Rampant management failure #2: DC area Metrorail (Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority)

Nothing new here:

-- "What to do about DC area Metrorail?," 2022
-- "Sometimes you have to wonder if transit/transit projects are being deliberately screwed up to make transit expansion almost impossible," 2022
-- "A tenure of failure doesn't deserve encomiums: Paul Wiedefeld, WMATA CEO," 2022
-- "WMATA is pathetic: of course it belongs to "the public"," 2022
-- "DC area transit commission board member thinks he has a brilliant idea on how to fund Metrorail: sales taxes ," 2022

But recent coverage ("Metro makes case for funding as regional leaders point to federal government," Washington Post) on how WMATA needs more financial support given ridership drop offs due to covid, but also accentuated by massive management and operational failures, reminds me of one of my learnings through observation about WMATA and government.  

It's best to line up support and funding, when you're wildly successful.

It's really hard when you're failing.

From the article:

Metro’s prospects for replacing hundreds of millions of dollars in fare revenue that vanished during the pandemic appeared to be waning as stimulus money runs dry, particularly as weary elected officials watch the agency struggle during a year-long train shortage.

In recent days though, Metro has escalated its sense of urgency in finding more revenue, trying to make the case to regional leaders that it can’t move forward alone. The transit agency took the first step this month, saying it will increase enforcement of fare evasion to stanch a $40 million leak — a move that eased tensions with political leaders who were hesitant to offer more money.

Some of those same local leaders are responding with a plan of their own: Convince the federal government, whose workforce is Metro’s largest customer base, to subsidize the system’s operational costs. Unlike the local and state jurisdictions that fund Metro, federal money goes only to the agency’s capital budget but not to its separate operating budget — a distinction local officials have long said is inequitable.

Good luck with that.

WMATA should have lined up multiple and steady sources of revenue--like sales taxes and other sources--when it was new, shiny, and successful, basically, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, as the system opened and expanded.

-- "Funding WMATA by a regional sales tax," 2017

Also see, "Creativity Helps Rochester's Transit System Turn a Profit," New York Times (2008). The director then, Mark R. Aesch, later wrote a book about his experience there, Driving Excellence: Transform Your Organization's Culture -- And Achieve Revolutionary Results.  It's worth a read.

The article discusses how the Regional Transit Service in Rochester New York developed "partnership" funding agreements with schools, colleges, and businesses to provide financial support beyond farebox revenue, to support mutual agreed upon objectives.

RTS did this when they were successful, so that when the 2008 recession hit, they were well placed to operate and survive financial setbacks that crippled other transit authorities who were not as well situated.

But it is also a management failure of local government.  Admittedly, oversight-wise, WMATA has a hard slog, as the State of Virginia, State of Maryland, and DC are "co-owners" now alongside the federal government.   They all have to agree on major decisions.  And the State governments can vary wildly on their support.  For example, one reason there are tolls on I-66 is to indirectly encourage DC-based businesses to relocate to Virginia to avoid tolls.

Plus at the county/DC scale, different jurisdictions have different goals for the service.  DC and Arlington County have a much more transit-centric planning paradigm than the others, who see transit as more about getting their residents to and from their jobs in the city.

Northern Virginia elected officials and stakeholders tend to be reasonably forward (not necessarily visionary) about the role of transit in the success of their communities, especially Arlington and Fairfax Counties--the latter because they think it can repattern land use along the Silver Line.

DC officials don't seem to get how the city's competitive advantage as a sustainable mobility-centric community ("DC is a market leader in Mobility as a Service (MaaS)," 2018, "Transportation and Urban Form: Stages in the Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis," "Planning for place/urban design/neighborhoods versus planning for transportation modes: new 17th Street NW bike lanes | Walkable community planning versus "pedestrian" planning," 2021) is built upon high frequency heavy rail transit service.

Since I got involved in urban revitalization I've argued that DC had five competitive advantages: 

1. historic architecture
2. urban form (urban design) dating from the walking and transit city eras of urban development, therefore supporting walkability, transit, and biking
3. historicity and identity (the nexus of people, historic architecture, and urban design)
4. a transit-centric mobility infrastructure that frees people from dependence on the automobile
5. the steady employment engine of the federal government

And that they need to be all over Metrorail and Metrobus in terms of management and oversight.  (For more than a decade I suggested that DC create a Transportation Commission, comparable to the Zoning Commission, to provide greater opportunities for oversight and involvement, both for elected and appointed officials, and citizen members. And that the WMATA Board should be elected.)

Just like DC's public housing fiasco, where 25% of the units are uninhabitable, the massive failures of Metrorail could have been avoided through the execution of sound management, accountability systems, and constant, ongoing oversight.

It's an asset and risk management failure of massive proportions.

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From "Funding WMATA by a regional sales tax":

26 ways to tax to fund transit
(Based on the report, Big Move Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool Profiles, produced for Metrolinx Toronto by AECOM and KPMG)

• Auto Insurance Tax
• Car Rental Fee
• Carbon Tax (including Low/No Carbon Zones in center cities)
• Cordon/Congestion Charge
• Corporate Income Tax
• Development Charges/Impact Fees
• Driver’s License Tax
• Employer Payroll Tax (Versement Transport)
• Fare Increases
• Fare Surcharges (There is a fare surcharge to use the SFO Airport via the BART system; "BART cuts surcharge for SFO workers," San Francisco Chronicle; Boston's Logan Airport is considering surcharges for passenger drop off and pickup to encourage use of transit, "Dropping off a friend at Logan? It could cost you," Boston Globe)
• Fuel Tax
• High Occupancy Tolls
• Highway Tolls
• Hotel & Accommodation Levy (Hawaii is about to approve this type of tax to help fund the commuter rail system in Honolulu, "After reaching deal, lawmakers to meet for special session on Honolulu rail funding," Hawaii News Now)
• Income Tax
• Land Transfer Tax
• Land Value Capture
• New Vehicle Sales Tax
• Parking Sales Tax
• Parking Space Levy
• Property Tax
• Sales Tax
• Tax Increment Financing (Special Assessment Districts)
• Utility Levy
• Vehicles Kilometers/Miles Traveled Fee
• Vehicle Registration Surcharges (this is allowed in Washington State, through what is called a Transportation Benefits District, and in the Puget Sound, a Regional Transit Authority fee for Sound Transit)