or returned to the city.

I do intend to do a book review on the book Nonprofit Neighborhoods: An Urban History of Inequality and the American State, which discusses how cities began outsourcing dealing with inequality and social issues to nonprofits.  This brief blog entry is by the author too, "The Origins of the Nonprofit Industrial Complex."

I have written many times over the years about problems with DC government grants and nonprofit execution.  

This is in the news more recently because of alleged bribes to a councilmember ("Trayon White expelled from the DC Council for corruption but he’s free to run for his old seat," AP) and government employee ("Former DC government official charged with taking bribe,"NBC4) by a grantee eager to secure their place in the system.

But it's been an issue for a long time, in fact the organization in Baltimore that is criticized by the author is similar to one that engaged in improper grant making in DC ("Harry Thomas, former D.C. Council member, is sentenced to more than three years in prison," Post), leading to the jailing of a Councilmember.

Minneapolis had some terrible problems/mistakes during covid, when it granted tens of millions to a grantee to provide meals, when the grantee had zero capacity to do so ("Minneapolis man admits to stealing at least $3.8 million from COVID-19 relief programs," KARE-TV).

Thinking about this I have five main points:

1.  A lot more money needs to be invested in capacity development and technical assistance for nonprofits, especially those receiving government grants.

2.  There must be transparency with the grant making process--something definitely not present in the Baltimore example.  An RFP and open call process with deadlines and decision making criteria.

3.  Accountability mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the right stuff is being done with the money and that it gets results.  This has been an issue with violence prevention programs in many places, including DC, where one recipient of funds recently was imprisoned for murder ("Former D.C. Violence Interrupter Sentenced for His Involvement in Drive-By Shooting," Washington City Paper, "Violence Interrupters Push Back Against Calls for Defunding," Washington Informer,  Many cities are putting hopes in violence interrupters, but few understand their challenges," NBC News).

4.  Evaluation of success and failure needs to be built into the program ("D.C.’s Violence Intervention Programs To Receive In-Depth Evaluation,".DCist").

5.  Ethics training is mentioned in the academic literature as being important.  I wonder...

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-- "Managing the brand promise of cities in the face of corruption," 2019
-- "Wow: Revisiting DC's Corruption Caucus," 2019

-- Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention, World Bank
-- "DC ethics legislation misses the point: focus on what produces corruption as a regular outcome, not monitoring," blog entry, 2011
-- Spring 2015 issue of the alumni magazine of the International Anti-Corruption Academy

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I just came across this, I haven't read it.  From the Journal of Business Ethics article, "The Labyrinth of Corruption in the Construction Industry: A System Dynamics Model Based on 40 Years of Research," :

Abstract 

The academic literature has viewed drivers of corruption in isolation and, consequently, failed to examine their synergistic effect. Such an isolated view provides incomplete information, leads to a misleading conclusion, and causes great difficulty in curbing corruption. This paper conducts a systematic literature review to identify the drivers of corruption in the construction industry. Subsequently, it develops a system dynamics (SD) model by conceptualizing corruption as a complex system of interacting drivers. Building on stakeholder and open systems theories, the proposed SD model shows how the complex reinforcing relationship between authoritative, organizational, cultural, and financial drivers of corruption further increases corrupt practices. The new model also provides lessons that can be helpful in the development of policy frameworks to control corruption in the construction industry. To achieve success in the fight against corruption, the findings of this research suggest that (1) corruption must be understood at both the organizational and state levels, (2) anticorruption practices must be informed by ethically grounded stakeholder management strategies, and (3) anticorruption reforms must go hand-in-hand with strategies to tackle the economic downturn.

No wonder corruption is so endemic.  It's embedded deep within the system.  Below is the diagram from the article showing the dimensions of corruption within construction.

Difficultly of fomenting institutional change not just a problem for minorities

I joke that half the entries I write are about best practice, the other half about worse practice and poor decision making.  Plus to be fair to elected officials even in the best circumstances change takes a long time.

I joke that I didn't start understanding patience within community organizing until my 40s, when I realized a "fast tracked" transportation project takes 10 years.

Lately too I've been thinking about how "ur academic literature" that is really important for interpretation is kind of lost to history and not referenced by current pundits.

The three big examples for me are Exit, Voice and Loyalty, about how people stay or leave organizations in the face of conflict, Diffusion of Innovations about exactly that (and the spinoff work by Geoffrey Moore, which Rogers disavowed), and Alexander Gerschenkron's papers on "The Economic Advantages of Backwardness in Historical Perspective."

The latter writings are particularly relevant to the take up of electric vehicles, and how China is overtaking the US in terms of having the preeminent position in electric car productions.  (This will be the subject of a later blog piece, along with some issues.)  In the case of China, they don't have the same investment in legacy technologies, so they can leapfrog the countries that do.

Washington Post columnist Perry Bacon has a piece, "We are facing limits from diversity," about the difficulties minorities face in trying to "change" organizations.  As someone who has worked on such issues for 30+ years, it's hardly an issue exclusive to minorities.  From the article:

... I once assumed that greater inclusion would inevitably lead to equitable policies, because people from groups that had been unfairly diminished would see injustice more clearly than others and be more motivated to address it. I don’t think that anymore. 

 ... It’s rarely directly stated that, “If we add more people of color or women to institution X, that will move it leftward.” But that assumption is embedded in a lot of discourse. Democratic politicians who are White women or people of color often emphasize their connections to those groups, hinting they will be particularly strong advocates for those who share their identities. For example, in his 2008 campaign, Barack Obama argued his candidacy was an extension of the 20th-century Black freedom movement. 

... Here’s the problem: Individuals, whatever their identity, usually don’t change powerful, established institutions, for several reasons. First of all, the minorities and women tapped to join such institutions are often chosen because they have signaled that they won’t disrupt the status quo too much. Many Black Democratic mayors and Black police chiefs have blocked efforts to increase scrutiny of officers or meaningfully reform police practices; they wouldn’t have gotten those jobs if they were going to push for major changes. 

... Second, even minorities and women who favor more progressive change are caught in a bind: Challenging the values of the institutions they are a part of would likely reduce their ability to advance, or even remain in their current roles. 

 ... The third and biggest problem is that minorities and women often simply don’t have enough internal power to change these institutions, even when they try. 

 ...Progressives should push institutions to fundamentally change, not just put more people of color in high-profile roles. The path to a consistently progressive Democratic Party is for the left to win primaries, particularly the presidential contest, and take over the party from within. A more diverse administration run by a centrist figure such as Biden isn’t enough. And when change is impossible, progressives should look to create or revitalize alternative institutions.

WRT institutional change, welcome to the club.

I did figure out some fundamentals when I did a bike and pedestrian plan for Baltimore County.  

(1) my job wasn't to be a bomb thrower but to figure out how to wend my way through the existing system and build support (at the first multi-agency meeting, a guy doing streetscape work did just that, criticizing all the other agencies--it was a good lesson) 

(2) build on existing best practice, reference it, building support across agencies.  

(3) work with advocates disappointed about not seeing progressive action from previous efforts, acknowledging that work, and how it led to the work that we're doing today.  Build on it.

(4) focus on preferred outcomes and look backwards at the system processes producing non-desirable outcomes as routine, and work on rebuilding the processes (process innovation) to generate preferred outcomes as a matter of course.

(5) make recommendations on elements like a Pedestrian and Bicycle Committee and sub-committees for political districts that were practical, and "opportunities for appointments" by elected officials.  

I was super proud of #5 and the sub-committees.  Because it would bring the executive and legislative branches together, with citizens, and a foundational agenda (from the plan).  The council districts did this have had way more progress on bike and pedestrian improvements than the council districts that haven't.

But one thing I didn't figure on... the County Executive gets to appoint the chair.  And he appointed a flunky, someone who worked for the Executive Branch, and therefore the Executive overly shaped the agenda and reduced the independence/objectivity/advocacy capacity of the group.

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That being said, systems aren't about improvement, but about maintenance of the system.  See Planning in the Public Domain and to some extent Social Psychology of Organizations.

WMATA Chief says it’s time to talk about a regional tax to help fund Metro (DC area)

Is an interview with WMATA CEO Randy Clarke (NBC Washington).

This pamphlet was an advertising supplement inserted in the Washington Star, 3/21/1976.

I get a kick out of this because this has been raised on and off for 20 years, such as in these reports from 2004-2006.

-- Washington Metro: Deficits by Design, Brookings, 2004
-- Keeping Metro On Track: The Federal Government's Role in Balacing Investment With Accountability at Washington's Transit Agency, Brookings, 2005
-- "Mass Transit: Issues Related to Providing Dedicated Funding for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, GAO, 2006

Also a statement by a transit safety commission board member:

-- "DC area transit commission board member thinks he has a brilliant idea on how to fund Metrorail: sales taxes," 2022

It's not new.

In 2009 and a couple times afterwards, I said it was necessary for WMATA to rebuild the regional/metropolitan consensus about support for transit.  And later about various funding mechanisms.

-- St. Louis regional transit planning process as a model for what needs to be done in the DC Metropolitan region, 2009
-- "WMATA 40th anniversary in 2016 as an opportunity for assessment," 2014
-- "Funding WMATA by a regional sales tax," 2017

I also wrote that the best time to ask for money is when you're successful, not in crisis (e.g., "Creativity Helps Rochester's Transit System Turn a Profit," New York Times).  

The best time would have been in the 1980s, when the system ran well and was still expanding.  Although sales taxes aren't a cure because they fall during recessions.

Regardless of Rahm Emanuel's point about not wasting crises, my observation is that governments aren't good at decision making generally, and are particularly bad during crises.  So given there's been talk about this for at leas 20 years I'm not holding my breath.

WMATA has even more issues because if either Maryland or Virginia have Republican Governors, it makes it very difficult to develop consensus support for such a tax, because they see it, justifiably or not, as helping DC disproportionately.  Right now, Virginia has a Republican Governor.  But even Democrats like Terry McAuliffe weren't super helpful.

=== From past entries:

Transit financing.  I've written a lot about WMATA and financing.  It has a big problem in that the jurisdictions appropriate money on a year-by-year basis, not as a matter of course.  Yes, this does make it harder for the agency.  Especially because jurisdictions will put off capital expenditures as long as possible.  Many people make the point that lack of dedicated funding is why the system is in failure mode.  I disagree.

-- Getting WMATA out of crisis: a continuation of a multi-year problem that keeps getting worse, not better (2015)
-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis (2015)

As I've argued, the federal transit pass has historically disproportionately funded the system, alongside the practice of charging fares by mode--most systems charge one fare for a bus+rail ride.  Not WMATA.  They charge two.  And pass products lowering the overall cost of transit have historically been a low priority.

This let the system get sloppy in terms of finance, budgeting, and understanding why "WMATA is so successful at funding operations from farebox revenue."

My solution: Step 1: creating a regional transport association.  The fact that there are so many "mobility" services, even beyond transit (taxis, car sharing, bike sharing, scooters, etc.) is why I've argued that the DC area should adopt the German form of regional transport association (called a VV, Verkehrsverbund), which links planning, budgeting and operation into one overarching organization, even if many different entities provide actual transit service.    They have an integrated planning and transit fare media system.  But there are over 20 operators of the various services, including private operators of bus lines.

Step 2: Separate planning from budgeting.  Too many transit services in the DC area make planning subsidiary to budgeting.  I understand why this happens, but if there were true "mass transit planning," we would define the breadth and depth of the network that we want.  And then come up with the funding to make it happen.

Transit operators would come back and say: you've defined the network breadth and depth (level of service) as X.  But the funding won't support that.  Then there would have to be a discussion of how to address funding shortfalls in terms of raising revenues or cutting service.

Step 3: Fix the Funding.  Yep, it needs to be done, but not just for Metrorail, for all of the regional transit services.  

Step 4: WRT WMATA, declare force majeure, and contract out operation of the heavy rail system to Hong Kong's MTR.  Start over.  Force majeure allows the abrogation of all contracts and starting over. 

Note: WMATA seems to be getting its act together under Clarke.  Maybe this is no longer necessary.

Funding options.  I have other pieces about options for funding.  

-- "Metrolinx Toronto: 25 potential tools to fund transit-transportation infrastructure," 2013

suggests a more structured process for identifying funding than an interview published in the Post.

The best would be a transit withholding tax.  But if the federal government refused to participate, it would significantly reduce the revenues from it.  In France, this tax is key, called the versement transport.  But MTA in New York State, and a couple other transit agencies do a form of it as well.

The future of transit in cities.  I don't know.  Work from home has torn apart the transit business model.  Most major cities have seen a reduction by half in transit users.  And systems like WMATA have reached a ceiling in how much they can charge.  Suburban jurisdictions now truly see helping transit as helping the city at their expense, since many of their workers have been able to significantly cut back on commuting to the center city.

DC doesn't have the budget to be able to take on the full responsibility of WMATA, but that would allow it to manage it in a way that benefits the city.

Although federal agencies leaving the city for sites poorly connected by transit, and maybe sports teams too, doesn't help the transit financial model either.

Post columnist Colbert King says the DC Council needs to do more oversight

In "An example of oversight from the D.C. Council? More of that, please."  Duh.  He makes the point that the Council probably needs more staff to be able to do so.  One of the comments on the article made a point about a local "Government Accountability Office" function.

The article mentions Councilmember Robert White questioning at a hearing, Brenda Donald, director of the DC Housing Authority, asking about her $40,000+ bonus for the year, after the agency was ripped to shreds by a HUD inspection report ("D.C. Housing Authority’s leadership is failing, HUD report says," Post).  After the Executive branch restructured the board in ways that didn't necessarily improve functioning and oversight--the Council pretty much rolled over on that.

Speaking of oversight, how is that the DCHA, which was revitalized during the administration of Anthony Williams, has in 15 years, deteriorated to one of the worse in the country?  Doesn't say much for executive branch competence.

I've written about how to improve the legislative branch and oversight over the years, "Continued musing on restructuring DC's City Council (mostly)" (2013), is probably the most complete summation of recommended changes.

In "Outline for a proposed Ward-focused (DC) Councilmember campaign platform and agenda" (2015), I suggest more tools for ward-specific oversight.

But I realize it's yetanother post, where I reference organizations like the Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington State or the Independent Budget Office of New York City, and I never mentioned the Congressional Research Service, which besides the GAO and the Congressional Budget Office, provides such resources to Congress, along with Committee staffs.

Organizations like the MRSC or IBO provide a lot of deep research which is almost uniformly lacking when it comes to DC policy development and program practice.  Although to be fair, the same goes for plenty of other cities.

-- "For a lot of "urban problems" the issue isn't knowledge about what to do, but willingness to engage that knowledge" (2017)

DC has Inspector Generals and an Auditor who reports to Council.  The auditor, former Councilmember Kathy Patterson, has done a lot of good reporting.  But again, the Executive Branch doesn't seem to want to engage with it, and the Council doesn't push.

In some cities, more independent offices, like the New York City Comptroller--currently Brad Lander--who is elected, do this kind of work as well, and bring more attention to the ins and outs of better governance.

=====

Note that separatelly I argue for training, assistance, and capacity development systems for the city's Advisory Neighborhood Commissions and citizens groups more generally.

-- "Framingham Massachusetts creates Citizen Participation Officer position," 2018
-- "Building civic engagement systematically: Seattle's Department of Neighborhoods," 2022

And in general across the board in other cities too.

New Years Day Post #1: Solutions versus cruelty | Immigration

Border wall of containers ordered by Republican Governor of Arizona Dan Ducey.  Photo: Ivan Pierre Aguirre for the New York Times.

These days I'm pretty depressed about the state of the US, given the virulence of the divide between Republicans and Democrats and a failure to focus on improving the quality of life of US residents versus cruelty and performance.

There is no question that things are far different from the time when states were considered opportunities for innovation--laboratories of democracy.

The quality of life outcomes for states under Republican rule are decidedly negative (2022 Scorecard on State Health System Performance: How did states do during the COVID-19 pandemic?, Commonwealth Fund, "SUMMARY OF 23 QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS — ARE RED OR BLUE STATES BETTER?," Applied Sentience, "Blue states rank better than red in livability: What does that mean?," San Jose Mercury News).

Perhaps the easiest indicator to track is life expectancy.

And long tax revenue capture.  Generally red states get a lot more back in government spending than they pay out.  While blue states pay more and get less.  Red states are the "takers" ("Blue high-tax states fund red low-tax states," Associated Press).

Immigration.  I think one of the most important entries I've written in the past couple years is on "the border crisis" -- immigration -- which Republicans call an absolute crisis. 

 It's a policy issue where Republicans get to show their cruelty ("GOP governors with presidential ambitions court Trump's base with cruelty to migrants," NBC News).

But sadly to reduce the power of the opposition, federal government practices even under Democrats can be pretty cruel.  

It amazes me because the states on the southern border with Mexico--Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California--drive a significant part of their economies through trade with Mexico.  California, being a Democrat run state, acts opposite of the other states.  

For example, Texas' biggest trading partner is Mexico and when they do things like tamper with border crossings it has significant negative effect ("Texas Ends Rule That Left Trucks Waiting For Hours To Cross Mexico Border," Forbes Magazine).  It's like Brexit leading to a significant drop in the UK's economic output, something every reputable economist said would happen.

But the Republican position on immigration makes it hard for Democrats, and makes it almost impossible for policy creativity.  Obama wasn't the greatest--he thought that being tough would get Republicans to work with him, but they didn't.  And Biden has some of the same issues.

The fact is that immigrants are an important source of labor, are motivated, increase the country's diversity, and add population in the face of lower birth rates.  Immigrants can be an important source of revitalization in otherwise shrinking cities etc.

End of Policing by Alex Vitale is pretty bracing.  Eight chapters discuss how we've criminalized certain social matters, and how police response to those problems mostly makes the outcomes worse.  

One chapter is on immigration (US Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and in it he suggests that the US consider dealing with immigration comparable to the European Union, which has free movement within the EU's 27 countries.

I think it's brilliant.  

Creating an American Union of the US and Central and South American countries.  What it would require is creating a kind of "American Union" with Central and South American countries.  Where citizens of participating countries could register and could immigrate/work in other participating countries, and it wouldn't require citizenship in the "receiving" country.  I think it would also allow for temporary rather than permanent emigration.  People could come to the US, make some money, go back home.

At the same time, like the EU, the US should invest in creating "cohesion" programs of investment in Central and South American countries, so that conditions of poverty, political unrest, and negative public safety could be reversed, reducing the demand to emigrate.  

-- "A solution to the immigration crisis on the Southern border, but it's too politically fraught," 2021

And a Caribbean Union.  When I wrote the piece I was focused on the border with Mexico, but the same goes for the Caribbean.  It's unjust that Cuba emigrants have special privileges in coming to the US, and proximity to the US creates the same kinds of tensions for countries like Haiti, Dominican Republic, etc.

Puerto Rico.  And we really should give statehood to Puerto Rico, and create new programs of investment and energy independence for that colony.

=====

The Salt Lake Tribune, now a nonprofit, has an initiative called the "Innovation Lab," where they focus on longer term issues with an aim of producing articles offering "solutions."

I don't think the issue is the need for solutions so much as a willingness to be focused on solutions and action.

And big time innovation is outside of the mindset of most public officials and community stakeholders.

WMATA is pathetic: of course it belongs to "the public"

In college in the early 1980s, the University of Michigan repositioned its focus on fundraising (what universities call "development") in part by hiring a top development official from Stanford, creating a new campaign, etc.--the University has successfully raised billions since.

In an interview the new VP for Development said something like "students don't think about it, but they become alumni in four years," making the point they (we) should start thinking about donating.

My response was "neither does the university, because if they did they would invest a lot more in the quality of the student experience." Although 40 years later my sense is that they invest plenty in that now.

Metro (WMATA) Owner's Manual: Your Metro...How to Use It, table of contents, Advertising supplement to the Washington Star, 3/21/1976.

This comes up because Randy Clarke, the new leader of the Washington area's transit system (Metrorail and Metrobus), has an op-ed in the Washington Post, stating that the transit system is really "we the people" (not his words), "New Metro GM: It’s your transit system."  From the article:

The capital improvement program reflects the region’s commitment to maintaining and improving your community’s $100 billion transit asset. The question of how best to fund Metro is an important one that requires thought leadership and extensive community input. It begins with “What do we want Metro to be?” Together with our board of directors, who represent our regional governing jurisdictions and the federal government, we are developing a strategic transformation plan that will address our funding future, fare policy and service equity and frequency, which we look forward to talking with customers about over the next several months to help us set Metro’s goals.

In the near term, we are supporting returning customers with more rapid social media engagement, and extended customer service hours Monday through Friday 7 a.m. to 8 p.m.; and Saturday and Sunday 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. For frequent, new and visiting customers, we are piloting new signage, beginning with putting service information at street level at Metro Center. We are also going to test way-finding signage to the new Dulles station in 33 stations and seek feedback from the community. ...

Everyone at Metro is focused on providing the excellent experience our customers and the region need and deserve. We are keeping customers at the center of everything we do. Operating safely isn’t a choice. It’s either safe or we won’t do it. I am empowering all staff members to own our service outcomes and to proudly represent America’s transit system.

As you travel the region this fall, I hope you will choose Metro. We beat traffic and gas prices, and we fight climate change. Though I am privileged to be the general manager, it’s your Metro, so please let us know how we can serve you better.

Despite publishing the op-ed, other reporting in the Post says the situation is dire, "Fallout grows from Metro’s train shortage amid safety probe."

People like me have been saying this for years, that WMATA needs to invest in its relationship with area residents as customers, riders, funders (as taxpayers), and supporters of transit.

-- "Making Transit Sexy," 2005 (!)
-- "More on Metro and rethinking transit marketing," 2006
-- "Helping Government Learn," 2009
-- "Transit, stations, and placemaking: stations as entrypoints into neighborhoods," 2013 
-- "Posting information on board members and the Metro in train stations," 2017

My concept of a "complementary investment program in the transit network in association with the introduction of new transit infrastructure," in this case the Purple Line, had a number of suggestions for improvements in "our Metro."

-- "Codifying the complementary transit network improvements and planning initiatives recommended in the Purple Line writings," 2022 (original posts 2017)

In 2009, after the crash which killed 9 people, I wrote that WMATA needed to update and rebuild the regional consensus on the support of transit, because in the 40ish years since the beginning creation of the system, most all of the original leaders have since died or moved on, and the millions of new residents in the region never participated in the development of that system.

-- "St. Louis regional transit planning process as a model for what needs to be done in the DC Metropolitan region"

Plus, once the system opened, it took for granted the need to constantly invest in building and maintaining support.

In fact, I mention that as an issue a lot in terms of funding.  

Now that the system is in ongoing crisis ("Getting WMATA out of crisis: a continuation of a multi-year problem that keeps getting worse, not better," 2015) although it's been more than 10 years, they are looking for additional funding, including a sales tax (actually that's been discussed for going on 20 years, "DC area transit commission board member thinks he has a brilliant idea on how to fund Metrorail: sales taxes," 2022).

My point is you ask for money when you are wildly successful and everyone is looking to join the bandwagon, not when you are failing, in crisis, and you have few friends.

Since they didn't do it in 2009, in 2014, I suggested with the impending 40th anniversary of the system's opening, they should rebuild the consensus.

-- "WMATA 40th anniversary in 2016 as an opportunity for assessment"
-- "What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis continued and 2016's 40th anniversary of WMATA as an opportunity to rebuild," 2015

Since then the system has degraded beyond imagination, with most trains out of service because of a derailment problem and more recently the failure to maintain the certification of hundreds of train drivers.

Metro (WMATA) Owner's Manual: Your Metro...How to Use It, cover, Advertising supplement to the Washington Star, 3/21/1976.

I guess WMATA still has this opportunity with upcoming 50th anniversary of the start of service--2026--to get their "stuff" together, rebuild the consensus, actually figure out how to operate the system, grow it, if possible, etc.

BART is celebrating its 50th.  Note that BART is celebrating its 50th anniversary of the start of service this year, although I don't think they have a big rebuilding consensus program.  

-- 50 Years of BART | bart.gov
-- "BART has carried riders for 50 years. It also changed how the Bay Area lives," San Francisco Chronicle (note registration required, although turning off your javascript simplifies access, other links at end of article)  
-- "BART 50 year anniversary: The past, present and future of Bay Area Rapid Transit," ABC7 San Francisco

They need to do it probably, but as a region the Bay Area is continuing to grow transit in terms of railroad, heavy rail, and light rail (+ ferry), in coordinating services across transit agencies, having a overnight transit network, funding transit through sales taxes and other means, etc.

Andy Byford.  I was surprised to see that Andy Byford has stepped down as CEO of Transport for London, as it was his dream job ("Ex-NYC subways chief Andy Byford quits London gig, plans return to US," New York Post). 

I do know it must have been bittersweet because to get the national government to re-fund the system given its covid-related financial problems, they had to agree to a lot of anti-rider changes ("'No choice': Khan accepts £3.6bn deal for London's transport," Inside Croydon), even though they've successfully begun opening Crossrail/Elizabeth Line.

Byford went to TfL after being forced out of the NYC Subway system by the since disgraced then Governor Cuomo, who didn't like that Byford got lots of great publicity when he wanted the accolades, and before that the Toronto Transit Commission, which is the third busiest transit system in the US and Canada.

Could Byford be brought in as a "special master" to "unsuck" WMATA?  Is he even capable of pulling off such a feat? 

Transit marketing.  Too many resources to list, although this entry lists many, "Advocates to Feds: We Need a New Traffic-Control Manual | My response: Create "the" Manual of Uniform Urban Mobility Control Devices."  Part of marketing is just successfully delivering transit service.

‘Systemic failures’ in Uvalde school massacre, report finds

I don't know what to think about this.  

The report by the Texas State House of Representatives ("Uvalde report: 376 officers but 'egregiously poor' decisions," Associated Press) says that a state or federal law enforcement agency could have taken control of the response to the mass shooting event at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, where 19 children and 2 teachers were killed and it took more than an hour for the police to engage with the shooter.

Like all government agencies, law enforcement agencies are very conscious of jurisdiction, and definitely a federal agency wouldn't step in unilaterally.  The report says that the Texas Department of Public Safety is tasked with the responsibility for dealing with mass shootings and could have taken control. Or that they or the US Border Patrol could have asked for control.

But that takes time, negotiations between the local department and the state agency etc., unless they already have a memorandum of understanding in place.

Why the chief of the school district police department, Pete Arredondo, or the acting chief of the city police department, Lt. Mariano Pargas, didn't step up and declare they were incident commander and act accordingly is beyond me.

It's definitely a great example of my belief that most people and organizations are bad at decision making, and even worse in crisis conditions.

It's accentuated by lots of different agencies in small places. While I understand the value of subsidiarity and having agencies organized and focused on smaller units, there is a lot to be said for scale.

Also see "America is resigned to mass shootings — but not to cops who fail to act," Washington Post. From the article:

An infuriating new report on the shameful police response to the Uvalde, Tex., school shooting “absolves no one,” according to The Post’s print headline. A better way to put it would have been that the report “implicates everyone” for delaying more than an hour while 19 children and two teachers were dying or lying dead.

But the question here is not whether the existing system could have been made to perform better. It’s whether we need a whole new system to confront the mass shootings that have become a tragic fact of American life. ...

But because we have effectively decided to tolerate school shootings and other mass killings of innocents, we need a system in which schools and other vulnerable institutions, such as churches and even shopping malls, are more effectively locked down. We need a system in which it is clear who is taking charge of the police response and in which incidents are considered “active shooter” until proved otherwise.

The reports on Uvalde make clear just how poorly every single tripwire that might have prevented the shooting functioned.

===

-- "Not that I want to defend management failure and unnecessary death, but that was an outcome determined by a corrupt system ," 2020

DC area transit commission board member thinks he has a brilliant idea on how to fund Metrorail: sales taxes

Given that I only tangentially "live" in DC these days, writing all the time about DC seems misplaced.  

Then again, I understand the place, there are universal lessons, and a lot of dumb stuff that I feel compelled to write about--I joke that I might not be a good planner, but I am great at gap analysis, and man are there many "gaps" in how planning is done in the DMV.

Similarly, my writings on DC area transit, even if trenchant, sometimes bore even me.  I mean, how many times can you write the same thing over and over and over, like this piece just two weeks ago:

-- "What to do about DC area Metrorail?," May 18, 2022

The Washington Post reports "Transit commission chairman offers advice for Metro’s funding problems." From the article:

Michael Goldman proposes Metro pitch the public on a sales tax after it wins back confidence

Sales taxes will save WMATA?  Um, wtf?

The reason this gets me is that for about 20 years, the idea of funding WMATA in part through sales taxes has been bandied about, editorialized about favorably in the Washington Post, etc.  Brookings fellow (I think now Virginia Tech professor) Robert Puentes has been the most visible proponent.

-- Washington's Metro: Deficits by Design, Brookings, 2004
-- "Keeping Metro On Track: The Federal Government's Role in Balacing Investment With Accountability at Washington's Transit Agency," Brookings, 2005
-- "Mass Transit: Issues Related to Providing Dedicated Funding for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority," GAO, 2006

I think sales taxes should be one of the funding streams, sure, but the 2008 Recession proved that sales taxes as a revenue stream for transit drop precipitously in recessions, endangering service.  Systems across the country big and small made massive service cuts in response to funding losses.

But the problem is bigger than safety and successful operation.    

1.  Crisis is a bad time to ask for money.  Although yes, first, being in crisis and performing badly isn't the time to ask for such funding.  Although to be fair, Michael Goldman concedes the point.

2.  The three jurisdictions controlling WMATA, Maryland, Virginia, and DC, disagree on the purpose of transit.  Sadly, the three jurisdictions, especially Maryland and Virginia, don't have congruence on what they think the system is supposed to do and how to fund it.  

3. The best time to ask for regularized funding is when you're successful.  I've made the point, in part because of this issue, that the best time to ask for regularized funding is when you're wildly successful, not desperate.  This should have been pursued in the 1980s, when WMATA was wildly successful, growing, and seemingly well managed, definitely a still young system in good repair.

Rebuilding the regional consensus about transit.  Note that in 2009 and later, after the crash that killed 9 people, I wrote that it was necessary to rebuild the regional consensus on transit, what it was supposed to do and why, how to manage it, etc.

-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis continued and 2016's 40th anniversary of WMATA as an opportunity to rebuild (2015)
-- "WMATA and two types of public relations programs (2015)
-- WMATA 40th anniversary in 2016 as an opportunity for assessment (2014)
-- St. Louis regional transit planning process as a model for what needs to be done in the DC Metropolitan region (2009)

Even without the crash this was necessary because from a planning standpoint the system was over 50 years old, even if it didn't start opening until 1976

The consensus "thingy" is important because transit service is hardly the exclusive domain of WMATA.  Yes they provide the precovid most frequently used transit service in the region, Metrorail heavy rail, and highly used "regional bus services," Metrobus.  

But most of the jurisdictions now provide bus service, DC has a streetcar service independent of WMATA, Maryland will be running the Purple Line light rail independent of WMATA (although fares will be integrated), the MARC and VRE rail services are independent of WMATA, and other transit types of services are being promoted like gondola or ferries, to be operated independently of WMATA, etc.  Amtrak Virginia offers services, there are inter-city bus services, etc.

Commenter charlie argues that the problems result from the tension of acting as commuter rail versus a city subway for DC and Arlington (see comments here, "Can WMATA's death spiral be staunched?," 2016).

Transit financing.  And I've written a lot about WMATA and financing.  It has a big problem in that the jurisdictions appropriate money on a year-by-year basis, not as a matter of course.  Yes, this does make it harder for the agency.  Especially because jurisdictions will put off capital expenditures as long as possible.  Many people make the point that lack of dedicated funding is why the system is in failure mode.  I disagree.

-- Getting WMATA out of crisis: a continuation of a multi-year problem that keeps getting worse, not better (2015)
-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis (2015)

And as I've argued, the federal transit pass has historically disproportionately funded the system, alongside the practice of charging fares by mode--most systems charge one fare for a bus+rail ride.  Not WMATA.  They charge two.  And pass products lowering the overall cost of transit have historically been a low priority.

This let the system get sloppy in terms of finance, budgeting, and understanding why "WMATA is so successful at funding operations from farebox revenue."

My solution: Step 1: creating a regional transport association.  The fact that there are so many "mobility" services, even beyond transit (taxis, car sharing, bike sharing, scooters, etc.) is why I've argued that the DC area should adopt the German form of regional transport association (called a VV, Verkehrsverbund), which links planning, budgeting and operation into one overarching organization, even if many different entities provide actual transit service.    They have an integrated planning and transit fare media system.  But there are over 20 operators of the various services, including private operators of bus lines.

-- The answer is: Create a single multi-state/regional multi-modal transit planning, management, and operations authority association, 2017
-- Metropolitan Mass Transit Planning: Towards a Hierarchical and Conceptual Framework
(presentation in 2010, at the University of Delaware Institute of Public Administration)
-- (Sort of a repeat) Without the right transportation planning framework, metropolitan areas are screwed, and that includes the DC area (2011)
-- "Verkehrsverbund: The evolution and spread of fully integrated regional public transport in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland," Ralph Buehler, John Pucher & Oliver Dümmler,  International Journal of Sustainable Transportation (2018)
-- "Branding's (NOT) All you need for transit," 2018

It should also aim to integrate for profit providers (car sharing, etc.) into what I call the "sustainable mobility platform framework."

Step 2: Separate planning from budgeting.  Too many transit services in the DC area make planning subsidiary to budgeting.  I understand why this happens, but if there were true "mass transit planning," we would define the breadth and depth of the network that we want.  And then come up with the funding to make it happen.

Transit operators would come back and say: you've defined the network breadth and depth (level of service) as X.  But the funding won't support that.  Then there would have to be a discussion of how to address funding shortfalls in terms of raising revenues or cutting service.

Step 3: Fix the Funding.  Yep, it needs to be done, but not just for Metrorail, for all of the regional transit services.  This entry from 2013, "Metrolinx Toronto: 25 potential tools to fund transit-transportation infrastructure," suggests a more structured process for identifying funding than an interview published in the Post.

Step 4: WRT WMATA, declare force majeure, and contract out operation of the heavy rail system to Hong Kong's MTR.  Start over.  Force majeure allows the abrogation of all contracts and starting over.  MTR runs the subway system in Hong Kong, the just opened Elizabeth Line and other lines in London. lines in at least three cities in China, and the heavy rail systems in Stockholm and Melbourne (London’s new Elizabeth Line is open – and it’s being run by Hong Kong’s MTR," South China Morning Post). (Then again, there is that US versus China political issue.)

Pre-covid, the Hong Kong subway system had about 5 million daily riders, which is about 7x higher than WMATA's precovid ridership on Metrorail.

MTR does a good job.   By contrast WMATA is failing.

As the British would say "WMATA needs to be sorted."  

The way it's being overseen, managed, operated, and funded isn't working.

All but one of the bus transit providers in Raleigh-Durham use the same logo and livery design, 

with different colors for different agencies.

Step 5: Reconfigure bus service in the metropolitan area.  A VV also has the opportunity to rearticulate bus service.  Recommendation 13 in "Setting the stage for the Purple Line light rail line to be an overwhelming success: Part 2 | the program (macro changes)" suggests:

Consider a redesign and rebranding of the the metropolitan area's bus systems into an integrated framework, comparable to that of GoTransit in the Raleigh-Durham area.

Although recommendations 10, 11, 12, and 15 also address bus service, with 15 focused on an overnight metropolitan Night Owl bus network.

-- "Will buses ever be cool? Boston versus the Raleigh-Durham's GoTransit Model," 2017
-- "Making bus service sexy and more equiable," 2012
-- "Route 7 BRT proposal communicates the reality that the DC area doesn't adequately conduct transportation planning at the metropolitan-scale," 2016

What to do about DC area Metrorail?

 A few months ago I wrote a couple posts about how it seems as if DC area transit planning and operations is deliberately designed to destroy support for transit and transit expansion.

-- "Sometimes you have to wonder if transit/transit projects are being deliberately screwed up to make transit expansion almost impossible" 
-- "A tenure of failure doesn't deserve encomiums: Paul Wiedefeld, WMATA CEO"

The second entry criticizes the Washington Post editorial board for saying the CEO was great even though WMATA got even worse during his tenure, not better.

Then a few days later the Post editorialized something similar ("Metrorail is a mess. What’s going to happen when more commuters return?").   

Tom Toles editorial cartoon, Washington Post

8/19/2015

This after most of the trains are out of service because of a derailment problem that has sidelined most every train, leading to service of 3-4 trains per hour, in each direction, on each line ("Dramatic drop in DC Metro's on-time performance, rider satisfaction: Report," WJLA-TV).

How could things get any worse?

But they did!

Last week, it was announced that half the train operators aren't certified, that service had to reduced further, and abruptly the CEO accelerated his retirement and the COO resigned ("Top Metro leaders step down one day after agency announces training lapses," Washington Post).

In 1994, the New Yorker ran a story, "Lost in the Mail," about the repetitive failures of the post office system in Chicago.  I remember how they said  because post offices are so embedded within communities, they are more a part of local bureaucratic systems than national (this has changed in the years since) and it was emblematic of local government failure.

WMATA's repetitive failures since 2009, when 9 people died as a result of a signals failure that had been identified but mostly ignored as anomalous rather than an indicator of a systematic problem, have gotten worse, not better.

• The signals problem still exists.  
• Financial problems still exist. 
• Inspection problems and tunnel fires led to a death and injuries
• ... abetted by poor emergency response action and coordination failures.  
• For a time financial reporting problems made WMATA ineligible for funding from the Federal Transit Administration.  
• There are continued problems with how the Operations Center operates
• and safety on the tracks for workers ("Metro commits to more stringent safety standards to protect track workers," Post)
• The wheel problems were known but not addressed, until the oversight body required trains be taken out of service.  
• Now the certification of train operators.

Although under Wiedefeld there has been a reasonable program of station and system infrastructure improvements 

And we're not even counting the effects of covid, which has led to massive ridership drops, leading to major financial problems.

Why is organizational failure so endemic to Metrorail?

After the crash I did write a piece suggesting that 30ish years after the initial opening, it was time to rebuild regional consensus about transit and Metrorail.  That didn't happen and later I suggested the same thing, using the 40th anniversary of initial operation as the lever.  

-- Getting WMATA out of crisis: a continuation of a multi-year problem that keeps getting worse, not better, (2015)
-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis (2015)
-- What it will take to get WMATA out of crisis continued and 2016's 40th anniversary of WMATA as an opportunity to rebuild (2015)
-- "WMATA and two types of public relations programs (2015)
-- WMATA 40th anniversary in 2016 as an opportunity for assessment (2014)
-- St. Louis regional transit planning process as a model for what needs to be done in the DC Metropolitan region (2009)

Later writing about financial issues ("Proposed WMATA fare increases (DC region)," 2012) and points about problems resulting from system design especially interlining ("More on Redundancy, engineered resilience, and subway systems: Metrorail failures will increase without adding capacity in the core," 2016), I suggested that the region should reorganize transit along the lines of the German set up of "transport associations," which links but separates planning, ownership,  operation, and budgeting.  

-- The answer is: Create a single multi-state/regional multi-modal transit planning, management, and operations authority association, 2017
-- Metropolitan Mass Transit Planning: Towards a Hierarchical and Conceptual Framework
(presentation in 2010, at the University of Delaware Institute of Public Administration)
-- (Sort of a repeat) Without the right transportation planning framework, metropolitan areas are screwed, and that includes the DC area (2011)

By contrast, there isn't really true transit planning for the DC area at the regional scale.  By default WMATA is the planner, but too often transit service is satisficed because of budgetary considerations.

The same goes for buses: 

-- "Will buses ever be cool? Boston versus the Raleigh-Durham's GoTransit Model," 2017
-- "Making bus service sexy and more equiable," 2012
-- "Route 7 BRT proposal communicates the reality that the DC area doesn't adequately conduct transportation planning at the metropolitan-scale," 2016

charlie argues that the problems result from the tension of acting as commuter rail versus a city subway for DC and Arlington (see comments here, "Can WMATA's death spiral be staunched?," 2016).

Definitely the agency is schizophrenic in terms of mission between commuter rail, in-city rail, and bus operator.

A new leader as the solution?  WMATA announced a couple weeks ago that the next CEO will be Randy Clarke, from the Capital Metro transit agency serving Austin, Texas.  He worked for MBTA in Boston, and has a great deal of expertise in safety management.  But it is enough?  

Is failure systemic and endemic?  Is he so capable that he can reorient WMATA towards excellence and away from systematic and endemic failure? ("Metro’s new general manager is optimistic riders will return," Post).

For years, I've suggested that a top notch transit executive from Germany, Japan, Hong Kong, France or London should be recruited to fix Metrorail.  

But probably the best transit executives aren't interested.

What is it about WMATA that generates failure as the routine outcome?

Although part of this is that often failure begets failure because in the best of times, people aren't very good decision makers.  And crisis makes it worse.

My joke is that the problem started at the beginning, when the first CEO came from the Army Corps of Engineers.  With a very bureaucratic orientation.

It didn't help when the system stopped expanding, and so Metrorail RIFed most of its construction engineering and planning personnel, excising from the system decades of engineering and operations experience.

I don't believe that necessarily it is the Compact, that it is necessarily the tri-partite structure involving the States of Virginia and Maryland and the City of Washington in joint ownership and management.

But it is problematic that support for transit waxes and wanes depending on who is in office.  Eg., Maryland Republican Governor Hogan wasn't too keen on WMATA.  Now, the Republican Governor of Virginia isn't either.  Even before, when McAuliffe was Governor, he understood that Metrorail favored DC and he pursued other transportation priorities.  And DC's elected officials just don't feel it in their bones that DC's competitive advantage as a place to live and work is built on the foundation of strong transit.