Ah, the H Street Community Development Corporation
The Washington City Paper reports that the former director of the H Street CDC paid himself more than $1 million of unjustified bonuses, without notifying the board ("Former Housing Nonprofit Director Found To Have Diverted Funds for Six-Figure Bonuses").
This was complicated by the fact that a long time ago, the CDC created a for profit division which allowed them more shenanigans with little oversight. A previous director had created a janitorial service which got the contract to maintain facilities, but as the potential conflict of interest was disclosed, it was allowed, etc. So top staff were able to generate additional revenue streams beyond their paychecks.
The DC Superior Court ruled that Kenneth Brewer, Sr. has to return more than $1.2 million. Looking over the board members mentioned in the article, and on their website, I recognize a bunch of the names still, not all, even though that was 20+ years ago. And I think it's interesting that on the current board there are no white people to reflect neighborhood demographics.
But as the neighborhood improved, the HSCDC could no longer compete in the market for property, so it moved to doing projects in still distressed areas of the city.
Things haven't changed much from 20 years ago.
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Community development corporations were created in the 1960s to stabilize inner city neighborhoods in the face of outmigration. Back then cities had two main types of neighborhoods:
-- areas that could be stabilized: those with building stock that was attractive and that in turn attracted "urban pioneers,"-- basically white people willing to live in the center city when housing choice trends favored the suburbs. Interest rates were high, neighborhoods were run down, city services constrained, and overall the city faced a loss of population. Historic preservation efforts were the primary tool for neighborhood stabilization.
Preservation had the benefit of being low cost to cities. Some regulation and staff time--supported in part by the federal government, and some investments in elements like brick sidewalks and historic facsimile light poles. Otherwise the residents bore the costs of rehabilitation.
-- more distressed areas with a lot of population leakage and a preponderance of low income residents. Cities tended to put their limited resources in these areas on equity grounds. But the return on investment was minimal.
The areas were CDCs were directed to act were istressed and challenging economically. This was complicated/accentuated by and in areas of cities that experienced riots. Riots decimated commercial districts especially, destroying the local micro economy. A lot of housing stock deteriorated.
CDCs were created to address these issues in distressed areas, but mostly focused on what I call "building housing for poor people." Great on equity grounds, but didn't have much positive effect on the micro economy.
Some addressed commercial district issues but mostly focused on housing.
DC did create historic districts in two historically black areas of the city, one East of the River, that remains impoverish, and Le Droit Park, which is better situated in the NW quadrant is pretty central, abuts Howard University and became "gentrified" by income if not originally by race.
Lack of accountability. Many CDCs lacked accountability and much success. Although to be fair, CDCs were given difficult areas to try to fix. The New York Times Magazine ran a cover story, "The Myth of Community Development" in 1994, in excoriating CDCs as an economic lever.
Some were good, some places had too many, there was always more demand for action than money, and the process of financing these kinds of deals was hard, even though back then the US Department of Housing and Urban Development actually provided money to cities for these purposes, which is a far cry from how it's been the last 20 years.
Leinberger's book made the point that before the change in attitudes, 70% of people wanted to live in the suburbs. With the change, it was 30% cities, 30% suburbs, and 40% either. That's changed though since covid.Times changed: c. 2000 and the new demand for urban living. OTOH, with the change in willingness to live in cities around 2000, momentum from private investment of large real estate developers and individual households reached a point of critical mass and was self-replicating. Although distressed areas still lagged, and needed city and other subsidies to fund improvements.
Improvements also came through gentrification and displacement, where relatively low cost housing was bought by people with more money--they weren't necessarily rich but they definitely had more money than the people they may have replaced.
For a long time you didn't see displacement in DC, because with the exception of converting four unit apartment buildings to condos, a lot of the housing that was acquired and renovated had been vacant. After all, the overbuilding of housing in the suburbs left a massive inventory of vacant housing in the cities.
But this started to change after 2000. For example, one subsidized development in Columbia Heights with great views was warehoused to be able to upscale it ("HUD Set To Seize D.C. Housing Complex," Washington Post). I visited that complex as a Census worker in 2000 and I was astounded at the number of vacant units. And the beautiful hill over the city from being on the hill of the escarpment. From the article:
U.S. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros announced plans yesterday to seize ownership of a federally subsidized apartment complex in Northwest Washington that he said is one of the 100 worst-maintained developments in the country.
There was a reason Now it's a fine example of a market rate development
CDCs are a mixed bag. An organization created in response to urban poverty, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, was created by the Ford Foundation to provide technical support and access to funds. In some cities, LISC branches were robust and demanded accountability. In other cities LISC was so so and definitely not pushing internal improvement.
Buildings weren't valuable. Design wasn't valuable. Only the ability to assemble land. When I started getting involved, the H Street Community Development Corporation was the primary revitalization actor in the neighborhood. The leadership didn't see any value in the historic building stock and the attractive architectural design it represented, either in the commercial district or the neighborhood, even though just a few blocks south, Capitol Hill was revitalizing because of people attracted to the "pretty buildings" and proximity to the US Capitol Complex and Downtown.
They tore down one of the oldest and most historic buildings to build a s**** looking 3 bay retail unit. And the strip shopping center, now replaced with an amazing building, was typical crap. None of the buildings they constructed were designed sensitively in a manner that would complement and extend the historic architecture of the commercial district and the neighborhood.
It wasn't pretty, but this similar building in Brooklyn that tends to be a restaurant on the ground floor with apartments above show that rehabilitation was possible. The building that replaced it is terrible, and the "second floor" is fake, it's just an extended facade. In fact, I came across that building when it was the Hope & Anchor Diner, and I immediately thought it was relevant to the 8th and H Street NE intersection
The Greater H Street neighborhood had the same conditions, except for poorer residents, and at the time maybe it could have flourished with a residential recruitment program like Live Baltimore, but it would have come with displacement.
In any case, the H Street CDC only saw value in the opportunity to capture and assemble land for bigger projects, and they rebuilt housing that had been frame (worth a lot more today) in 1980s style rowhouses in a number of places around the neighborhood, helped fund a suburban style shopping strip, etc.
Houses built by the H Street CDC on the 700 block of 8th Street NE. While I think they're ugly, some have an asking price of $1+ million. Maybe I'm the person whose position is wrong-headed.They did buy and hold the Atlas Theater, but they wanted to convert the interior to parking, or to build a roller rink. Creating an entertainment focus for the business corridor never crossed their minds.
So when we created the historic preservation focused Main Street commercial district revitalization program for the corridor, complemented by a revitalization plan commissioned by the rejuvenated Office of Planning, we were at odds.
(I wrote about this tension on the anniversary of LISC, "The community development approach and the revitalization of DC's H Street corridor: congruent or oppositional approaches?," in 2013, in response to a laudatory op-ed, "The seeds of the H Street ‘miracle’," in the Post.)
Banner from the Montana Community Development Corporation.I thought CDCs sucked by definition ("The Community Development Corporation Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Political Economy Critique and an Alternative").
But then I went to the National Trust for Historic Preservation conference in Cleveland in 2002, and their CDCs blew me away. It turns out that the philanthropic community joined together to demand accountability and for a bunch of the CDCs to merge, since they covered similar areas, and would have more heft. Funding was dependent on these changes.
That never happened in DC. LISC was weak. A couple CDCs did some decent work, but even then they had a hard time showing quantum improvement.
The Washington Post did a hard hitting series in 2002 ("Falling up -- Accountability and DC Community Development Corporations"). We thought we were vindicated but nothing came of it. And this was when the Post was still doing important local coverage and investigative reporting.
-- "Federal Money Flowed With Little Oversight: City Promises to Cut Off Ineffectual Groups"
-- "D.C. Revitalization Promised, Not Delivered: Nonprofits Collect Millions as Work Goes Undone, Neighborhoods Left With Eyesores"
-'"Risky Ventures, Little Accountability: After Years of Public Funding, Nonprofits Have Completed Few Projects"
-- "Blighted Sites May Revert To D.C.: Revival Has Stalled Under Nonprofits"
-- "$100 Million Down the Drain" [Editorial]
-- "D.C. Housing Authority Fines Nonprofit: Development Group Sold Two Row Houses, Meant for Individuals, to Investor"
I guess that's when I learned that $100 million didn't go very far anyway, let alone when grift and graft is involved.
Conclusion. A few years later the groups won awards from the DC Building Industry Association. And in 2011 the Post ran similar stories ("(Some) Community Development Corporations still screwing up").
Now in 2026, we basically have embezzlement. That's 39 years of experience all right.
All the stuff I've experienced gets referenced in my thinking. The point about accountability mechanisms that I wrote about in terms of best practice revitalization, was based on good and bad examples in Europe in a series I wrote for the EU National Institutes of Culture Washington Chapter on culture based revitalization in Europe.
- A commitment to the development and production of a broad, comprehensive, visionary, and detailed revitalization plan/s (Bilbao, Hamburg, Liverpool);
- the creation of innovative and successful implementation organizations, with representatives from the public sector and private firms, to carry out the program. Typically, the organizations have some distance from the local government so that the plan and program aren't subject to the vicissitudes of changing political administrations, parties and representatives (Bilbao, Hamburg, Liverpool, Helsinki);
- strong accountability mechanisms that ensure that the critical distance provided by semi-independent implementation organizations isn't taken advantage of in terms of deleterious actions (for example Dublin's Temple Bar Cultural Trust was amazingly successful but over time became somewhat disconnected from local government and spent money somewhat injudiciously, even though they generated their own revenues--this came to a head during the economic downturn and the organization was widely criticized; in response the City Council decided to fold the TBCT and incorporate it into the city government structure, which may have negative ramifications for continued program effectiveness as its revenues get siphoned off and political priorities of elected officials shift elsewhere);
- funding to realize the plan, usually a combination of local, regional, state, and national sources, and in Europe, "structural adjustment" and other programmatic funding from the European Regional Development Fund and related programs is also available (Hamburg, as a city-state, has extra-normal access to funds beyond what may normally be available to the average city);
- integrated branding and marketing programs to support the realization of the plan (Hamburg, Vienna, Liverpool, Bilbao, Dublin);
- flexibility and a willingness to take advantage of serendipitous events and opportunities and integrate new projects into the overall planning and implementation framework (examples include Bilbao's "acquisition" of a branch of the Guggenheim Museum and the creation of a light rail system to complement its new subway system, Liverpool City Council's agreement with a developer to create the Liverpool One mixed use retail, office, and residential development in parallel to the regeneration plan and the hosting of the Capital of Culture program in 2008, and how multifaceted arts centers were developed in otherwise vacated properties rented out cheaply by their owners in Dublin, Helsinki, and Marseille).
- commitment and time. Revitalization is a forever process that takes a long time to begin to see results. It needs to continue beyond the vicissitudes of changing political administrations.
- adaptive management. Visionary revitalization requires continuous process improvement. Other ways to think about it are using the design method or adaptive management instead of remaining static. Programs can always be improved and should be.
But we have plenty of our own good and bad examples in the US. DC CDCs and the H Street CDC in particular. Fleetwood Mac sang the song, "You can go your own way." That hasn't worked out so well for DC ("Urban economic development best practice is not found in DC").
Labels: civic engagement, commercial district revitalization planning, community development, community organizing, neighborhood revitalization, urban design/placemaking, urban revitalization











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