Reprint with editing: Today WMATA Metrorail's 50th anniversary from the start of service | Part 1: many lessons can be found, if you look
“There are no great cities without great public transit.”
-- Zach Mortice
writing about Harry Weese, chief architect for the design of Metrorail stations
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Originally published January 8th. Today is the anniversary of the opening of the first leg of Metrorail on the Red Line between Rhode Island Avenue Station and Farragut North.
Last month, a WMATA Board Member sent out a treat criticizing the LA Metro Board for voting to oppose a California Legislature bill on adding density to transit stations.
After all, the article "How DC densified" (Works in Progress) attributes the region's relatively lower rents to densification in association with transit oriented development. Note that the article focuses on Arlington County, and its decision to densify by redirecting the Orange Line from the I-66 median into a tunnel along the Wilson Boulevard corridor,
I think there are many lessons, good and bad, from WMATA. One is to build more density than usually planned for.
--D.C. Freeway Revolt and the Coming of Metro, part 1, Federal Highway Administration
-- part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, part 6, part 7, part 8, part 9, part 10
There are some additional points since this entry was first published in January.
-- "WMATA's 50th anniversary from the start of service, Part 2a | The Original Approved Metrorail System (1968-1970)"
-- "WMATA's 50th anniversary from the start of service, Part 2b | Lessons learned: The Metrorail system we don't have"
-- "WMATA's 50th anniversary from the start of service, Part 3 | Stations"
-- WMATA's 50th anniversary from the start of service, Part 4 | Buses"
This entry has a number of edits compared to the January iteration.
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I started this piece in late fall, spurred probably by "Streetcars: transit, economic development levers, source for discontent in local politics | Milwaukee HOP streetcar."
Because of the issues raised about transit as a lever of economic development, urban revitalization and the repositioning of cities. (Relevant to the sorry saga of the DC Streetcar, entry to come."
A Red Line train heading toward Glenmont arrives at Metro Center. A track-switching problem apparently delayed the train -- and worsened the backup. Photo Credit: By Linda Davidson -- The Washington Post Photo
It reminded me that 2026 is the 50th Anniversary of WMATA's opening of the first section of the Metrorail system; On March 27th, 2026, the Red Line from Rhode Island Station to Downtown's Farragut North Station.
At that time there was a regional consensus about the value of building the subway that had been built up over many years of planning and promotion.
A Reddit commenter did make the point that consensus was easier to develop because it was led by the Federal Government, which was able to convene the separate jurisdictions more easily than a single jurisdiction could have. (Maybe later the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments could have, but made up of local elected officials with varying levels of vision, probably not.)
Post-2009: the transit consensus denigrates further. In 2009, after the Fort Totten train crash which killed 9 ("Remembering Metro's deadliest crash, 15 years later," NBC), I argued that the regional consensus built to support Metrorail and presumably transit more generally, needed to be rebuilt as the region and population grew, with new residents unfamiliar with the history of the system ("St. Louis regional transit planning process as a model for what needs to be done in the DC Metropolitan region").
(I also made the same argument for 2016, the system's 40th anniversary, "WMATA 40th anniversary in 2016 as an opportunity for assessment").
During this period, DC and Arlington had been planning streetcars. Arlington shut down their effort in 2014, while DC, as a great example of planning failure managed to open the streetcar in 2016--after starting planning in 2003--but now plans to shut it down.
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And then there's the Purple Line light rail program. Proposed in the late 1980s as a circular line connecting all the Metrorail lines. After starts and stops, the Maryland program is developing a section of it, from Bethesda to New Carrollton.
I used to comment that the opposition to the streetcar and light rail implied a total lack of knowledge and history of Metrorail, back when the system was serving more than 750,000 riders per day (plus another 500,000 trips by bus).
Back then, residents in Maryland and Virginia voted in favor of a bond for their portions of the system. Now people sue against transit.
Covid as another catastrophic event. Alongside the years of reinvestment and poor service, another key event is the decline of ridership during covid because of the shift of work from the office to remote work at home.
Downtown as a business center and transit destination further diminished by Trump Administration firings of federal workers. Fewer federal employees and moving agencies out of DC reduces ridership.
The system has 2/3rds the ridership from 2019, although WMATA is rebounding better than many of its peers ("Can Washington DC keep its transit comeback rolling?" Governing). Funding, with the fall of farebox revenue, has also been a problem.
Definitely needed are sessions on "lessons learned." Even to compare DC to SF's BART ("BART has carried riders for 50 years. It also changed how the Bay Area lives," San Francisco Chronicle), Atlanta's MARTA, and Miami's Metro.
For example, DC's streetcar is the textbook example of poor planning, yet it has sparked more than $1 billion in new or planned development ("DC and streetcars #4: from the standpoint of stoking real estate development, the line is incredibly successful and it isn't even in service yet, and now that development is extending eastward past 15th Street," "Update/revision of H Street transit oriented real estate development table").
Transit infrastructure can have speedy returns on public investment. A key lesson for me was the revitalization impact of the New York Avenue Metrorail station on the H Street neighborhood.
The station led people with choices to choose the neighborhood as a place to live, and play. The commercial district and subsequent building of housing was accelerated by the presence of the station (which also provided major development impact on the Union Market district and in the NoMa area west of the Union Station railyard).
It made me a believer that when done right, transit infrastructure is the fastest return on investment for urban revitalization.
Plus, besides lessons for good, We need lessons for bad. And for recommendations and an action plan for improving and integrating transit modes into a true system going forward.
Urban and Transportation Planning Lessons from DC Metrorail
Economic revitalization
I think that's the result of metropolitan area studies which spreads results out, when transit economic effects are more localized. But it's also because seeing results takes a long time. It takes a long time to build one building, let alone hundreds.
Although later studies found significant impact (When we invest in transit, our community thrives: 2024 Benefits of Transit Report, WMATA), which makes sense because it covered a longer period of time.
E.g., the region versus Downtown DC, DC neighborhoods ("To Create Abundant Housing, Ignore the YIMBY Playbook," Washington Monthly), or the Wilson Boulevard corridor in Arlington County ("The Effect of Transit-Oriented Development in Arlington, Virginia on Transportation Choices").
DC, Arlington, Alexandria, and Montgomery Counties have benefited more from Metrorail than Prince George's County. Unlike the others, PGC has fewer conurbations served by the Metro and it hasn't been focused on shifting development to those places served by Metrorail.
For example, for years I've thought the County should move its place of government to New Carrollton, which is served by Metrorail, from Upper Marlboro, which is not ("Go big or go home: Prince George's County needs to think big and consider better revitalization examples for New Carrollton"). Recently, more agencies have moved to Largo, which is served by Metrorail, but the development in the area is disjoint, very much not like stations in DC.
Arlington has been particularly successful in repositioning Wilson Boulevard as an office district, competitive with DC because of lower rents, although this is changing as the Silver Line presents new development further out with even cheaper rents ("The state of Arlington County Virginia's commercial real estate market: 2012 and the future").
It's also important to look at the differential impact on the suburbs ("Inner ring suburban community improvement," "Metrorail as a revival mechanism for the inner suburbs: Takoma Park," and "Tysons, White Flint and the continued "maturation" of the suburbs").
2. Still, perhaps the biggest lesson is that transit focused revitalization takes a long time. Although it can be incredibly fast if done right, additive, within an existing system ("NoMA: the neighborhood transit built." Urban Land, "Three New Metro Stations To Open Before Year's End," Washington Post). This aligns with the finding of the UMN Center for Transportation Studies that the greatest value from additions to transit infrastructure come within the first 10 miles of the core system.
3. Especially when you aren't guided by good planning, financing and high quality implementation organizations. Which should be done at the system, line, and station area scale ("Revisiting creating Public Improvement Districts in transit station catchment areas," 2020).
When I first got involved, I thought DC didn't do station area planning.
It did, but it didn't have an implementation organization or financing ("Updating the best practice elements of revitalization to include elements 7 and 8 | Transformational Projects Action Planning at a large scale," 2024), and actually that was a benefit because the plans took on the urban renewal architectural brutalism of the time. Later transit oriented developments tend to be much better than the original planning.
4. More should have been invested in stations as neighborhood gateways ("Transit, stations, and placemaking: stations as entrypoints into neighborhoods"). Because the DC area is much less dense compared to NYC, it's been difficult to have stations serve as neighborhood hubs in the way that they do in NYC or Chicago.
5. Sometimes development can be too soon. A lot of early development such as at Silver Spring, was low density residential, because that was a building type financial institutions were familiar with. Waiting until market understanding catches up with the new reality on the ground can be important. In short, building what you can build today can impose opportunity costs and suboptimal outcomes.
A good example is Fort Totten in DC. Early development on site is three and four story garden apartments. Second phase development off site is 6 story mixed use buildings. But post-covid, much of the later proposed greater density projects are on hold.
6. Polycentric versus monocentric development. Metrorail was set up to move suburbanites to and from jobs in the city. Thinking about revitalizing DC, the way that Arlington thought about shifting the Orange Line to an in-county rather than in-freeway alignment wasn't a huge part of the discussion.
7. At DC's core, the Metrorail system is monocentric. While the system is spread out--polycentric--the reality is that in certain sections, like the core of DC or the Wilson Boulevard corridor, it functions monocentrically.
DC has about 42 stations. At the core of the city there are 30, many serve neighborhoods. For the most part, all of those neighborhoods have revitalized.
8. Relatedly, Centers are key. Stations outside of already even somewhat developed centers take much longer to bring about substantive development, let alone TOD ("Transit oriented development station typology revisited," 2024) This problem was accentuated because a lot of transit systems are built along existing rail corridors, which are usually more industrially focused, and not well placed in terms of population and employment centers.
This is demonstrated in the difference between the Red Line in Montgomery County and the Blue and Orange Lines in Prince George's County. Many Red Line stations serve existing centers (Bethesda, White Flint, Rockville, Silver Spring, Wheaton).
You can't say the same for stations in Prince George's County outside of West Hyattsville and Hyattsville Crossing on the Green Line--stations in College Park and Greenbelt are far from the commercial cores in the city. Meanwhile PGC hopes to develop a "Downtown" at the now renamed "Downtown Largo" Station. But the land use form is super large disconnected parcels, nothing like a compact Downtown or regional commercial district.
9. Trickle down development versus purposive planning. It took 20-25 years to see Downtown DC reasonably well built out in response to Metrorail. Separately, it took 25-30 years to see the effect on DC neighborhoods. Arlington and Montgomery County also benefited, and Alexandria, all with their own timeframes, but a little more quickly than DC.
It's fair to say that DC had a trickle down approach to development, in that it was expected that transit was enough to move the city forward. But pushing various levers would have speeded up progress.
Arlington County did it differently ("How DC densified," Works in Progress). They provided a special upzone of the transit shed along Wilson Boulevard, served by four Orange Line stations. It wasn't an upzone per se, but a planned unit development process that allowed for significant height bonuses, in part in return for community benefits. That process was faster and more purposeful than DC's and resulted in a lot of commercial and residential development.
It wasn't perfect. Ballston Mall never really improved much and the impacts on Rosslyn which had already developed somewhat before Metrorail, were minimal. Although these days Rosslyn has a lot of new development, as it still offer lower commercial rents than DC.
(Note: later, very successfully, DC provided incentives for housing development at the Columbia Heights and Petworth stations, among others, when the areas still lagged the core of the city.)
10. Proffers. In Arlington, along Wilson Boulevard, to get the upzone developers had to provide significant proffers/community benefits in return. This includes public space improvements, amenities such as theater spaces for use by nonprofits, investments in transit, and other benefits.
The other jurisdictions haven't done this so systematically. DC does have a similar planned unit development process, allowing for a 20% project upzone. But the city doesn't have a systematic set of criteria on which to negotiate ("Revisiting community benefits agreements," 2021). Montgomery County charges impact fees, based on various criteria.
11. Equity. It was believed that transit would increase economic activity and property values. At the time, people didn't think too much about the impact on low income populations, and the potential for displacement as neighborhoods changed as higher income residents were attracted to transit connections and other previously unappreciated amenities.
The light rail systems in Minneapolis ("Affordable housing along transit corridors," Hennepin County, "15 development projects will create and preserve nearly 2,000 affordable homes," Met Council) and Phoenix ("Light rail housing fund spurs 15 projects in metro Phoenix" and "Why you don't see more vacant lots along light-rail route," Arizona Republic) have been better at creating community development initiatives to build affordable housing in association with the new transit lines, reducing negative effects.
This has driven a lot of organizing around the Purple Line especially in the Takoma-Langley area ("As Purple Line construction resumes, the fight against gentrification is on," Washington Post) but they haven't moved in a substantive way towards implementation ("Op-Ed in Washington Post about preserving affordable housing in the Purple Line corridor (Department of Duh)," "Follow up: Washington Post op-ed on affordable housing, the priming role of foundations and Washington's weak philanthropic community | Enterprise Community Partners could be a leader").
To its credit, Amazon, having entered the region with its HQ2 development in Arlington, has invested a lot of money in affordable housing projects, as part of its national initiative.
12. Are suburban conditions different from the center city? Yes. Arlington took on a more urban orientation with the addition of Metrorail to its urban core.
While Fairfax County's initial stations were more outposts along the freeway.
But as discussed above, centers are key, serving as launch points for new development and intensification.
I came up with a station typology of development opportunity based on some WMATA planning work--they came up with the original, and I expanded it. Their focus was more about what type of stations needed particular kinds of pedestrian and bicycle improvements. I extended this to ancillary development.
-- "Transit oriented development station typology revisited," 2024
A key difference, and this is especially true of the Silver Line, is that pods of development in automobile-dominated communities aren't likely to be transformational in terms of promoting sustainable mobility or even transit use.
-- "Setting the stage for the Purple Line light rail line to be an overwhelming success: Part 4 | Making over New Carrollton as a transit-centric urban center and Prince George's County's "New Downtown"," 2017/2014
-- "Suburban Virginia's Silver Line Metrorail after 10 years," 2025
Transit engineering
I am not a transit engineer. However, I can offer a few observations.
1. Focus on safety, not a bias for operational uptime. The cause of the 2009 Crash which killed 9 people was faulty signalization equipment. Over time, WMATA integrated new equipment into the system, and the original manufacturer made the point that they couldn't guarantee seamless operation with the different equipment.
As many as a half dozen times before the Crash, WMATA had similar systems failures of a train proceeding when the track had another train on it. In one instance trains crashed causing extensive damage. But no passengers were involved.
After the Crash, people were promoted, rather than demoted.
2. Interlining. The Red Line is the only Metrorail line that doesn't share track with other lines. Generally it has the greatest capacity and reduced downtime compared to the other lines. I liken interlining to a virus (between the Blue, Orange, and Silver Lines and separately the Green and Yellow) One there is a problem on one line it spreads to the others, it doesn't contain problems.
3. Additional tracks/redundancy/pocket tracks. This is a long time debate. Should WMATA have had extra tracks to support express service or to provide redundancy when there is a problem with a train and it takes a track out of service? I'd argue it should have been considered. At least in some places it would have provided redundancy for out of service incidents, but not express service. ("Redundancy, engineered resilience, and subway systems: Metrorail failures will increase without adding capacity in the core," 2016).
Pocket tracks are set up between stations so that trains can turn around and switch sides. For whatever reason, the pocket track at Stadium-Armory doesn't work so well for the Silver Line.
4. Should express service be an issue? Well, since the majority of ridership is within the core, does it make sense to provide express service to the end lines? Probably not, although as depicted in this graphic, Shady Grove as an end of line station has have greater ridership compared to some core stations. But that's because people even further out drive to the station. This used to be the case for Vienna Station, until the Silver Line went into service.
One way to do this is with a double stack tunnel.
Diagram produced for people advocating that the Silver Line be underground in the Tysons area ("The Tysons Tunnel decision : a case study of suboptimal decision-making in major transit investments," MIT thesis). Ultimately, the FTA refused to pay towards the added cost.
Entry #2 in this series discusses system expansion mooted at the beginning of the system (Approved Plan) and in a 1991? "21st Century Metrorail" graphic.
Were the system to extend to Annapolis or even Baltimore (the first I think is a good idea, not the second), four tracks would be in order both for redundancy and express service.
5..Silver Line stressed the system. The pre-Silver Line system was roughly at equilibrium in terms of equipment (like power stations) being up to the task for running the lines with minimal problems. When the Silver Line opened this changed. As part of constructing the Silver Line, Virginia should have been required to pay for system improvements not on the Virginia portion of the Line, to mitigate negative effects.
(This would be as issue for new lines suggested in entry #2 in this series.)
6. Undergrounding. More track underground is expensive. Otoh, it can still operate in extreme winter weather. That's why Montreal's STM only has underground stations, as the region gets tremendous snowfall. But the subway keeps running. Speaking of tunneling, "ASCE Panel Recommends Tunneling through Tysons Corner."
7. Regulation and oversight. After the Fort Totten crash in 2009, it came out that decades before, the BART system in the San Francisco Bay region had similar problems, but because of safety regulation by the California Public Utilities Commission, it was addressed, and redundant safety controls were implemented within the signaling system.
For some reason, public transit systems (and water systems) tend to be excluded from typical regulatory oversight. When streetcar and bus transit systems were privately owned they were regulated. Just because a transit authority is public doesn't mean it doesn't need oversight.
Since the Crash, an oversight board was created, but it is more of a captive advisory group. Better to have an independent regulator ("In 2009 I wrote that WMATA's regulatory oversight needed to be significantly improved, US DOT says the same in 2016").
Transit infrastructure and operations planning lessons
To me, conceptually the best example is Portland, in that they made quantum scale tough decisions, and continued to do so, as far as integrating transit, urban design, compact development and quality of life planning ("A summary of my impressions of Portland, Oregon and planning," 2007).
1. While the early system was expensive and seemed extensive, it missed areas that would have been good to have included, and WMATA seems to not have continued to work for expansion beyond the original system program. (I have to qualify this because I don't have insider knowledge.)In terms of requests for expansion, WMATA kept saying, not until we finish the original Approved Plan. This meant that original concepts of extensions mostly did not come about. Any substantive expansions would be decades out. (I pointed this out to the first Dr. Gridlock columnist for the Washington Post, c. 1990.)
As the Purple Line light rail program proves, it takes decades to build rail. If you do it in fits and starts it takes a lifetime.
This point has been further developed in a separate entry:
-- "WMATA's 50th anniversary from the start of service, Part 2a | The Original Approved Metrorail System (1968-1970)"
-- "WMATA's 50th anniversary from the start of service, Part 2b | Lessons learned: The Metrorail system we don't have"
2. Vibes: a transit city has to invest in transit improvement and expansion. As David Miller, former mayor of Toronto said, "you can't have a transit city if you don't continue to build transit."
He wasn't re-elected and the program was dropped ("The transit city that could’ve been," Ethnic Aisle, "Transit city's not dead yet: David Miller," Toronto Globe &Mail
From EA:
Well, Toronto has to build rapid transit. It needs to build rapid transit that helps the city direct the growth that’s come into the city appropriately. It needs to build rapid transit that serves people from all walks of life. It needs that from a transportation perspective, from an environmental perspective. Which is why it should be rail and electric based, no emissions or close to zero emissions. That rapid transit network will not only address transportation issues, it will address economic issues, so it’s good socially, economically, environmentally, and for transportation. We need that, the city’s not going to thrive without it.
OTOH, I don't think the region ever tried to build from a vision of a "a transit city" or "transit metro" where a transit first agenda is the foundation of the regional land use and transportation planning paradigm.
SF has a "Transit First" approach solidified in the City Charter, focused on its MUNI system ("Comments on Proposed EYA Development at Takoma Metro Station, Washington DC," 2006).
Paris is the best example over all ("Paris’ Vision for a ‘15-Minute City’ Sparks a Global Movement," World Resources Institute, "Ambitions behind Greater Paris Project," "Paris is getting a whole new Metro network. And it's huge," CNN). New York City some of it on placemaking, without the massive expansion of transit.
London and Paris are the preeminent transit cities in the Western Hemisphere, continuing to make investments in transit expansion, although London like New York City, lags comparatively due to budget constraints.
3. Transit "vibes" (priorities) of DC (and Arlington) are different from the suburbs: tensions in oversight of Metrorail. One problem is that DC and Arlington favor intensification and service in the core, including service throughout the day and on weekends, to support a car-light lifestyle and mobility paradigm, while the outer jurisdictions care more about getting their resident workers to and from DC. They care about peak service, not off peak service. They don't see value in building a mobility paradigm that doesn't favor automobility, etc.
Another way to think about it is in terms of polycentric versus monocentric interests. Plus Maryland and Virginia tend to wax and wane in their support of transit. Even Democratic Governors who favor transit fear DC proper getting "too much" of the economic benefits from Metrorail. Separately, then Governor McAuliffe in Virginia decided to toll inbound I-66, to "encourage" businesses to relocate from DC to Virginia. (DC has a tough time competing with Virginia as it is.)
4. Relatedly, Transit is cheapest to build "RIGHT NOW." A former BART (SF) chairman used to say "the cheapest time to build transit is right now" because costs only go up. (I can't find the cite.) E.g., I think the Purple Line has doubled in cost over its timeframe for planning and construction.
Saying you want to do X without ever moving it into planning, design and engineering means it won't happen. Or when it does, it will be way more expensive.
5. A transit city/transit region should integrate railroad commuter service with subway and other modes like light rail or streetcar/tram, alongside deep bus networks. And be focused on improving service and expanding where it makes sense ("Branding's (NOT) all you need for transit"). For example, Paris just added a gondola to serve a section of the city particularly difficult to serve by traditional transit.
6. WMATA sees itself not as the metropolitan area's primary transit operator, but the manager of a subway. By default it is the primary transit planner, but not so committed to transit overall. Their focus is Metrorail as the golden child and Metrobus as the scapegoat child.
Two examples include how WMATA refused to run the Takoma Langley bus station, forcing the Maryland MTA to run it. Same with the Purple Line. MTA expected WMATA would want to run it. They didn't. The same goes with planning a gondola service in Georgetown. That's led by the Georgetown BID, not WMATA (Although a Separated Silver Line would be even better.)
By contrast LA MTA figured it was to its advantage to lend its planning expertise to proposed transit projects outside its current purview (mostly that's a potential gondola service for Dodgers Stadium).
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7. The region should have (and still can) adopt a German style "transport association" where most elements of the transit system are part of one association, with a clear distinction between planning and system and route operation
-- "The answer is: Create a single multi-state/regional multi-modal transit planning, management, and operations authority association," 2017
-- "Verkehrsverbund: The evolution and spread of fully integrated regional public transport in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland," International Journal of Sustainable Transportation, 2018
-- "One big idea: Getting MARC and Metrorail to integrate fares, stations, and marketing systems, using London Overground as an example," 2015 [I did ignore the VRE and Virginia which was an oversight]
-- "A new backbone for the regional transit system: merging the MARC Penn and VRE Fredericksburg Lines," 2015
-- "DC State rail planning initiative," 2015
-- "Route 7 BRT proposal communicates the reality that the DC area doesn't adequately conduct transportation planning at the metropolitan-scale," 2016
8. Additions to transit infrastructure should be used to drive complementary improvements across the transit system. Both to increase the success of the new infrastructure, and to build ridership overall. Like DC's streetcar or the Purple Line or the Silver Line (some station upgrades compared to the legacy system, have occurred with the Silver Line, in particular public restrooms and enhanced bike parking),
Past blog entries illustrating this concept include:
-- "Codifying the complementary transit network improvements and planning initiatives recommended in the Purple Line writings," 2022/2017
-- "Using the Silver Line as the priming event, what would a transit network improvement program look like for NoVA?," 2017
-- "A "Transformational Projects Action Plan" for the Metrorail Blue Line," 2020
9. Fare media integration. One good thing is that WMATA's MetroCard fare card is usable across the metropolitan area on WMATA and local bus systems. It took awhile for this to happen. Also because the Maryland Transit Administration funds Metrorail, it uses the same fare card system for local transit in Baltimore. So the same cards work in either metropolitan area (but not on railroad passenger services).
10. Bus services complement heavy rail. This is discussed in a separate part of the series to come.
The counties have done this around bus transit. For example, Montgomery County leveraged the Metrorail system to develop a national best practice suburban bus system.
It didn't have one before Metrorail, and its bus system aims to servie neighborhoods conveying residents to and from transit stations.
The County continues to invest in transit, and has made riding the system free as of this year (Ride On Reimagined: Montgomery County’s Comprehensive Bus Network Study: Service and Implementation).
Alexandria is also a suburban leader ("Alexandria, VA, Transit Riders Enjoying ‘The DASH Difference’," Busline), and of course Arlington, which also is the area leader in promoting biking and walking--one of their promotions now focuses on encouraging winter cycling. PG County is a laggard but is improving their bus system and investing in trails.
11. Providing bus service when Metrorail is not operating. Metrorail operates from 5 AM to Midnight, Sunday (starts at 6 AM) through Thursday, from 5 AM to 2AM on Friday, and from 6 AM to 2 AM on Saturday. Ideally, a bus service paralleling the subway system would provide service to night workers and others.
Funding lessons from DC Metrorail: ask for money when you're doing well and everyone loves you
At the beginning of when I became more involved in these issues c. 2003, there were reports and lectures about how WMATA needed a regional taxing mechanism to provide more funding predictability for funding. .
The funding system now is (1) each year the jurisdictions provide base funding and bus funding, (2) more recently the federal government does too, (3) along with other federal funds for capital improvements, (4) farebox revenues, and (5) miscellaneous revenues (leases, advertising, etc.).
Generally when the system turns a "profit," the jurisdictions demand a refund.
But nothing ever happened on the sales tax front ("Funding WMATA with a regional sales tax," 2017)..
Note that the past blog entry, "Metrolinx Toronto: 25 potential tools to fund transit-transportation infrastructure," (2013) lists many different funding sources for transit, based on a study for Greater Toronto's Metrolinx regional transportation authority. I've since added a few in the comments, although the overall entry hasn't been updated.
It came to a head after the 2009 crash, and ever since ("WMATA Chief says it’s time to talk about a regional tax to help fund Metro (DC area)"). Note a sales tax isn't perfect. Revenues drop during recessions. But it could be a part of a broader revenue stream and add more stability.
Even so it would have been difficult to pass a sales tax measure.
Getting the cities and counties and the state governments to work together is like herding cats.
But in the 1980s when the system was growing and thriving would have been the best time ("Creativity Helps Rochester's Transit System Turn a Profit" New York Times). And they did pass a capital bond to build the system already.
Note that the SF Bay region is looking to add another sales tax to support area transit including BART, CalTrain, and MUNI (SF) in response to the post-covid fiscal cliff many transit systems are experiencing ("Bay Area transit sales tax measure clears state hurdle," San Jose Spotlight).
2. Metrorail is expensive to ride. Because it's a hybrid of inner city heavy rail and suburban commuter rail, fares are high, more like commuter rail. (2) WMATA charges a fare for each mode (with a slight discount when you transfer), so that you pay two fares if you ride bus to and from Metrorail. Although bus to bus transfers are three. (3) For a long time, Metrorail could get away with high fares because federal agencies provide transit benefits to workers for travel to and from work--this year it's a maximum of $340.
For these reasons, Metrorail boasted for many years of its high farebox revenue rate, in the 80th percentile. Now, they've hit a bit of a ceiling and in response have added a myriad of pass products to make it cheaper to ride.
Note that in Baltimore, if you ride the MARC train with a pass, you can ride local transit for free (the same goes for Southern California riders of Metrolink.)
Governance
Is complicated because it is split between DC, Maryland, and Virginia, and now the federal government. Each of which provides annual funding to the system. One problem is that the core communities--DC and Arlington--have different goals from the outer suburbs.
DC and Arlington focus on the system's qualities of serving city residents, reducing dependence on the automobile, while the outer suburbs are more focused on their residents getting to and from work. This affects discussions about fares, and what kind of service to provide.
When the system foundered as a result of the Fort Totten crash, unbelievably some of the suburban jurisdictions actively considered shutting down the system.
Virginia too doesn't want to help WMATA too much, even though it is one of the backbones of the economic success for Northern Virginia, because it competes with DC for residents and businesses. Maryland under Republican governors is anti-transit; pro with Democrats.
2. Board members are appointed. Could they be elected? I've thought that like BART, maybe it would be better if the representatives from jurisdictions were elected, and treated as part of the political infrastructure of the local jurisdiction in terms of developing budgets and other programs. The federal government could continue to appoint its representatives.
Labels: public finance and spending, suburban revitalization, transit and economic development, transit infrastructure, urban revitalization, voting and referendums
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